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Introduction
When one arrives at Lilongwe International Airport and takes a taxi to the city
centre, the drive leads along an endless straight tarmac road bordered by huge
empty areas of soft hilly grassland and never-ending rows of trees and bushes.
Especially during the rainy season, when the grassland stands high with matur-
ing maize, one hardly notices the huge, low-built settlements dispersed between
the rolling hills along the city boundaries which have come to host the major
part of Lilongwe’s population and where most of the city’s development is tak-
ing place. The scattered settlement structure of Lilongwe, interrupted by large
undeveloped green areas, and its huge geographic extension, with two tiny ur-
ban cores, resembles a huge village rather than an urban settlement, andmakes it
hard to believe that one is entering Malawi’s second largest and fastest-growing
town.
The encounter with a city and an urbanisation process that hardly fits into
classic notions of modernisation and development and which, despite rising
poverty rates and social insecurity, continues to grow, lies at the core of this book,
which examines the social security of urban migrants in Lilongwe. This appar-
ently so paradoxical modernity and urbanity that is arising, despite worsening
social and economic conditions and dramatic poverty, has become the norm in
most Sub-Saharan cities, which are among the fastest-growing in the world. It
is estimated that 40% of the population in Sub-Sahara Africa are already liv-
ing in the major cities: and 72% of these city dwellers live in poor areas, or so-
called ‘informal settlements’, which mostly are located at the outskirts of the city
and which often lack any public services, such as water, sewerage or housing
(UN-Habitat 2004). Most inhabitants of these settlements are employed in the
so-called ‘informal sector economy’, which usually means that they depend on
insecure and precariousworking relations and do not have access to any ‘formal’
or public social security. For the majority, this will not change in the near future.
This ‘informal’ or ‘marginal’ city also provides the social, economic and geo-
graphic context in which this research on social security is located. Sector 7/Area
Introduction 3
25A is one of these typical urban fringe areas at the outskirts of Lilongwe City,
around 15 km northwest of the city centre. Hidden from the main road to Li-
longwe Airport, it forms part of Area 25, a partially well-developed Traditional
Housing Area (THA) which comprises three other sub sectors: Area 25/A, Area
25/B, and Area 25/C. Having been occupied by landless urbanites shortly af-
ter the transition to democracy in 1994, Sector 7 was one of the first so-called
‘Unplanned Traditional Housing Areas’ (THAs) or ‘Traditional Housing Area
Layouts’ that have since then sprung up all over Lilongwe at an ever-increasing
pace. Starting my research in 1998, I had the unique opportunity to observe the
urbanisation processes taking place in Sector 7 almost from scratch. My return
three years later in 2001 gave me the opportunity to follow up on these develop-
ments and the social, economic and spatial twists and turns the urbanisation of
the area, its inhabitants and their social security arrangements had taken.
The development of Sector 7 and the lifestyle of most of its inhabitants hardly
fit conventional notions of urbanisation and migration as predicted by the grand
theorists of modernisation and development, who declared the city to be the
motor of progress and development.1 The notion of the ‘African peasant’ whom
urban industrialisation would draw into town, where he would then be ‘pro-
letarised’, ‘modernised’ and turned into a citizen who would assert his political
and social rights, which amongst others, would also encompass the development
of a welfare state, has to be seriously reconsidered. Whereas modernity hardly
arrived in the countryside, we shall see that also in town it has only partially
taken root. Most people actually live in an economic and social reality that en-
compasses more than just one mode of production or form of living. Thus, most
people in town are engaged in both ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ working relations,
including subsistence activities such as agriculture and livestock rearing, in or-
der to make a living. This fragmentation of living conditions also includes social
security. Most people in Malawi depend on a mix of so-called ‘formal’, ‘infor-
mal’ and ‘traditional’ social security arrangements. In contrast to social security
provided by the state, the latter two can also be referred to as ‘non-state arrange-
ments’ (Leliveld 1994), encompassing both ‘traditional’ customary arrangements
and those ‘informally’ evolving in day-to-day practice.
In Malawi, as in most developing countries, it is in fact these non-state ini-
tiated mechanisms that provide the biggest source of social support. In the
absence of comprehensive ‘formal’ or state social security systems, which are
mostly onlymarginally developed, familial, communal and associative networks
based on kinship, religion, ethnicity or informal arrangements provide the ma-
jor source of economic and social support. This also holds for those integrated
1 For an excellent summary and critique on modernisation theories and especially the role of the
city see Simon (1992); Simone (1997); Anderson & Rathbone (2000).
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in the ‘formal’ sector economy, who are usually only marginally protected by
public social security systems.
The importance of these non-state schemes for social security has caught the
attention of both researchers and policy makers (for exampleMidgley 1984, 1987;
Drèze & Sen et al. 1991; Getubig & Schmidt 1992; F. & K. von Benda-Beckmann et
al. 1988; The World Bank 1990; Van Ginneken 1996, 1999). Especially the failure
of Structural Adjustment programmes inmost developing countries, which, con-
trary to predictions, have led to rising pauperisation and informalisation of large
parts of the population in most developing countries, have brought the subject
of social security onto the agenda of research and policy. This was also reflected
in a paradigm shift in the international development regime towards a poverty-
oriented development strategy at the beginning of the 1990s. Within a renewed
focus on the social dimension of development, new strategies that aim at inte-
grating non-state arrangements into comprehensive social security schemes have
been developed since that period (see for example ILO 2000; Holzmann & Jør-
gensen 2000; OECD 2001). While these approaches thus finally seem to recognise
the complex social and economic realities inmost developing countries, many re-
searchers are critical of the largely unchanging assumptions on which these new
policy approaches are based (for example F. & K. von Benda-Beckmann et al.
1988; 1994; Midgley 1984; Drèze & Sen et al. 1991; Leliveld 1994; Lachenmann
1998, Fine 2001). In the light of this, one central argument and aim of this book
is to show that the reality of social security in developing countries is far too
complex and dynamic as to be approached and analysed with recourse to an un-
derstanding of social security that remains strongly associated with and caught
up in a notion of social security closely related to the Western-style welfare state.
Notions, norms and practices of social (in)security are usually far away from
modernist assumptions of needs and insecurities associated with the capitalist
urbanmode of production on the one hand, and the traditional subsistence mode
of the village on the other.
Moving beyond a binary understanding of social security, I shall take a de-
centred, functional approach to social security, as developed by Franz and Kee-
bet von Benda-Beckmann (1994). The understanding of social security as an
intrinsic aspect of social life embedded in the wider social, economic, politi-
cal, cultural or legal context of society, enables the drawing of a more coher-
ent and complex picture of social security realities and dynamics of everyday
life in the city. As well, a context-driven analysis of social security also allows
for an adequate assessment of social security: arguing for what Kaufmann has
called “engaging with the societal practice”2 (1977: 62). I will show that the so-
cial security of most urban migrants in Sector 7 is not necessarily a question
2 Own translation: “Einlassen auf die Praxis der Gesellschaft.” (1977: 62).
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of public/private, state/non-state, formal/informal, modern/traditional or ur-
ban/rural, but rather a question of availability of material resources, social rela-
tions, status, power, knowledge, and last but not least, timing and place.
‘Unravelling’ social security along various aspects and layers of social organ-
isation, my arguments will also shed light on the dynamics and ambiguities of
social security arrangements. These are not static, but are constantly adapting,
transforming and modifying according to individual and collective needs and
insecurities, as well as in response to changing wider social, economic or eco-
logical conditions. The exploration of these ‘analytic borderlands’ (Sassen 1996:
185) shows that social security is actually a “bricolage” or “make-shift-mode” (De
Certeau 1984: xv) of notions, norms, practices and entitlements pertaining to
different social (security) domains that are continuously mixed, manipulated,
and re-negotiated by the different actors involved. This also concerns rules and
regulations of support. We shall see that people constantly manipulate and re-
negotiate support rights and obligations, thereby drawing new boundaries or
lines of in- and exclusion.
Being a geographic borderland situated at the margins of town, Sector 7 also
draws attention to the spatial dimension of social security. Social security is not
only embedded in different economic, social, legal and institutional realties: its
multi-sitedness is also spatially defined. Social security networks of urban mi-
grants in Sector 7 are usually anchored in different geographic sites that extend
far beyond the city boundaries. This trans-local condition (Glick-Schiller et al.
1992) of social security also challenges notions of identity and belonging, all of
which are of vital importance in gaining access to social support and care. We
shall see that this is especially pronounced in a ‘geographic’ borderland situated
at the margins of the city, like Sector 7. Rural-urban borderlands, like Sector 7,
epitomise these delineation and boundary-setting processes in a specific way, as
‘new’ migrants try to re-assert and redefine their ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ identities
in the encounter with the city, the urban ‘autochthon’ population and the ‘rural’
relatives left behind.
The exploration of social security in an urban context must finally also in-
clude yet another, typically urban understanding of social security, i.e. as “issues
of management and control” (Simone 1997: 3). Questions as to how people – in
the absence of adequate infrastructure and social services – gain access to these
services and organise their living in town has for a long time been at the core of
urbanisation studies (for example Castells 1983; Gilbert 1994; Gugler 1997; De
Sousa Santos 1977; Fernandez & Varley 1997; Rakodi 1997). These aspects are,
however, often left out or analysed separately from studies on urban poverty,
livelihood and survival strategies. Whereas the importance of trans-local net-
work relations for the urban livelihood has become in the meantime an unchal-
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lenged fact (see for example Potts 1995; Lomnitz 1997; Gugler 1997; Tacoli 2001),
the influence of the city and urbanisation processes on the organisation and for-
mation of local and trans-local social security networks and practices, as well as
notions of (in)security, remain widely un-theorised.
Trying to obtain a comprehensive view of the social (in)securities of urban
migrants, this study understands urbanisation as an integral part of local and
trans-local social security practices. Rather than viewing urbanisation and mi-
gration as compartmentalised, self-contained social processes, I shall argue for
a more interconnected and integrated view. Linking together different social,
economic, political, legal, cultural contexts, experiences and places, these pro-
cesses not only influence each other, but also have an impact on the making and
re-making of social (in)security, its notions, needs, and coping strategies.
Organisation of the Study
Aiming to get a hold on the dynamics of social security practices in-between the
city and the countryside, ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’, and kinship and the state, I
will take a ‘mobile’ and unbound perspective on social security practices that al-
lows their analysis across geographical, political and analytical boundaries. My
research shall thereby highlight the following set of arguments and questions:
• Has the composition and quality of social security mechanisms and strate-
gies in urban Malawi changed over time, and if so, for whom and why?
• How strong is migration (still) as a social security strategy, and how vital
are social networks over distance for the urban population, as well as for
those left behind in the villages?
• To what extent do these changes induce a specific qualitative and quanti-
tative transformation in the context of ‘informal’, ‘traditional’ and ‘formal’
schemes?
Accordingly, the study is organised as follows. In Chapter 1, I will discuss
and expand on the theoretical and methodological approaches laid out in the
introduction, challenging the notion of social security as a mere aspect of moder-
nity and urbanisation and trying to re-position it as a dynamic concept in the con-
text of urbanisation and migration processes. Chapter 2 gives a short overview
of the political economy of Malawi with special reference to the social policy
sector. It shows that social security in Malawi has always been highly infor-
mal, a system in which non-state institutions and mechanisms have played an
important role. Chapter 3 focuses on urbanisation and migration processes in
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Lilongwe and specifically Sector 7, the research area. I shall argue that marginal
areas and borderlands like Sector 7 represent a normality of modernity and ur-
banity for a rising number of urban inhabitants in Lilongwe, as well as in many
other developing countries today. This borderland situation, in which a vari-
ety of different lifestyles and ways of living pertaining to different rural/urban,
modern/traditional and formal/informal domains encounter one another, mix,
and exist side-by-side, hosts to a rising extent also those migrants who due to
Structural Adjustment and Good Governance have experienced a social, eco-
nomic and spatial marginalisation. Chapter 4 will show that this marginalisation
process has also intensified the struggle over the city. Whereas access to the city,
including land, housing and infrastructure, has always been difficult, we shall
see that urbanisation attempts by the poorer autochthon part of the population
of Sector 7 are increasingly being hijacked by the relatively marginalised, yet
richer and more powerful civil servants, who – ousted by social policy reforms –
have been gentrifying the area over the years. The poor, in contrast, are forced to
be continuously on the move, being marginalised further, to the edges of town
and beyond. In this way, they not only lose access to a better and healthier infras-
tructure, but are also deprived of the chance to create a permanent place called
home, including permanent social network structures.
Chapter 5 deals with local social security arrangements in the city. We shall
see that the heterogeneous urban context allows for a broad extension and ex-
pansion of network relations and institutions. This may also lead to the creation
of new kinship relations, which remain a nodal point of network relations in
town. At the same time, the chapter shows that overall social and economic
pressure has highly stratified urban support relations over the years. Especially
HIV/AIDS has had a severe impact on network relations. Access to support has
not only become extremely insecure, but is increasingly fought over by means
of fear and force. Chapter 6 discusses social security networks anchored outside
the household sphere, including religious, ethnic and regional associations and
NGOs, specifically micro saving and credit schemes. These organisations offer
an important communal space for migrants in town, as they provide a source of
belonging and identity and potential network partners. We shall see that overall
support constraints are transforming these networks increasingly into important
direct providers of support that are faced with a growing number of needs and
needy.
The analysis of trans-local relations in Chapter 7 shows that trans-local sup-
port cannot be confined to the exchange of material resources, but should encom-
pass a wide range of different resources, ideas, values and skills that move back
and forth. I shall argue that this trans-local social security economy is highly
dynamic, expanding and contracting over time, and is characterised by different
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degrees of mobility. Notwithstanding the strong obligations and expectations
of mutual support existent both in town and in the village, we shall see that
trans-local support is increasingly stratified and situational, and is largely acti-
vated in severe crisis situations only, such as family issues or hunger. At the same
time, the chapter shows that socio-economic constraints andHIV/AIDS have led
to a re-activation of trans-local support strategies, thus re-connecting town and
the village. This has also changed mobility patterns. While the social and eco-
nomic decline has immobilised a number of especially poorer people, who are
no longer able to draw on trans-local strategies, it has also made more people
move between village and town in order to make a living. Social and economic
tensions have also changed access modalities to existing social security arrange-
ments. Whereas land and labour shortages in the village restrict return options
for the urban migrants, urban female migrants in particular are becoming vic-
tims of rapacious and violent inheritance practices, such as property grabbing.
Finally, in the last chapter of the book, the main results are summarised and
discussed against the theoretical assumptions raised in the introductory chapter.
This also includes a short discussion of my findings against the current political
and analytical debate on social policy in developing countries that has been an
important source of inspiration for this book.
Chapter 1
Contextualising Social Security:
Some Theoretical and
Methodological Considerations
1.1 Introduction
If one examines the current international debate on social policy and social se-
curity in developing countries and the policy approaches underway within in-
ternational organisations and NGOs, it seems that the welfarist notion of social
security that presented one of the great modernist narratives of the post-war pe-
riod has become a thing of the past.
While for a long time it was assumed that social support relations based on
the extended family and communal relations would break away with economic
growth and modernisation, to be substituted by public institutions that would
provide for a different, modern type of social support, the new social security
concepts (for example Holzmann et al. 2003; World Bank 2003; ILO 2000; Van
Ginneken 2005) in developing countries seem to be taking another turn. Con-
trary to the purely growth-oriented, modernist approach, that saw economic
growth as a pre-condition for social development, the new approaches not only
emphasise the importance of social investment and development as a comple-
mentary set of measures that should help to engender growth and through its
re-distributive function, sustain and balance it (for example DAC 2005; OECD
2005; World Development Report 2006), they also seem to take a different insti-
tutional approach, trying to integrate both state and non-state arrangements into
comprehensive social security schemes. The ‘new consensus on social security’
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adopted by the ILO (2000) aims for the extension of social security to cover peo-
ple employed in informal labour relations, too. Via a wide range of partly locally
organised small-scale arrangements, people are to be linked up and integrated
into a ‘multi-facetted’ welfare scheme, within which the state is just one provider
among many others (ibid; Van Ginneken 2005). The ‘social risk management
framework’ developed by theWorld Bank takes an evenmore residual approach
away from the state, one that largely focuses on the promotion and expansion
of individual economic capacity, which is understood as the core instrument in
coping with economic and social risks. Aiming at “providing instruments that al-
low the poor or vulnerable to minimize the impact of exposure to risk and change their
behaviour in a way that helps them exit poverty and lower their vulnerability” (World
Bank 2003), social security is largely understood as an individual responsibility,
to be taken care of on a private, partly commercial basis. The role of the state is
largely reduced to that of a crisis manager that is only to come to the assistance
of the so-called ‘critically vulnerable’ who are unable to manage their risks on an
individual basis, and to intervene in case of major covariate risks, such as natural
disasters, hunger, or war (Holzmann & Jørgensen 2000).
The growing importance attributed to the social dimension of development
and the new approaches taken are not just a matter of fashion. The widespread
failure of the Structural Adjustment that the International Finance Institutions
introduced in many developing countries during the 1980s put an end to the
modernist dream of development in most countries. The realisation that macro-
economic measures alone did not automatically lead to a trickle-down of eco-
nomic and social development, but instead contributed to rising poverty rates,
also challenged concepts of social policy and social security. The concept of the
“incremental welfare state”, (Midgley 1997: 98) that would slowly expand at the
same pace as the economy grew, had actually been reversed: while until the
1970s and mid-1980s, public social security has been steadily rising in many de-
veloping countries, the number of people employed in the formal sector econ-
omy and covered by statutory social security has been decreasing in most devel-
oping countries since this time, and currently covers less than 5% of the labour
force worldwide, with Sub-Sahara Africa having the lowest coverage rates of be-
tween 5% and 10% (Van Ginneken 1999: 1). By the same token, the number of
people working and living in the so-called ‘informal’ sector and being dependent
on ‘informal’ social security has been rising dramatically, and has become nor-
mality for most people in developing countries today, also for those integrated
in the ‘formal’ sector economy and covered by only marginally developed public
welfare schemes.
It would thus seem that policy makers have finally realised the importance
of taking account of the complex social and economic conditions in which most
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people in developing countries live and manage their social security. However,
this chapter argues that, despitemajor policy changes, the assumptions on which
these new approaches are based largely remain the same. This becomes espe-
cially apparent when one looks at social security in the context of urbanisation
and migration – both phenomena closely identified with modernisation. In this
chapter, I will continue to develop the theoretical assumptions laid out in the
introduction to this book. Trying to dissociate social security from its narrow
modernist concept, I shall argue for a notion of social security as a dynamic and
trans-local phenomenon intrinsic to migration, urbanisation and social change.
I will argue that only a broad, functional approach to social security allows us
to take account of the complex and fragmented social and economic realities in
which people in Malawi live and which, as we shall see throughout the book,
are a long way away from modernist or traditionalist assumptions of the state,
market, household, social security and finally, the city. In a second part of the
chapter, I will discuss some of the methodological aspects and implications of
the study.
1.2 Social Security Beyond Modernity
At first glance, the new policy approaches that are discussed for developing
countries seem to indicate that social security has finally escaped the “narrow
horizon of time and space” (Partsch 1983: 18) to which modernist notions of eco-
nomic and social development, including industrialisation and the development
of a social welfare state had confined it . Indeed, the new means and mecha-
nisms proposed finally seem to take account of the complex social and economic
realities in developing countries, including the growing informalisation of living
and working conditions and the different needs and insecurities resulting from
these developments.
Yet, upon closer examination of these new concepts, one realises that this
is not necessarily the case. While the new concepts have broadened the classi-
cal state-centred welfarist approach, major assumptions related to social secu-
rity as a concept of modernity remain largely unchanged. They not only imply
a highly static, divisionary notion of ‘formal’ institutes and ‘informal’ institu-
tions, they also assume a strong hierarchical structure as regards their function-
ing, including their efficiency and effectiveness, their organisational degree, and
their qualitative and quantitative coverage. Indeed, four major contradictions
can be discerned: (1) the continuous focus on the state as having a primary role
in the provision of social security; (2) the legal dimension, stressing the role of
statutory law in regulating access to social security; (3) the ‘definitionary’ di-
mension, assuming a specific set of (in)securities and needs; and finally (4) the
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socio-economic dimension, relating social security to a specific mode of produc-
tion (see F. von Benda-Beckmann 1994; Leliveld 1994).
Despite the fact that the new policy approaches have reduced the role of the
state, the latter is still attributed a key function in the provision of social support
which is closely related to a modernist notion of the (welfare) state. The new ILO
approach promotes the development of other mechanisms that are more appro-
priate for dealing with different socio-economic realities and insecurities. But
these new mechanisms and forms of social security or insurance are largely per-
ceived as mere transitory, auxiliary measures, which sooner or later will have
to be linked up and integrated into a comprehensive welfare state scheme (ILO
2000). Thus, the state retains an important role as regards the provision and
administration of social security. This holds as well for the World Bank, which
takes an even more residual approach, reducing the state’s role to a risk and
crisis manager that under ‘normal’ circumstances exists merely to guarantee an
institutionally efficient framework, the so-called ‘enabling’ environment neces-
sary for non-state providers of social support to function well (see Holzmann &
Jørgensen 2000).
However, even this new reduced role attributed to the state as a manager and
administrator of social security heavily contradicts the reality in most develop-
ing countries, where the state consists of a highly fragmented set of institutions
with a similarly fragmented authority (see for exampleAnders 2005; Bayart 1993;
Chazan 1994). The shape, geographic extension, efficiency and effectiveness of
a state’s institutions are not homogenously distributed. In most countries, the
presence of the state shows a strong urban bias, which makes it difficult to ad-
equately fulfil its tasks as a crisis manager or administrator of a multi-facetted
scheme. This urban bias also concerns its role as a provider of social security
mechanisms, where it retains an important role, as is the case for health, edu-
cation or its employer’s liability. In Malawi, for example, state social security
continues to show a strong urban bias, which makes it difficult for those in rural
areas to gain access to support and care, for example, to hospitals or schools, or
simply to be in the position to cash a monthly pension.
The role of the state as creator of an enabling environment strongly ties in
with the second dimension; attributing state law a primary role in regulating
support relations. Although the new welfare mix recognises other entities aside
from the state as social security providers, this does not include other legal frame-
works. On the contrary, in the course of the Good Governance reform, the ‘rule of
law’ – here being understood as an effective legal and judicial regulatory frame-
work – has even gained more importance, being attributed a key role in creat-
ing efficient and sustainable economic development. Through private law, such
as family, inheritance or property law, it is also to provide the basic regulatory
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framework for non-state social support mechanisms, among individuals, com-
mercial organisations or other private institutions, or NGOs taking care of social
support.
Whereas in most countries a quite extensive legal framework on private mat-
ters, such as inheritance or property, has come into existence, it is hardly effec-
tive. The introduction of inheritance law in Malawi has been celebrated as an
enormous achievement, especially as regards the position of women. However,
we shall see that most women hardly have the knowledge and the resources to
gain access to a court of justice, which are in any case usually too overcrowded
and overworked to reach an agreement in time. At the same time, we shall see
that in Malawi, as in many other developing countries, extensive legal pluralism
exists. While state law is claimed to have a primary position over other legal
frameworks, this is not necessarily the case. State law is usually just one legal
framework amongst many others anchored in customary law or ‘informal’ rules
and regulations, which under certain circumstance may gain much more rele-
vance than state law. These non-state social security arrangements may show
a high degree of institutionalisation, such as can be found in customary or re-
ligious law, or in the rules and regulations concerning access to development
projects (see for example K. von Benda-Beckmann 1988). Land rights represent
another highly institutionalised form of social support, similar to inheritance law
or the rights and obligations concerning kinship.
The co-existence of these different regulatory systems anchored in ‘formal’,
‘traditional’ and ‘informal’ spheres is of specific relevance in relations to social
security mechanisms, which are often regulated by more than one legal frame-
work. In many developing countries, land rights are, for example, regulated
by both state and customary law, the content of which may diverge substan-
tially (for example Toulmin & Quan 2000). Another example might be the legal
framework provided by the state for NGOs or commercial insurance companies,
which in turn have their own, sometimes contradictory, regulatory frameworks.
The existence of various legal frameworks may make it easier to gain access to
resources in different environments and circumstances – but it may also cause
substantial conflict. We shall see that people are actually “forum shoppers” (F. &
K. von Benda-Beckmann 1994: 22), shifting between different regulatory frame-
works in order to manipulate and gain access to support and care.
The emphasis on state-law as central for gaining access to and controlling so-
cial security relates yet to another ‘functional’ contradiction. State-regulated so-
cial security systems are not only assumed to function much better, but to guar-
antee universal, continuous and ‘just’ access to social support resistant to fraud,
corruption and economic shortfalls, as opposed to the highly particularistic, sub-
jective and manipulative rules and regulations surrounding ‘informal’ support
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relations, such as family relations or informal labour relations (ibid.). We shall
see that ‘informal’ labour relations may encompass strong obligations to provide
social support on part of the employer. Moreover, these may in many ways be as
efficient and effective as social services in the ‘formal-sector-economy’, which of-
ten lack the resources necessary for their realisation as an effective social security
arrangement.
The existence of different social and economic realties in which people are
living strongly relates to yet another point: the definition of social security. So-
cial security approaches usually depart from a notion of social security that is
strongly based on risks and insecurities related to the capitalist way of produc-
tion. The focus on risks arising from productive cash labour is also reflected in
the still widely used ‘minimum standard definition’ of the ILO, no.102 of 1952,
that defines social security as “(. . . ) the protection which society provides for its mem-
bers, through a series of public measures, against the economic and social distress that
otherwise would be caused by the stoppage or substantial reduction of earnings resulting
from sickness, maternity, employment injury, unemployment, invalidity, old age and
death; the provision of medical care; and the provision of subsidies for families with chil-
dren.” (ILO 1984: 2-3) The recent shift of the ILO towards its decent work strat-
egy and the Basic Social Security Approach (ILO 2000) implies a broadening of
its definition, at least on an administrative level, including risks other than those
related to cash labour, such as adequate nutrition, housing, etc. (Van Ginneken
2005).1
However, the definition remains highly problematic. We shall see that many
people in Malawi live mainly in the subsistence economy. Very many more,
most urban migrants among them, live in-between the subsistence and the mar-
ket economy, and only a few employed in the ‘formal sector’ are able to live
solely on their monetary income. These different normalities of working rela-
tionships and types of income not only create different needs, but also risks and
insecurities other than those related to the loss of monetary income. More impor-
tantly, as Woodman (1988: 72) states, the ILO-definition only includes those who
“lose an income-producing activity” but not those who – due to mental or phys-
ical handicaps – are “unable to begin any”. In this context, Keebet von Benda-
Beckmann (1995) also refers to the importance of looking at the overall societal
framework: what is regarded as a ‘decent life’, what responsibilities an indi-
1 Recently, international agencies have increasingly come to use the concept of ‘vulnerability’ in-
stead of (in)securities (see for example Holzmann & Jørgensen 2000; OECD 2001; for a critique
see Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler 2004). Although the historical development of the social secu-
rity discourse and the use of different social policy and social security concepts in development
politics at different points in time would be a highly interesting point of discussion, it would go
beyond the scope of this book, which closely adheres to its focus on and indeed evolves around
the concept of social security.
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vidual has, how need and social risks are defined, and under which conditions
and through which mechanisms social support is provided, is not only subject to
the socio-economic framework, but also the social order of a society, its cultural
principles, and the political decision-making process (1995:5). In fact, I shall ar-
gue that the demographic collapse as a result of HIV/AIDS has truncated many
of the migration and urbanisation trajectories migrants usually had available to
them, which in turn, has also meant a substantial reduction of social security ar-
rangements ‘typical’ within a wider trans-local political economy. Furthermore,
we shall see that HIV/AIDS has also had a profound impact on the social or-
der of Malawian society as a whole, re-shuffling notions of (in)security, risk and
perceptions of past, present and future.
Ultimately, the reduction of social security to one, single normality refers
to the economic dimension, relating social security exclusively to the capitalist
mode of production. This assumption has also strong geographical connotations,
as it is assumed that the cash economy is a predominantly urban phenomenon,
while subsistence and agriculture are confined to rural areas only (Mouton 1975).
We shall see that urban migrants depend on a variety of income sources, modes
of production, andways of living that criss-cross ‘formal and informal’ labour re-
lations, including agricultural production, and urban-rural and national bound-
aries (see for example, Baker & Claseon 1990; Baker et al. 1992). Moreover, I
shall show that this ‘occupational mix’ is not a strategy used by the poorer ‘infor-
malised’ population to deal with insecurities here and there, but that it is actually
a constitutive part of the urban economy for both rich and poor.
1.3 Mobile Migrants
The fact that social security is a mix of different state and non-state institutions
and relations scattered over a wider geographical area also challenges the con-
ceptual framework within which it is analysed. Social security is a patchwork
of a variety of mechanisms and actors embedded in different interlocking social,
economic, political, cultural andmoral orders. This ‘multi-sidedness’ is also spa-
tially defined. We shall see that the social security economy of urban migrants
is anchored in a variety of localities that encompass both town and the village
and may even extend beyond national and continental boundaries. It is within
this wider geographical framework of different social, economic, political and
cultural conditions and constellations that migrants live, work and manage their
social security. In the wake of those trans-national migration studies that anal-
yse migrants’ behaviour and strategies as embedded in a wider trans-national
framework of different social, economic, cultural and political conditions and
environments rather than alongside regional, national or urban-rural geographic
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and conceptual boundaries,2 I will also take a trans-local perspective. Under-
standing the rural and the urban as a trans-local space sheds a different light on
social security practices in town and the way they operate. We will see that mi-
grants live and move within a trans-local economy which also structures their
social security capacities in gaining and providing access to support, as they are
dependent on the availability of resources, and the actual social and economic
conditions at hand.
Analysing social security as a trans-local phenomenon also requires a re-
appraisal of migration in general, and as a social security strategy in particular.
Especially rural-urban migration has for a long time been considered a specific
feature of modernity and development that only came into existence with colo-
nialism, capitalism and modernity.3 Urban migration was perceived of as an
indispensable pre-requisite of modernity, an inescapable force to which people
would react almost automatically. Being uprooted from their sedentary, static
rural way of life, they would join the steady stream of labour force flowing into
the city in order to become amember of the urban “labour aristocracy” (Potts 1997:
449). It went without saying that this move into modernity was an irreversible
and unique one, as people – once in the city – would also remain there and be-
come permanently urbanised (Kearny 1986).
Although the process intensified with the onset of modernity, it is now a com-
mon understanding that Africans had been on the move long before colonialism
and capitalism penetrated the continent, as a reaction to territorial disputes or
climatic changes.4 Moreover, most people remain mobile throughout their lives.
Contrary to a modernist understanding that views migration as a deviation and
‘pathology’ to the ‘normal’ sedentary way of life, we shall see that in countries
like Malawi it is migration which actually represents ‘normality’, being an in-
tegral part of social life and organisation (for example Baker & Aina 1995; De
Bruijn et al. 2001; De Haan 1999; Andersson 2001; Simone 2005). People always
seem to be on the move, moving behind spouses, land, labour or care. This does
not mean that people necessarily breakwith their former social environments, as
many follow a ‘circular’ migration pattern (Chapman & Prothero 1983; De Haan
1997). People tend to move back and forth between different places, remain-
ing in close contact with their home of origin, or other places they have lived in
along their migration itinerary. This also encompasses inner-urban movements:
we shall see that urban migrants are exposed to a high degree of inner-urban
2 See Glick-Schiller et al. (1992); Glick-Schiller and Fouron (2001); Basch et al. (1994); Appadurai
(1995); Nuijten (1998); Bryceson & Vuorela (2002); Kearny (1986);
3 See Todaro (1971); for an overview and critique De Haan (1999); Baker et al. (1990); Coquery-
Vidrovitch (1991); Kearny (1986); Simon (1992), Ferguson (1999).
4 For an overview of the early history of Central Africa see Wills (2001) and Birmingham & Martin
(1992).
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mobility, which is also discernible in their network relations, which may stretch
over different residential areas of town.
This circular migration pattern was for a long time associated with an incom-
plete modernisation process that would not allow people to permanently settle
in one place.5 We shall see that this is not necessarily the case. Migration is not
only a response to poor living conditions in the village that force people to move
in order to survive: contrary to conventional assumptions, migration is central to
the livelihoods of both rich and poor andmay also assume an income- or welfare-
enhancing function (De Haan 1999). Furthermore, migration is not solely based
on economic considerations, as migration models, such as the widely discussed
push-pull-model by Todaro (1971), have for a long time assumed. Whereas eco-
nomic considerations are central to the decision to migrate, migration decisions
are much more complex, encompassing social, psychological or political aspects
that may be equally, or in some cases even more important, than economic con-
siderations (see for example Gugler & Flanagan 1978; Baker & Aina 1995).6
The importance of non-material considerations in determining migration de-
cisions is especially discernible when migration is examined as a social secu-
rity strategy. We shall see that considerations concerning the availability of care
labour, medical treatment or psychological support often play an important role
in migration decisions. The breakdown of family structures and social networks,
and the resulting scarcity of care labour due to HIV/AIDS has, for example, led
to an enormous upsurge of urban migration for social support.
The understanding of migration “not as a passing phenomenon of transition
but a durable feature of the regional political economy” (Ferguson 1999: 91) reveals
that urban-rural resources encompass a variety of non-human and non-material
things on the move, such as ideas, values and skills (for example Adepoju 1977;
De Bruijn et al. 2001). Rural relatives often come to acquire specific skills from
5 While modernisation theorists saw this continuous dependence of urban migrants upon their ru-
ral homestead as a transitional phase of a modernity not yet completed that sooner or later would
come to an end (for example Jones 1953; Gavrilova 1975), world system theorists saw it as a deeply
rooted structural condition of capitalism itself. The merely partial incorporation of the urban mi-
grant into the global capitalist system would not allow him to permanently settle in town and
forced him into a ‘dual economy’ (Gugler 1971), having to diversify income sources and produc-
tion types over spatial distance by combining both urban cash and rural subsistence economies in
order to make a living (for example Gugler & Flanagan 1978; Gugler 1991; Amin 1972; 1995).
6 The strength of the economic bias is also discernible in the analysis of rural-urban network re-
lations, the resilience of which is largely assessed by measuring the frequency with which cash
remittances or other material goods are sent back and forth (for an overview on the literature on
remittances see De Haan 1999). This also pre-supposes an urban bias, as it is assumed to be the
urban migrant who is exclusively on the cash-provider side of social support, whereas the vil-
lager on the other side of the chain is reduced to a person who waits, merely fulfilling the role of
a recipient.
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their urban relatives that may allow them to earn some cash income upon their
return in the village. Apart from funerals and marriages that are usually held
in the village, urban migrants return home in case of marriage problems to be
counselled by their ankoswe.7 The same holds for disputes over family matters or
land issues, which are usually discussed in the village. Finally, many migrants
in town also call upon their female rural relatives as traditional birth attendants.
Migration therefore also extends the ‘social security radius’ of those left be-
hind in the village. Apart from remittances sent back and forth, the urban kin in
town also provide ‘long-distance-access’ to resources and social security mecha-
nisms more easily accessible in town, such as health care or development organ-
isations. The migration of one person also has an important bridging function
for those migrating in the future (Grieco 1995). Potential migrants hardly move
without having any contact in town. As we shall see, they usually have a fairly
large rural-urban network at their disposal before they even start moving, and
thus also have access to information onworking opportunities and themoney for
the transport fare. Urban kin also have an important sluice function, providing
newly arrivedmigrants with shelter, support in seeking employment, education,
health services or other assistance (see for example Makuka 1995; Rohregger
2000; K. von Benda-Beckmann 2004).
1.4 The City as an Open Space
Discussing migration as relational, i.e. embedded in a wider social, economic,
cultural and geographical trans-local framework, also challenges the perspective
on urbanisation and the city as yet another notion and locus intrinsically related
to modernity and development. Looking at African and Latin American cities
and their partly breathtaking architectonical representations that appear totally
out of place when compared to the impoverished urban and rural surroundings,
the city does indeed seem to represent the embodiment of modernity par excel-
lence. Although it has lost much of its original splendour, tall buildings and
shopping malls can also be found in the tiny urban core of Lilongwe city. This
spatial expression of a global corporate capitalist culture (Sassen 1996) refers not
only to a specific mode of capitalist production, but also epitomises an ‘economi-
sation’ of modes of organisation, types of relations, behaviour, and thinking. As
Wirth (1938) in his famous article ‘Urbanism as a way of life’ described, the trans-
formation of a ‘tribesman’ into a ‘townsman’ (Mayer 1963) was supposed to lead
to a dissolution of ‘traditional’ multiplex relations, to be replaced by a homoge-
nous mass society bound by a highly individualised and institutionalised, sim-
7 Ankhoswe (pl.)/ Nkoswe (sgl.) ‘traditional’ marriage advisor.
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plex type of social relations. Urbanism would thus also give birth to a modern
rational and efficient individual who would strive for economic competition and
profit maximisation (Laurenço-Lindell 2001).
This process of ‘Vergesellschaftung’would also include a ‘social securitisation’.
It was assumed to be the city where the migrant, in the course of the capitalist
incorporation and the breakdown of traditional solidarity structures based on
the family and the community, would become incorporated within the welfare
state, which, in the course of the capitalist expansion, would eventually reach
the rural hinterland. This process also included access to infrastructure, housing
and other social services, which were discussed as specifically urban problems
exclusively related to the ‘making of the city’ (for example Gugler 1997; Gilbert
1994; Rakodi 1997).
The teleological perspective on migration and urbanisation as a continuous
forward movement along an urban-rural continuum was also assumed to un-
derlie a specific spatial order. Based on Burgess’ organic city model, a centre-
periphery model developed, which assumed that the city would develop in con-
centric circles around an urban core, relocating groups and individuals according
to their position within the overall social and spatial hierarchy (Burgess 1967).
The existence of a vast urban fringe springing up at the margins of the city and
modernity, where the rural migrant would initially arrive and which was associ-
ated with poverty and informal working and living conditions, was thereby put
in stark contrast to a small, but spatially, socially and economically fully mod-
ernised and highly dynamic urban core that would also provide a link and nodal
point with the world ‘outside’ (Simon 1992).8
Many writers, such as Sassen (1991; 1996) and Harvey (1990a; 1990b), have
pointed out since then that urbanisation processes and inner-city movements,
both in developing and industrial countries, are far too complex and contradic-
tory as to follow mechanical patterns of spatial and economic order that would
make people move almost automatically from the poor ‘rural’ periphery into the
rich urban core at the same pace as the economy would grow. This is especially
the case in developing countries, where the areas along the city boundaries and
the marginal fringe areas within the city centres represent highly dynamic and
vibrant parts of the city. We shall see that it is in these marginal areas where
8 World system and dependency theorists (for example Frank 1970; Amin 1972; Wallerstein 1986)
interpreted changing economic, social and political dynamics of theworld system as a series of dy-
namics that evolve between the economic centres and core areas and the peripheral world zones,
which were largely situated in the developing countries. It was the unequal distribution of eco-
nomic and political power which also led to unequal development, fromwhich profited especially
the countries in the core who could extract resources for their development at low cost from the
periphery. The cities which were partly incorporated in the world system was thereby ascribed a
satellite function between the rural hinterland and the global markets (Simon 1992; Sassen 1991).
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the city largely seems to take place and which, despite their weak economic and
political power, have become “powerful space(s)” (Hall cited in Sassen 1996: 196).
In this respect, the city is understood as amultiply divided, de-centred terrain
with a myriad of hierarchical spatial relations, which are in a continuous process
of re-assertion and re-definition (Krätke 1990; Sassen 1996; Harvey 1990a). The
understanding of the city “as a strategic terrain of a whole series of conflicts and con-
tradictions” (Sassen 2002: 18) that require continuous ‘place-making’ over one’s
social, physical, economic and symbolic environment also challenges concep-
tual notions of urbanisation. Urban place-making processes do not evolve along
a clear-cut line of social, economic, spatial or cultural division drawn between
the city margins, its rural hinterland, and its centre that corresponds to the con-
ceptual dualisms of urban/rural, formal/informal or modern and traditional, as
suggested by theories of modernisation and change. Rather, urbanisation pro-
cesses are to be understood as a whole range of conflicts over practical, symbolic
and imagined spaces and places that follow their own specific lines of conflict,
among which the classical modernisation process between the capitalist core and
the underdeveloped periphery is just one amongst many others (ibid.). These
processes are taking place simultaneously in many different sites and places in
the city. They are not static, nor do they follow a specific hierarchy in the city’s so-
cial and economic space, but rather follow their own logics. We shall see that ‘il-
legal’ or ‘informal’ place-making strategies in town, including access to housing,
infrastructure and other social services, such as policing or dispute settlement,
are not only a desperate attempt of the ‘excluded’ and ‘marginalised’, who, in
the absence of adequate public infrastructure, find their own ways into the city.
The construction of what I shall call ‘counter-legalities’9 in order to gain, main-
tain and defend their access to the city also involves the still powerful centres
and their inhabitants who are increasingly gentrifying the marginal city. In their
struggle for permanence, people thus continuously transcend and subvert the
very boundaries and lines of division they have created in their efforts to gain
access to town, thereby constantly re-defining the city and the city’s spaces.
Following Massey (1994: 121), who defines spaces and places not as bounded
areas, but as open and porous networks of social relations whose “‘identities’ are
constructed through the specificity of their interaction with other places rather than by
counter position to them,” I understand urbanisation as a range of social processes
that – similar to migration – are embedded in social organisation and change.
Urbanisation processes, therefore, also transcend geographic boundaries, taking
place far beyond the city limits and having repercussions upon all members in
a trans-local network, including those ‘left behind in the village’. At the same
time, the definition of space as relational also allows for an open and unbound
9 See Chapter 4.
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definition of the city. The notion of the city, not as a contained spacewithin which
urbanisation follows spatially-, socially- and economically-grounded linear pro-
cesses, but instead as an open space of social and economic relations involved
in continuous boundary-setting processes, also allows for a shift in the focus of
attention towards the edges and margins of the city. These borderlands between
modernity and tradition and the city and the countryside not only provide the
geographic and analytical focus of this study: as we shall see, it is in marginal
areas like Sector 7 where these boundary-setting processes are especially pro-
nounced.
1.5 The Urban-Rural Borderland as a Trans-local Space
Understanding the city as an open space with no clear-cut boundaries but as a
whole range of ‘analytic borderlands’ (Sassen 1996) challenges spatial concep-
tions of town and countryside at the same time. In addition, the understand-
ing of the city as “a work in progress” (Simone 1997: 56) also challenges its sym-
bolic and conceptual boundaries. The debate about the definition of the city as
a spatial, social, cultural and economic field as opposed to its rural hinterland
is a long one. There are as many definitions of the city as there are cities in
the world, ranging from demographic and behavioural, cultural, social or eco-
nomic issues to functional concerns (for an overview see Coquery-Vidrovitch
1990; Simon 1992; King 1996; Southall 1998). Especially in the East- and Southern
African context of fast-growing industrial centres which attracted large streams
of labour migration, the cultural dualism between the ‘urban’ and the ‘rural’,
‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ formed a core debate of the regional anthropology.
The persistent tribalism among urban migrants discernible in the maintenance
of strong rural-urban relations, the creation of ethnically-based associations and
the vivid presence of ‘traditional’ customs and dances in urban areas was the
subject of intense research and heated debates (Mitchell 1956; for a critique see
Kapferer 1995; Ferguson 1999; Englund 2001).10
10 Whereas functionalists interpreted the persisting tribalism as a transitional phase in the ‘divine’
plan to urbanity and modernity yet to be completed, urban anthropologists working in the great
industrial areas argued that it was the modernisation process in the colonies itself which did not
allow the urban migrant s to get fully settled in town and reach full ‘urban involvement’ (Mitchell
1956; 1966; 1973; Gluckmann 1961; Southall 1961; Cohen 1969; 1974). However, while ethnicity
was understood as an essentially modern feature brought about by mass-industrialisation, the
cultural dualism implicit in urbanisation theories persisted. The assumption of a ‘cultural break-
down’ as a necessary pre-condition to urbanisation was perceived as inescapable. It was only a
question of time, dependingmerely on the ‘urban involvement’ of themigrant and on their ability
to become independent of the social, economic and cultural relations which still tied them to the
village (Mitchell 1956; for a critique see Ferguson 1999).
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The definition of rural-urban boundaries is of special relevance in the context
of this study. Contrary to modernist assumptions of the urban fringe as the place
of the poor and the not yet urbanised, a place from which populations would
slowly gain access to the city and modernity, we shall see that in Sector 7, dif-
ferent, partly contradictory urban tendencies and trajectories exist side-by-side.
While a few migrants have realised their urban dream, having gained access to
a better job and better housing over the years, most inhabitants have remained
in the area and will probably not succeed in leaving it in the future. On the
contrary, many have been marginalised still further, having been pushed off the
area, either back to rural areas or to other marginal areas of town by better-off
migrants, mainly civil servants who have been forced to move to marginal and
cheaper areas as a result of retrenchment in employment and social services due
to Structural Adjustment and Good Governance.
At the same time, we shall see that the appropriation of the city, both in ge-
ographic and symbolic space, involves both rural and urban resources. Every-
day practices in the city show that people continuously mix different identities,
sources of income, means of power and representation, and ways of living, in or-
der to manage town life. This concerns both urban place making strategies, such
as access to housing or infrastructure, and individual network relations. Rural
network relations are not only of intrinsic importance for urban migrants’ secu-
rity networks. Urban/rural dualisms provide also an important resource set that
migrants use in their daily social security discourse and practice to negotiate and
manipulate their social support rights and obligations by trying to gain access to
support or, as a provider, justify its denial.
Against the background of this incessant intermingling of rural and urban
resources, strategies and lifestyles, it has been argued that rural-urban differ-
ences are increasingly dissolving. Whereas informal living and working condi-
tions and the strong rural-urban links have been interpreted as a ruralisation of
the city (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1991; Bakari 1988; for a critique see Simone 1997),
others have argued that an analytical differentiation between rural and urban
areas has totally outlived its utility. Rather than between two distinct areas, peo-
ple move behind gradually different social and economic conditions evolving
within a wider regional political economy (for a critique see Cordell et al. 1996).
We shall see that changing social and economic conditions brought about by
Structural Adjustment and a growing monetisation have indeed blurred empir-
ical and analytical boundaries between ‘rural’ and ‘urban’ life worlds, as people
are increasingly drawing upon both life worlds to make a living, transgressing
functional, administrative and physical boundaries related to the city and its ru-
ral hinterland.
I shall argue that a rural-urban differentiation remains important neverthe-
less. Firstly, it remains crucial for the people themselves, providing a powerful
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place-maker and boundary marker within town and over distance. Thus, the
civil servants forced to move into cheaper Sector 7 from higher income residen-
tial areas view Sector 7 with its tight social structure as a well-equipped village
with a well-developed infrastructure. On the other hand, for many migrants, es-
pecially those who have only recently come to town, Sector 7 is the embodiment
of the urban jungle. Listening to their accounts of Sector 7 as a socially totally
anonymous place, full of crime and prostitution, it seems as if they were living in
the most dangerous neighbourhoods of London, New York or Paris. At the same
time, questions of ‘belonging’ wrapped up in discourses on identity, community
and culture are of intrinsic importance in trans-local social (security) relations
in order to gain or deny access to support and care. Secondly, a differentiating
view is also of importance on an analytical level. It is in town where processes of
social and economic change are particularly pronounced and intense, which in
turn also engender particular dynamics and distinct developments (Low 1996).
These differences remain crucial for the understanding of the trans-local social
security economy and the strategies deployed, including migration. Rather than
two clearly defined and opposed domains, I therefore understand the urban and
the rural domains as closely articulated social, economic and cultural spheres
(Cordell et al. 1996; Simone 2005; Englund 2002a). While they may coincide
in specific practices and strategies, showing complex and dense social and eco-
nomic links, they may provide completely opposite domains in others, respond-
ing to overall changing social and economic conditions or life-cycle events taking
place both within the village or town.
In fact, we shall see that village and town provide a highly complex and dy-
namic field of relations that is exposed to a continuous process of re-organisation,
expanding and contracting accordingly. Contrary to what they claim, most mi-
grants’ trans-local relations to the village or beyond the city boundaries are far
from providing a stable and regular support network. While for some issues
support relations continue to function quite well, such as family issues or skill
training, harsh social and economic conditions have severely reduced most ma-
terial support, such as cash remittances or agricultural inputs.
However, trans-local relations continue to play an important role in town.
As highly localised relations11 in the form of a common ethnic or regional back-
ground, a common language or a common religious, they provide an important
background for the creation of new identit(ies), communit(ies) and social secu-
rity networks in town. The construction of community, identity and culture as
a virtual, ‘imagined’ reality and not necessarily a space-bound community is an
11 See also Gupta and Ferguson (1997), Anderson (1991) or Appadurai (1995; 2000), who have exten-
sively discussed culture, identity and community in relation to space, challenging the stipulated
isomorphic structure of culture, space and place.
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important and powerful focal point of identification and belonging, engendering
feelings of duty and obligation (Anderson 1991; Amit 2002).
This is of intrinsic importance to the study. The construction or idealisation
of a – historically or geographically – distant or non-existent culture or com-
munity as a source of a new identity in the absence of an old identity that has
been left behind, or as a means to distance oneself from the ‘dominant’ commu-
nities and identities in the actual place of residence is common practice among
many migrants living abroad or in town. Based on ‘traditional’ ethnic, regional
or kinship identities, we shall see that these communities and identities are ac-
tually very modern, urban inventions that have little to do with rural lifestyle,
tradition and culture (see Hobbesbawm & Ranger 1983). Moreover, they do not
only provide important powerful lines of in- and exclusion in town; they are also
an important resource in defining and negotiating social security practices and
strategies over distance (see for example Englund 2001). Especially in the case
of trans-local networks, images of the ‘rural’ and the ‘urban’ and related social,
moral, economic or political values and norms often have an important discur-
sive power and may become very concrete social realities anchored and taking
place in specific spatial localities when it comes to converting them into prop-
erly functioning social security arrangements (see also Massey 1994; Ferguson
1999).12
The extent to which people are able to convert their cultural capitals embed-
ded in identities, morals and traditions, rules and obligations to gain access to
support and care is not necessarily only a question of being exposed to other
‘cultures’, or one’s capacity and flexibility to learn from it. We shall see that the
extent to which people are able to participate in and learn different cultural ex-
pressions is largely related to and stratified by economic and political power,
gender, age, or quite simply, time. All of these aspects have an enormous impact
in altering one’s leverage in struggles over meaning, entitlements and rights, and
obligations.
The struggle over meaning in terms of rural-urban borders and boundaries
is also of importance in the struggle over space and place in town. As we shall
see, cultural capital and imagined communities play a crucial role in town when
it becomes necessary to defend or invade geographic boundaries. Whereas the
differences in lifestyle between the inhabitants of Sector 7 and those migrants
living beyond the city boundaries is actually negligible, cultural capitals, tradi-
tion and imagined communities and identities related to the urban and the rural
constituted an important source of leverage in the battle over land and housing.
12 In his study of migrants on the Copperbelt, Ferguson (1999) discusses at length the importance of
what he terms ‘cultural styles’ of ‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘localism’ that people use as a resource
in urban-rural living strategies.
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1.6 Shifting Boundaries of Support: The Functional Approach
Understanding the urban and the rural as a dynamic trans-local economic, so-
cial and cultural space in which social networks are anchored is also of intrinsic
importance for social security. Social security practices are usually far removed
from the urban/rural, modern/traditional and formal/informal order or logic
of things (De Certeau 1984; Bryceson & Varuela 2002). We shall see that so-
cial security is a highly dynamic concept, the meaning, content and function of
which is undergoing a continuous re-negotiation process. In their efforts to gain
access to social security, people continuously transgress, dissolve and re-create
institutional, legal, political, ideological, functional and conceptual boundaries
or ‘organisational principles’ (Long 1990, 1996) of social support embodied in
questions of kinship, solidarity and reciprocity, re-distribution, rights and enti-
tlements, or ‘target’ processes of public social policies or development projects.
Trying to get a hold on the dynamics of these shifting boundaries or “shifting
circles of support” (Palriwala & Risseeuw 1996) that evolve in these analytical and
empirical borderlands, I shall take an unbound and de-centred view of social
security that dissociates the concept from its narrow modernist understanding.
I will discuss my empirical findings along the lines of the so-called ‘functional
approach’ developed by Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann (1994). Orig-
inating from the tradition of legal anthropology that understands law as being
embedded in the wider context of social, economic, cultural or legal relation-
ships, the approach understands social security as an intrinsic aspect of social
life and social organisation. Rather than along clearly delineated sets of notions,
concepts, institutions and mechanisms, social security is understood as a social
phenomenon embedded in and evolving out of a variety of different layers of
social organisation and change.
How these different layers are defined is described in the following para-
graphs (for more details, see F. & K. von Benda-Beckmann 1994). The first layer
is the layer of cultural and religious ideas and ideologies, which indicates the whole
range of abstract general ideas and ideals of social security existent in religion,
political ideologies or culture. These include the various ‘welfare ideologies’,
ranging from the institutional welfare approach dominant in Western Europe
to the ‘residual’, more neo-liberal model dominant in the Anglo-Saxon welfare
economies. Equally important are the various ‘development ideologies’ of the
international development regime, such as poverty alleviation, the agenda on
the social dimension of development or the newly developed concepts on social
security for developing countries briefly mentioned in the introduction. Notions
of social security are also captured in religious ideas found in almost all world
religions and partly represent general societal or cultural values, such as mercy,
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solidarity, or altruism. Political, ideological and cultural values and ideologies
on social security are far from being homogeneous, but define different needs,
insecurities and means to deal with them. Especially against the background of
the increasingly wide range of social security providers upon which people de-
pend – both in Western Europe and Africa – these ‘support ideologies’ need to
be taken into account if an adequate understanding of social security practices
and their guiding principles is to be achieved.
The second layer refers to the layer of institutional provision, dealing with spec-
ified ideas of social security embodied in institutes and institutions of society.
These refer on the one hand to institutional provisions by state agencies or NGOs
with their clearly defined access criteria and on the other, to institutionalised
rights and obligations concerning social security provisions embodied in kin-
ship relations, inheritance or property law. They all encompass very specific
ideas about the ‘normality’ of a situation, neediness, risk, and ways of dealing
with them. They usually vary according to gender, age, or social and economic
status. Yet they may not necessarily correspond to notions of insecurity, risk
and vulnerability of the people they are actually targeted at, and who are often
living in different and more complex realities and situations of neediness. Clas-
sical examples are development projects or social policies that – while aiming to
increase social security and minimise risk – may turn out to be very counterpro-
ductive. Development projects may miss their actual ‘target’ group, improving
the situation of people who do not necessarily need it, but are in a better position
to take advantage (see for example K. von Benda-Beckmann 1988). As we will
see, micro-credit schemes may undermine the already precarious situation of the
very poor. Being forced to divert resources that were meant to be invested in col-
lective social security arrangements in order to serve loans for money borrowed,
many poor people faced with an unforeseen calamity find themselves not only
highly indebted but also without a social network to cope with the crisis situa-
tion.
Furthermore, the layer of actual social relationships between recipient and pro-
vider of social security provides yet another important organising principle of
social securitywhich should be examined. The roles and the behaviour attributed
to providers and recipients of social support are usually not as clear-cut as insti-
tutionally prescribed. This holds both for specified institutions of social sup-
port and ‘multifunctional relationships’ in which social security is one function
amongst many others, such as kinship or patron-client relationships. Contrary to
the assumption of the conventional institutional approach, that tends to reduce
the citizen to his/her receptive role as a social welfare client or beneficiary (Cul-
pitt 1999), people are usually both providers and recipients of social support.
This role allocation is not static, but may change substantially, depending on the
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actual contingency at hand and the flow of major lifecycle events, such as birth,
death, or old age. Moreover, social security relations are not one-dimensional, as
the institutional perspective suggests, but usually overlap with other relations.
Institutional relationships may also be defined by kinship, membership in the
same party, or a common origin: a fact that may substantially influence access to
social security provisions, both in quantitative and qualitative terms.
Finally, the functional approach draws attention to the layer of actual social
practices. This layer refers to the actual fulfilment of normatively or institution-
ally prescribed social security functions, i.e. the conversion of resources into ac-
tual working social security arrangements. These have to be regarded separately,
since they tend to differ from the general rules about social security practices, as
normatively prescribed rights and obligations do not necessarily imply their ac-
tual fulfilment. Keebet von Benda-Beckmann (1994: 10) reminds us to differen-
tiate carefully between the “conditions under which mechanisms operate” and their
“actual allocation and distribution”. The availability of material, social or symbolic
resources for social security does not automatically imply that social actors are
able or willing to convert them into functioning social security arrangements (F.
& K. von Benda-Beckmann 1994; Dréze & Sen 1991). Furthermore, looking at
actual social practice permits a better assessment of social security. Existing so-
cial security mechanisms may very well function according to prescribed rules
and regulations, but they may “not necessarily prevent destitution”, if provisions
are too small for survival (F. & K. von Benda-Beckmann 1994). By the same
token, it is important to take into consideration the actual social and economic
context within which these mechanisms are operating. Social security provisions
may undermine, as well as exceed, actual needs and as such, have an intrinsic
importance when analysing social security. Taking into consideration the social
and economic consequences of social security practices is therefore of intrinsic
importance (ibid.).
Taking a functional approach to social security also implies a broad definition
of social security. Social security is understood as “all collective measures and efforts
that on a preventive and reactive basis allow people who are not able to take care of
themselves to live a decent and acceptable life (F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann: 2001)”.13
Whereas to some this unbound view of social security might appear to be too
broad and too inclusive, I argue that this ‘societal’ view of social security, as also
suggested by Partsch (1983) or Kaufmann (1977), is of high analytical value. This
view allows for a comparative and dynamic analysis of social security, a fact that
is of special importance for this study, both as a study of social security in devel-
oping countries and a study in a rural-urban borderland. Both contexts display a
variety of collective and individual normalities, lifestyles, modes of production,
social (in)securities and mechanisms to cope with them in a more pronounced
13 Own translation.
28 Contextualising Social Security
way than in most industrial countries. Understanding social security as rela-
tional (Moore 1996) makes these manifold linkages visible. Allowing for a broad
perspective on social security also provides a higher analytical value in terms
of its functioning: rather than starting off from narrowly defined, abstract cat-
egories of prescribed roles and functions as regards providers and recipients,
services, access criteria, etc., an embedded view of social security asks how so-
cial security is actually functioning, thus allowing for a better assessment and
evaluation. Moreover, it enables one to take account of those social security re-
lations and institutions that appear ‘invisible’ to the conventional view (Zacher
1988: 23). These encompass those social security functions that are internal to
‘common’ or ordinary social relations, such as kinship or friendship, as opposed
to the functionally and institutionally highly differentiated social support mech-
anisms or institutes exemplified by the welfare state or friendly societies (ibid.).
Analysing social security as a field of struggle over material, social or sym-
bolic resources in which various social actors are involved (see Bourdieu 1990),
also draws attention to the role that social actors play as brokers, translators and
transformers of different types of knowledge, organisational principles, values
and ideas into the local context (see also Long 1990; Acre & Long 1992; Long
1996). Individual perceptions of needs and contingencies may not always coin-
cide with collective ones embodied in institutions, rules and obligations: they in-
fluence and shape each other, but are not necessarily congruent. On the contrary,
rather than being followed on a one-to-one scale, we shall see that collectively
prescribed notions, rules and regulations are subject to continuous subversion
and re-negotiation. Social actors usually create interface situations where differ-
ent, often contradicting notions and ideas, values and behaviour, interests and
power constellations embodied in social security institutions and discourse per-
taining to different “social domains” (Long 1996: 55) intersect, are re-worked and
re-negotiated and thereby translated and interwoven into the actual social con-
text and its social security order (ibid.). It is in this “space between” (De Certeau
1984: 127), at the dynamic and ambiguous edges and boundaries of social secu-
rity institutions and practices, where I argue most social security is actually tak-
ing place: Social actors not only mix ‘formal’, ‘informal’ and ‘traditional’ social
security systems, they also create new systems by mixing material and symbolic
structures and resources anchored in ‘formal’ and ‘informal’/ ‘traditional’ sys-
tems. Ascribing fictional kinship ties upon close friends and workmates is, for
example, widespread in urban areas. Other examples are provided by the many
urban burial associations that re-invent ‘traditional’ and ‘ethnic’ ‘rural’ traditions
for burial ceremonies in town (Matsuda 1998).
The degree to which people are able to shift and manipulate normative, ma-
terial, social or spatial boundaries is, however, not unlimited. The “bargaining
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space” (Ghannam 2002: 174) may vary greatly as age, gender, social and eco-
nomic status, politics, ethnicity or places of origin create powerful lines of social
differentiation and in- and exclusion. The “art of being in-between or dwelling in
the order of ‘the other”’, as de Certeau (1984: 30) has most elegantly described
most societal practice, thus implies considerable power differentials. In fact, as
Nuijten (1998) points out, it is important to be cautious about a too optimistic
assessment of the multiple forms of tactics and strategies coming into existence
between cultural, economic, social or legal institutions and practices, a discourse
that, especially in relation to culture and ‘cultural styles’, has become so popular
in the post-modern tradition of ethnographic research and in the discussion on
cultural, economic and social globalisation processes in recent years (for exam-
ple Appadurai 1996; Hannerz 1980, 1987, 1992; Ferguson 1999). The availability
of tactics and strategies of social security is very limited for most people in de-
veloping countries. For example, most people in Sector 7, Area 25 are facing se-
vere insecurity and poverty, a situation that considerably limits their “full-house”
of (social security) strategies (Ferguson 1999: 78). This concerns their material
situation, but increasingly also touches upon their social relationships: the con-
tinuously rising AIDS death-toll in Malawi is creating a huge number of social
paupers, i.e. people who lack social relationships to be taken care of materially,
and in terms of productive or care labour (F. von Benda-Beckmann 1988). More-
over, we shall see that tightening social and economic conditions may further
challenge access to tactics and strategies of social support, as criteria of access
and denial are becoming subject to intensified negotiation or ‘ambiguitisation’
processes (Simone 1997) and may become more permeable and open to trans-
gressions, or subject to stricter interpretations and boundary setting processes as
a consequence.
Analysing social security as embedded allows us to have a ‘bifocal’ (Gupta
& Ferguson 1997) or ‘multi-local’ (Marcus 1995) perspective on social security,
which permits the simultaneous analysis of both local perceptions and living
conditions and the wider trans-local, national and global socio-economic con-
text. This does not solely refer to social security as a trans-local phenomenon:
we shall see that Structural Adjustment and the continuous re-invention of an
ever-changing political agenda, with which the donor community is exerting
considerable pressure on developing countries, are highly influential in terms of
social security. The impact of ‘Good Governance’, social risk management poli-
cies, decentralisation, community-based development strategies or the focus on
women – just to mention a few – is strongly visible when one examines the so-
cial security situation and strategies of urban migrants. Whereas the civil service
reform, which has been taking place in state social security schemes over the last
years, and the continuing liberalisation of the Malawian economy have led to
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overall worsening social and economic conditions, we shall see that the ‘project-
law’14 of donors and NGOs active in Sector 7, as well as overall changing de-
velopment ideologies, influence ‘informal’ personal support relations, changing
needs, perceptions, and rules and regulations of mutual support.
The functional approach allows for a trans-local perspective on social secu-
rity both geographically and symbolically and for a dynamic historical view of
social security. Notions, ideas, practices and tactics of social (in)security are not
static, but are underpinned by permanent changes. The sharp increase in terror-
ist attacks is becoming a major source of collective worldwide insecurity today,
an issue that was believed to have lost its threatening potential over the last
20 years. By the same token, HIV/AIDS, and the lack of land and food have
considerably challenged perceptions of (in)security in Malawi. These changes
concern the (in)securities of everyday life and challenges to lifecycle arrange-
ments (Freiberg-Strauss & Jung 1988). Childhood, youth, adult life and old age
all have their specific (in)securities concerning the well-being of a person, but
are particularly strong in the transitional periods from one phase to the other.
In order to cope with upcoming insecurities, these “deficit and surplus phases”
(ibid. 231) should ideally intersect in such a way as to be able to provide sup-
port mechanisms for those insecure from those in a phase of relative security.
We shall see that especially HIV/AIDS has severely disturbed life-cyclical crisis
situations and their coping strategies. This also includes changing perspectives
on past, present and future. As reciprocal arrangements, social security mech-
anisms are always based on past experiences and – hidden or overt – future
expectations. These “promises encapsulated in existing mechanisms” (F. & K. von
Benda-Beckmann 1994: 17) are never totally foreseeable and as such, provide a
major source of insecurity. Expectations might not be fulfilled, or estimations
of future developments might turn out to be wrong. Especially within a trans-
local social security economy, these discontinuities and ruptures in relations to
support expectations are clearly visible.
1.7 Methodological Considerations
In this second part of the chapter I will discuss some methodological considera-
tions. I present the research design, including the methods and tools used dur-
ing the fieldwork. In so-doing, I also discuss methodological problems that arose
during the preparation for the fieldwork, as well as during the fieldwork itself in
Malawi. Especially the use of a broad analytical approach to social security and
the focus on town has posed methodological challenges.
14 See Chapter 4.
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1.7.1 Methodology and Tools
The research is based on semi-structured interviews that were concentrated on
previously structured research areas capturing different aspects of the central
research questions. However, the list of keywords which we usually prepared
before going to an interview often presented a mere point of departure for open-
ended interviews that usually led into completely different aspects and ques-
tions. Against the background of my research questions focusing on changes
of social security in the context of urbanisation and migration processes, we
also conducted a series of narrative interviews in order to capture migrants’ and
urban-dwellers’ life histories (Krüger & Marotzki 1994, Hermans 1991; see also
Flick 1996). Life histories and interviews on temporarily or thematically lim-
ited periods of peoples’ bibliographies provided important insights into social
security processes in the context of migration and urbanisation. Most of the in-
terviews we conducted were with individuals. We also conducted some group
interviews, although not as many as we had planned, as peoples’ workloads and
time-pressure often made it difficult to bring them together. Time pressure even
turned out to be a problem with our individual interview partners. Faced with
the difficult economic situation and the approaching hunger period, people were
too taken up with the business of survival to have time for ‘chatting’.
Interviews with persons involved in community matters, such as the village
headman, the local City Council officer or members of the development commit-
tee, and activists and representatives of religious or other associations, clubs and
NGOs, formed yet another important part of the research. The nature of the re-
search also made it necessary to plunge into the field of policy. In addition to an
extensive literature study on relevant policy documents, we conducted a series
of interviews with representatives of relevant institutions, ministries and depart-
ments, donors and NGOs, concerned – amongst others – with the provision of
plots, housing, and infrastructure, as well as social policies and development
projects.
The fact that we were living in the area allowed us to participate in every-
day life of Sector 7. The daily routine of fetching water or going to the market,
the participation in social, cultural or political events of the Sector and finally,
the extensive chatting, brought valuable insights and observations that would
not have been possible otherwise. This was especially relevant in terms of per-
ceptions or claims of social support that hardly complied with reality, i.e. what
people told us they would do and actual social practices turned out to differ
quite substantially.
These ethnographic methods were sustained by visual techniques taken from
the so-called ‘RRA-toolbox’ (Rapid Rural Appraisal) and partly adapted for our
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purposes: transect walk, seasonal calendar and institutional or Venn diagram
(Chambers 1997). These tools, such as the Venn diagram, proved to be very use-
ful, particularly because they allowed for the visualisation of support relations,
which made it easier to discuss them. This network analysis (Mitchell 1969)
made together with the people concerned helped us to get an idea of the “struc-
tural morphology” (Keupp 1987: 26) of the social security networks, including the
relational closeness, the multiplexity and the quality of interaction with which
people considered certain support relations in contrast to others. In addition, it
also enabled us to get an idea of and discuss power relations and difficulties in
relation to access to social support inherent in these relations.
The quantity of policy and statistical data on conditions and poverty in Ma-
lawi available has increased significantly over the last decade. For urban areas,
existing material is still not very plentiful. The Malawian political and economic
ideology that focused on the ‘rural’ as the central sphere of economic develop-
ment, and as a basic model of the political and social order, together with the
low rates of urbanisation, have strongly influenced the research focus in the past,
which for a long time focused on the ‘rural’, and – one must add – still does. This
also concerns ethnographic studies. The most valuable materials on urban stud-
ies onMalawi still remain the studies by Deborah Potts (1986)Gillian Roe (1992a;
1992b; 1992c), Francois Lodh (1994; 1996) and StephenDevereux (1999). In recent
years, the works of Chilowa et al. (2000), Anders (2005), Van der Borne (2005)
and especially Englund (2001; 2002b) have provided important contributions to
different aspects of urbanisation in Malawi.
1.7.2 The Selection of the Research Site
The selection of Sector 7 as a research site was largely determined by the way
this study came into being. In 1998, I was hired by the German Technical Corpo-
ration (GTZ) to carry out research on social security in an urban area as part of
a Malawian-wide research project on social security.15 Sector 7, the area chosen
by the GTZ, was one of many marginal areas that had been recently occupied by
the urban population since the transition to democracy in 1994. The occupants
had formed a strong local initiative in order to gain access to urban infrastructure
on a self-help basis. This was also the reason why the area was chosen. It was
15 This study is based on data collected in a Malawi-wide research project the Social Policy Advi-
sory Services to the National Economic Council at the Office of the President and Cabinet (SPAS-
Project) conducted fromMay to September 1998 to provide base line information on social security
inMalawi. The information gathered in five different sites chosen for their special social, economic
and ecological conditions was to be used todevelop a social policy framework for Malawi which
particularly addresses the needs of the vulnerable members of the society. Four Dutch students,
myself, and five Malawian graduates in social science conducted the field research.
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hoped that this local initiative would provide an important institutional entry
point for the establishment of a local community self-help project.16 When I had
to select a research site for my own research, I decided to continue researching
in Sector 7. Apart from the fact that Sector 7 provided the ‘ideal’ site for my re-
search purposes, the fact I had already made contact with the people there was
an important selection criteria.
In 1998, during my first field stay, my by then research colleague Maggie
Chipasula and me had created ‘artificial boundaries’ by concentrating on a spe-
cific neighbourhood comprising of a number of rows of housing and covering
around 40 households which provided the basis for our sample. The mixed so-
cial structure of the area had not yet been transformed to result in a spatial divi-
sion of the area. As such, the sample encompassed people from all sorts of social,
economic and regional backgrounds that, it was hoped, would provide a broad
range of different ways of life and modes of social security strategies. Interview
partners were selected randomly, but in such a way as to guarantee a wide het-
erogeneity of aspects that supposedly influence social security strategies, such
as gender, age, class, status, origin, type of employment, and length and type of
migration. This neighbourhood, which provided the core of Sector 7 and was
in the first corner of the area to be occupied, with most of its inhabitants being
newcomers, also provided the core of my fieldwork in 2001, as my primary aim
was to examine the extent to which urbanisation processes had changed social
security strategies.
However, the changes that had taken place by 2001 led my new research
assistant Nellie Chipwanya and me to transgress our field boundaries. People
within the area and Lilongwe in general tend to be very mobile – and many, in
fact, had moved to other places, forcing us to work trans-locally. At the same
time, the shift in geographical focus was also a consequence of the new develop-
ments that had taken place during the fieldwork and which we wanted to follow
up on. This included the issue of AIDS-orphans, grandparent-headed house-
holds, property grabbing, and witchcraft. In order to compare and get to know
more people with similar experiences, we would often visit people and places
in other sections of Sector 7. By then, this had also become necessary, as a cer-
tain spatial hierarchy had developed following the inward migration of higher
income people.
16 For a discussion on the development initiatives in Sector 7 and the conflicts evolving around them
see Chapter 4.
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1.7.3 The Town as an Ethnographic Field
Ferguson (1999) unmasks much of the methodological quagmire related to the
city as yet another aspect of amodernist dualism that juxtaposes a socially highly
heterogeneous and incomprehensible city structure against the ‘social whole’ of
a socially, economically and geographically bounded village structure. Notwith-
standing, fieldwork in urban areas causes much methodological anxiety. Ques-
tions of which neighbourhood to chose and whom to ask caused much concern
in the beginning of the research. The size of the area, with around 8,000 inhabi-
tants, and its social heterogeneity encompassing people from completely differ-
ent backgrounds, pertaining to different social and economic classes, and living
very different lifestyles made it even more difficult to get an ‘idea’ of the social
(in)security of its inhabitants. The methodological insecurity was nurtured fur-
ther by the fact that some of the reviewers of the research project had voiced
considerable doubt about the study being representative, as I had planned to
look into one area only. They wanted me to look into other areas in Lilongwe as
well. Yet the aim of the field research in Sector 7/Area 25, in which I spent a total
of 12 months between May 1998 and December 2001, was not to provide a pos-
sibly comprehensive overview of common social security strategies of migrants
in the urban fringe of Lilongwe. In the face of Simone’s observation that most
urbanisation strategies are actually highly volatile and provisional (1990: 162),
and within my timeframe, this would have been in any case an impossible task
to fulfil. Rather than aiming at providing a comprehensive picture of social se-
curity in urban areas, the central concern of this study was to seek out the ‘logics
of practice’ (Bourdieu 1990) underlying the everyday practices often not looked
at or left unattended in conventional approaches. Focusing on what Jane Finch
(1989: 178) has called, the processes of ‘working it out’, the study aims to unravel
the way in which urban migrants manage, produce and negotiate their social se-
curity and which structural, social and economic or other constraints they face
in gaining access to social support and in making these arrangements work.
This was also the reason for returning to the same area after three years.
Whereas the stay in the field in 1998 provided a snapshot of the urbanisation
dynamics of the area and of social security mechanisms in particular, the return
in 2001 enabled me to embed the developments taking place within a longer
time frame of urbanisation processes taking place in Lilongwe. The return to the
same area over a three-year period also made visible the particular role of these
urban borderlands as focal points of urbanisation dynamics typical for many
third world cities today.
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1.7.4 Multi-sited Ethnography
The geographic focus of the study in town on the one hand, and the subject of the
study itself, dealing with social security of urban migrants on the other, ties in
strongly with a theoretical and methodological debate that has profoundly chal-
lenged the anthropological discussion, i.e. globalisation and mobility. The de-
construction of culture and place as an isomorphic unity against social, economic
and cultural processes of globalisation in anthropology (see Hannerz 1986; 1992;
Fardon 1995; Appadurai 2000; Gupta & Ferguson 1997) has also led to a re-
consideration of methodological questions concerning the ethnographic field.
Whereas stationary, long-term fieldwork in a small, localised community through
participatory observation maintains its paradigmatic character even against the
global multi-sited processes, the fields themselves are increasingly perceived as
mobile and multi-local. This mobile notion of the field also requires a different
methodological approach that Marcus (1995) has subsumed under the term of a
“multi-sited ethnography”. According to Marcus (1995: 105), “multi-sited research
is designed around chains, paths, threads, conjunctions, or juxtapositions of locations
in which the ethnographer establishes some form of literal, physical presence, with an
explicit, posited logic of association or connection among sites that in fact defines the ar-
gument of the ethnography”. Depending on the research context, the tracing down
of or following up on people, things, a metaphor, a plot, story or allegory, a life
or biography and finally, a conflict (ibid.), is seen as a sine qua non for an ade-
quate understanding of both trans-local and local processes. In fact, in recent
years, researchers have increasingly started to investigate consequences of mi-
gration in both the place of origin as well as the place(s) they were moving to
(Hahn 2004). It is even argued that the ‘culture of migration’ (Lambert 2002)
can only be adequately understood by starting to investigate the local culture in
the place of origin, which would provide the pre-condition and points of depar-
ture for migration motives and flows, rather than by concentrating on trans-local
movements.
Whereas my initial intention was to follow people and social security flows
back to their places of origin or wherever they were anchored, I soon decided
to remain in town and concentrate on the migrant networks there. One reason
for this was related to my basic thesis, which concentrated primarily on town
and the urbanisation of the migrants and their social security networks in Sector
7. This is not to say that the village and other trans-local sites were not present,
and as we shall see, they play a very important role in the migrant’s social se-
curity considerations. The village also became very present through the visits
and written interventions of village people who came to town to visit, to ask for
support, or sent letters in order to do so. The voices of these villagers are also in-
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corporated in the study, providing valuable insights, especially in relation to the
nature of and the stark difference between claims and reality concerning urban-
rural support. These aspects are always analysed from the urban perspective as
well. Ultimately, however, the decision to confine the study to town was based
on the fact that rural-urban exchange largely did not take place. While most peo-
ple had trans-local relations beyond the city boundaries, only a few moved up
and down on a regular basis. Most migrants were too poor to provide for regular
support, not to mention the transport money for regular visits. As we shall see,
it was largely the rural kin that came to town in order to ask for support.
Multi-sited ethnography also has, however, an important second connotation
in the context of the study. Following social security strategies and processes also
leads one into different social, economic, political and cultural fields, among
which for this study the policy field is of specific importance. Social and eco-
nomic policies, as well as the institutions that prepare and implement them on
a national and global level, including Good Governance, Structural Adjustment,
national ministries, NGOs and international organisations, are thereby impor-
tant fields that need to be studied. Shore and Wright (1997: 4) argue that, “(. . . )
policy has become an increasingly central concept and instrument in the organization
of contemporary societies. Like the modern state (to which its growth it can be linked),
policy now impinges on all areas of life so that it is virtually impossible to ignore or
escape its influence.” In this respect, the social policy arena of Malawi with its
relevant ministries, institutions, non-governmental organisations, provision and
legal regulations provided an important arena for this study. Apart from litera-
ture studies and the review of statistical data, we conducted several interviews
with representatives of international donor organisations, ministries, the City
Council, trade unions, and several NGOs present in Sector 7. Beyond that, the
global debate on social security and social policy within the international donor
community forms another arena and ‘ethnographic site’ of the study. The in-
ternational debate provides the overall framework within which this study is
embedded and from whence it came. At the same time, however, this global de-
bate has already had a local impact, influencing as it does the everyday lives of
the people in Malawi and Sector 7. They are affected by overall changing politi-
cal frameworks and changing policy premises, such as poverty alleviation; or in
a more local context, the shifting emphasis of many NGO-projects aiming at also
incorporating social aspects in their small-scale credit schemes, as is also the case
in Sector 7. This shift in politics towards more a poverty- and socially-oriented
policy approach has also found entrance in the language and the vocabulary of
the people, who discuss specific issues in different terms than they would have a
few years ago. This is especially visible with those working in organisation and
those people in the community that are directly involved in community develop-
ment and work hand in hand with NGOs and international donor organisations.
Chapter 2
The Political Economy of Malawi
2.1 Introduction
Examining social security as an intrinsic aspect of societal order cannot be ade-
quately understood and ‘placed’ without taking into account the wider histor-
ical social, economic and political context shaping and influencing it. This is
all the more the case in Malawi, where the British colonial period has left deep
imprints in the different spheres of society that continue to dominate Malawian
economics, politics and society today.
In contrast to the booklets of the Malawian tourism industry, which promote
the country as the warm heart of Africa, the British colonial authorities always
considered Nyasaland to be in a marginal position. The “imperial slum” or “Ire-
land of Central Africa – poor, scenic and with a ready supply of exportable labour”
(Pryor 1990: 39), as Malawi was described when compared to its neighbouring
colonies rich in natural resources, had indeed little else to offer its colonisers. The
lack of notable mineral resources1 and its specific geographical position also set
the natural framework for its economic development, which is mainly based on
agriculture.2 The long north-south extension of the country, stretching some 800
km along the southern extension of the African rift valley, provides for a variety
of climatic and soil conditions that make Malawi the country with the most fer-
tile soils in Africa. Its landlocked position hindered, however, the development
of large-scale agriculture as envisaged by the British when they ‘discovered’ the
1 The country possesses some mineral deposits, including bauxite, limestone, coal, and uranium,
but only a few, notably coal and limestone, are exploited due to the high cost of exploitation and
transport (Africa South of the Sahara 1996).
2 Malawi covers an area of 11.85 million hectares, of which Lake Malawi covers almost a quarter
(2.43 million hectares).
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country in 1859. The high transportation costs in linking Malawi to the outside
world soon put an end to the British endeavours. The strong dependence on
reliable lines of communication across the southern part of the continent, espe-
cially to the Pacific coast, remains one of the main features and constraints of the
Malawian economy today.
With a current population of 11.9 million and an average density of 110 per-
sons per square kilometre, Malawi is one of the most densely populated coun-
tries in Africa. This is exacerbated by the population’s very uneven distribution:
11% of the population live in the Northern Region, 39% in the centre and 50%
in the South, a distribution in stark contrast to the proportions of arable land
available, amounting to 38%, 34% and 29% respectively (Palamuleni 2000: 5).
Malawi’s population is also growing at a rapid rate, amounting to an annual
growth rate of 3.1%. This population explosion is largely attributed to the high
incidence of poverty.3 Though the annual growth rate is predicted to slow down
to 2.2% in the next 15 years – a fact also attributed to rising mortality due to
HIV/AIDS – the population will have reached 15.7 million in 2015 (UNDP 2002).
This rapidly rising population is having a serious impact on food security. As
we shall see in the course of this study, pressure on arable land is already high
and is likely to increase further. The liberalisation of the economy made agricul-
tural inputs to boost agricultural production unaffordable for most Malawians,
forcing people to start cultivating new and often less fertile land. The neglect
of fallow periods in order to meet rising food requirements is already common
practice in most regions, leading to further erosion and soil-degradation. While
most of the total arable land in Malawi is already in use, one of the most signif-
icant problems is decreasing farm size, which has an enormous impact on land
management and soil fertility. Most farmers in Malawi are smallholders cultivat-
ing on less than 1 hectare, a size considered insufficient to meet even basic food
requirements (Palamuleni 2000). This number has always been high. Over the
years, however, it has considerably increased, from 43% in 1968 to 68% in 1991,
jeopardising further the country’s food security (ibid).
Malawi has around 25 different ethno-linguistic groups. The most important
ones are the Chewa, predominant on the lakeshore and in the centre of the coun-
try; the Tumbuka, Ngoni and Tonga of the North; and the Yao, Nyanja, Lomwe and
Sena, who settle predominantly in the South (Chirwa 1998).4 In contrast to other
3 On average, poor households in Malawi have 1.5 more persons than non-poor households. This
is the same both in rural and urban areas. The inverse relationship between the wealth status of
the women and the level of fertility indicators is the same at all levels of education (Chilowa et al.
2000).
4 According to the population census in 1966, the Chewa constitute 28.3% of the population, the
Nyanja 15.3%, Lomwe 11.8%, Yao 11.2%, Ngoni 9%, Tumbuka 7.4%, Sena 2.8%, Tonga 2% and other
smaller groups amounting to 12.2% (Pryor 1990: 25).
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Southern African countries, Malawi has only a tiny percentage of European pop-
ulation, i.e. 0.2%.5 Another minority is the Asian community, which amounts to
0.3% of the total population (Bouzek 1992; Pryor 1990).
While most of the white and Asian minorities live in urban areas, the greater
part of the Malawian population is rural. Although Malawians are very mobile,
urban migration in Malawi represents a rather recent phenomenon when com-
pared to other African countries.6 Although urbanisation rates have increased
over the last decade by 68% (NSO 2000), rates of urbanisation are still very low,
lying currently at 16.3%. It is estimated that they will have reached 22.2% by the
year 2015 (UDNP 2005).
With the exception of the Tumbuka, Tonga andNgoniwho are patrilineal, most
ethnic groups in Malawi have a matrilineal descent system. The definition of so-
cial identity and kinship relations – either through the paternal or maternal line –
also encompasses rules and regulations concerning succession and inheritance
which are all intricately intertwined (see for example Peters 2002; F. von Benda-
Beckmann 1970). Historical anthropological studies have shown that marriage,
inheritance and residence patterns of the respective kinship systems have al-
ways been subject to modification and change, being exposed to conflicting inter-
ests and changing economic, social or demographic conditions (see for example
Van Velsen 1964; Phirie 1983). Yet the changes Malawian society has been go-
ing through since the 1980s, including migration, land scarcity, HIV/AIDS and
growing monetisation, have led to a profound social transformation process that
has enormously influenced inheritance patterns and rules and regulations con-
cerning access to land and other goods acquired: Peters (2002: pp. 160) argues,
in fact, that land scarcity in Malawi and the growing number of disputes over
access to it have to be understood in the context of class-formation and stratifi-
cation, rather than in the context of ‘common’ fissions and modifications of rules
and regulations taking place over a historical periodwithin kinship systems. The
severity of the disputes involving witchcraft accusations and the conversion of
kin into stranger indicates a profound economic – and by the same token, so-
cial and cultural – transformation from an economy where land is considered
a resource, also in terms of belonging and home, to an economy where land is
considered an individual commodity that may be possessed by anyone. We shall
see that this has also had consequences on social security arrangements.
Together with the ethnic line of division, regional identity plays an important
role in Malawian identity formation. The tripartition of the country into North-
5 The low economic attractions ofMalawi reduced the number of white settlers in the colony consid-
erably. The low economic and social investment of the British crown in Malawi is also attributed
to the fact that Malawi lacked a significantly large white settler community (Pryor 1990).
6 While in Malawi current urbanisation stands at 16%, in Zimbabwe the current urban population
amounts to 35%, in Zambia 35.9%, Tanzania 35.4% and Mozambique 35.6% (UNDP 2005).
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ern, Central and Southern Regions by the British colonial administration in the
1920s soon became identified with the dominant ethnic groups in the respective
areas, i.e. the Tumbuka, the Chewa and the Yao. This strong identification with cer-
tain ethnic groups was fostered further through the creation of written forms of
ChiChewa and Chitumbuka by the missionaries and their subsequent use by the
colonial administration. The creation of a Yao and Timbuka intelligentsia in the
missionary schools of the North and South was yet another important element
that forged a strong group consciousness along regional lines.
Another important strand of Malawian identity is religion. Currently, 57%
of the population belong to Christian communities, 16% are Muslims, mostly of
them Yao from the South, while 11% practice ‘natural religions’ (Naturreligionen)
(Bouzek 1992: 29). Recent statistical data indicate that roughly 7.9 million or 80%
of Malawians are Christians and 1.3 million or 13% Moslems (NSO 2000). Most
of the Christians live in the North, where they amount to 96% of the popula-
tion, compared to 84% in the Central Region and 73% in the South. In terms of
the Muslim population, the distribution is exactly the other way around, being
highest in the South with 21%, 7% in the Centre and 1% in the North (NSO 2000).
Among the Christian churches, the biggest communities are the Roman Catholic
Church (RCC), the Church of Central African Presbyterian (CCAP) and the An-
glican Church. Among the Evangelical churches, the Seventh Day Adventist
Society is the biggest, constituting the third largest denomination in Malawi as a
whole, followed by the Assemblies of God and other smaller churches. Similar to
many other countries in Africa, Malawi has experienced an upsurge of a number
of Charismatic Churches or New African Independent Churches (NAICs) in re-
cent years that enjoy a growing appeal among many Malawians. Many scholars
attribute their rising popularity to the social, economic and political transfor-
mation processes that Malawi and other countries are currently going through.
Their strong spirituality and healing aspect render many of these churches es-
pecially appealing in order to cope with increasingly difficult living situations
due to rising poverty and HIV/AIDS and a wider political environment that is
increasingly corrupt and authoritarian. The strong appeal they enjoy in many
developing countries has provoked a great deal of anthropological research in
recent years, which among others also looks at the influence of Pentecostalism
on social value and norms and their alleged contribution to increasing individ-
ualistic and liberal values and attitudes, which is closely related to our research
subject of social security and well-being (for example Van Dijk 1998; De Bruijn,
Van Dijk & Van Dijk 2001, Gifford 1991; Fiedler 2000). I will come back to this
subject when discussing religious organisations and related support structures,
which have indeed undergone substantial changes over the last years. These
changes are, however, not confined to Charismatic Churches only.
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The coincidence of ethnic, regional and – though to a lesser extent – religious
identity is a salient feature of Malawian identity and society that also left its mark
on the economic and political development of the country. Since the colonial pe-
riod, it has provided a valuable asset in gaining access to political, administrative
and economic power (Kaspin 1995; Vail & White 1989; Chirwa 1989). Likewise,
regional and ethnic identities are a key issue in understanding the very uneven
and stratified social development of the country.
2.2 Political Development
The independence that Malawi gained from Britain on July 6th 1964 under its
nationalist leader Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda who also was to become the
first prime minister, was twofold. On the one hand, Malawi became indepen-
dent from the British crown, which had taken formal control of the ‘Protectorate
Nyasaland’ in 1891. On the other, and almost more important, Malawi gained in-
dependence from the so-deeply resented British Central African Federation with
Northern and Southern Rhodesia, which had lasted from 1953 to 1964, and the
formation of which had provided the final spark for the political independence
struggle. The creation of the federation had nourished strong fears in the pro-
tectorate, and especially among the numerous labour migrants with their long
standing experience with the apartheid system in Southern Rhodesia, that the
British would sooner or later introduce similar harsh racial policies in the coun-
try that would complete the strong economic discrimination and inequalities sys-
tematically established by the British since their arrival and that had impeded
the development of a domestic economy. The huge stream of labour migration
to the estates in the South of the country and further south to the mines of South-
ern Rhodesia, which the British kept afloat due to a ‘hut tax’ system,7 resulted
in an extreme drain on the country’s labour force and economic development.
Furthermore, due to the specific structure of the agricultural sector (see 3.3),
labour migration also provided one of the few opportunities of making a liv-
ing in Malawi, whose economy was otherwise exclusively oriented towards out-
side demand, confining systematically the possibilities for a domestic economy
and its stakeholders to develop. This concerned both the Malawian peasantry
and the tiny African middle-class and estate owners that had started to evolve
during the 1940s and 1950s. The introduction of an export-oriented estate sec-
tor in the Southern Region had caused serious land-shortages in the southern
part of the country and had led to severe unrest, eventually forcing the colonial
7 Governor Johnston, the first governor to Malawi, introduced the taxation programme as early
as 1892 in order to secure a constant labour stream to the newly established estates in the South
(Africa Today 1996).
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administration to repurchase land from the estates in order to re-settle African
peasants (Thomas 1975). Rigid agricultural regulations, including set planting
and harvesting dates and the forced plantation of cassava as a crop insurance in
the aftermath of the great famine of 1949, together with rural pricing policies that
created considerable disincentives for the local production of cash-crops, further
hampered the development of a domestic economy and put an end to the aspi-
rations of the African estate owners who had accumulated land from their white
masters (McCracken 1983; 1989).
Against this background, it seems no coincidence that an outsider was sought
who would be able to forge these highly antagonistic political and economic in-
terests and grievances into a united nationalist movement. It was the ‘returnee’
Dr. Kamuzu Banda, a Chewa by origin, who had left Malawi 40 years earlier
in order to study medicine in the United States and who had worked as a prac-
titioner in Britain and Ghana for many years who took over this unifying role,
leading Malawi into a relatively peaceful independence.
It became quickly clear, however, that politics under Banda would not really
change. On the contrary, the conservative-autocratic style with which Banda
ruled both politics and economics was by and large a continuation of the British
policy of ‘indirect rule’. WhilemanyAfrican countries, includingMalawi’s neigh-
bouring countries Tanzania and Zambia, took a socialist-oriented development
strategy inspired by the pan-African movement, Banda’s ‘conservative pragma-
tism’ (Thomas 1975) was conspicuously anti-ideological. Convinced that only
economic development would ensure Malawi’s political independence in the
long run, he left the economic and administrative structures put in place by
the British largely unaltered (Pryor 1990). The ‘dual economy’ divided into an
export-oriented estate-sector and a vast smallholder sector to secure domestic
consumption was maintained and fostered in the post-colonial period, provid-
ing the main basis of the Malawian economy. The Africanisation of the largely
white colonial administration so typical of many young African states was only
gradually realised, leaving many positions in the hands of European expatriates
until late into the 1970s (Baker 2001).
2.2.1 The African Discourse
Banda’s clear opposition to pan-Africanist ideas became fully overt with the so-
called ‘cabinet crisis’ in 1964, during which he removed all his political oppo-
nents once for all and anchored his autocratic regime based on growth-oriented
capitalism, which stood in stark contrast to the more re-distributive economic
development strategy claimed by some of his ministers. Apart from the nation-
alisation of the core industries and higher investment in social services, they had
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also proposed an accelerated Africanisation of public services, all policies very
typical of the socialist pan-African movement of the time (Baker 2001).8
While Banda openly opposed the pan-African movement, ‘Africanism’ and
‘Traditionalism’ played an important role in the nationalist discourse and iden-
tity formation. The ‘traditional’ African way of life embodied in the image of the
rural Chewa village-community with its tight hierarchical social structure and its
traditional authority as its political leader, to which Banda continuously referred,
became the basis of Malawi’s “imagined community” (Anderson 1988) and pro-
vided the ideological, rhetorical and ritual framework formuch of Banda’s highly
pragmatic and ‘modern’ social and economic policies (Forster 1994; Harrigan
2001). As the Nkhoswe No. I9 he portrayed himself as the austere, but benign of
the young Malawian nation, which was to owe him ‘Unity, Loyalty, Obedience
and Discipline’ (Bouzek 1992).10
The rural focus of Banda’s politics, which also guaranteed him a stable rural
power basis, did not remain on a discursive level only. The rural areas became
the political and economic focus for fostering his authoritarian one-man regime
that he had established since the cabinet crises,11 having declared himself party
leader, prime minister and president for life. This highly centralised decision-
making structure, which practically meant that Banda took all relevant political
and economic decisions himself,12 was sustained by strong local power struc-
tures on the ground. By boosting the political power of the Chiefs through their
incorporation into the political system and the re-introduction of the ‘traditional’
local court system, he created important political allies that allowed him to ex-
tend his power to the grassroots level (Forster 1994; Power 1992). This was sus-
8 The opposition of the ministers, who all leaned towards the left wing of the Malawian Congress
Party (MCP) and had their power base mainly among the better-educated critical and urban-
based civil servants and intellectuals, was not only based on fundamental differences regarding
Malawi’s future development. It was also a political opposition movement against Banda’s in-
creasingly autocratic political style. While they also argued in terms of an African polity based on
African values and tradition, they saw its virtues in its egalitarian, communitarian style, as em-
phasised by the socialist oriented pan-African movement, rather than in its hierarchical structure,
as emphasised by Banda himself (Forster 1994; Baker 2001; Anders 2005).
9 Nkhoswe (singular) / Anskoswe (plural): Chewa for marriage advisor, usually the maternal uncle in
the matrilineal clan.
10 In this context see also Sandbrook (1985) for the intertwinement of ‘traditional’ authoritarian lead-
ership as a central element for the functioning of the domestic political economy and for its ability
to adapt to the changing international economic environment.
11 Baker refers in this context also to the political impact of the cabinet crisis. The exile and imprison-
ment of six of his cabinet ministers and closest comrades to Banda in the independence struggle
meant a major political, economic, and cultural rupture inMalawian political history (Baker 2000).
12 “The Malawian system, the Malawian style is what Kamuzu says it’s just that, and then it is finished.
Whether anyone likes it or not, that is how it is going to be here; no nonsense, no nonsense! You can’t
everybody decide what to do.” (Dr. H. Kamzu Banda cited in Braun &Weiland 1982: 355).
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tained by a rural-oriented development strategy, which was to become the focus
of Malawi’s economic policy after independence.
The economic, political and rhetorical emphasis on the countryside as the
site where the real Malawi was said to exist also implied a strong anti-urbanism,
which put the image of the traditional and organic countryside in stark contrast
to the dangerous and amoral town life. We shall see that the images, fears and
prejudices that this anti-urban discourse had created are still deeply rooted in
the rural-urban discourse and practices of urban migrants and rural dependents
today.
2.2.2 Divide and Rule: Identity as a Political and Economic Asset
However, Banda’s policy measures stood in stark opposition to his political rhet-
oric, largely based on fear and force. While he strongly emphasised the unity
and one-ness of the Malawian nation and its people, 13 regionalism and ethnicity
were to become the most important pillars of Banda’s power. Being a Chewa
himself, he promoted the Central Region disproportionately at the expense of
the other regions, especially the North. Hosting the educated elite of the country,
the northerners were the groupwhich was politically terrorised and harassed the
most, being accused of tribalism and of punitive acts against the state (Kaspin
1995; Anders 2005).14 The regional and ethnic bias towards the Central Chewa
Region also became overt in terms of the regional allocation of resources. Little
effort was made to fuel development in the Northern and Southern Regions,
whereas the centre became the focus of development spending, most obviously
with the shift of the capital from Zomba to Lilongwe City in the 1970s (Chirwa
1998).
On the political level, the omnipresence of the ‘one-man-state’ was secured
through a vast party-machinery that, via a system of forced party membership,
soon penetrated all aspects of life. Access to most public services, including
buses and hospitals, was only possible with the party membership card that be-
came the most valuable asset in everyday life. Public order and control was
largelymaintained by theMalawianYoung Pioneers (MYP). Originally the youth
organisation of the MCP, they soon developed into a militant organisation that
became Banda’s closest ally in imposing and maintaining his authoritarian rule.
13 “We must no longer think in terms of individual tribes (. . . ) we must not think in terms of our regions or
provinces: ‘Oh, you are from the North, you are from the South, you are from the centre, no! (. . . ) We are
one people, one country.” (Address by His Excellency the Life President, Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu
Banda to the wives of civil servants and female civil servants, Lilongwe Community Centre, 4
April 1975 cited in Chirwa 1998: 59).
14 The North was the first region to be evangelised and in due course, also the first to receive educa-
tion (Africa Today 1996; Pryor 1990).
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Trained as a paramilitary force to fulfil ‘special security tasks’, they killed and
detained anyone who was suspected of wanting to usurp Banda’s power (see for
example Bouzek 1993).15
Whereas traditionalism provided the ideological ‘glue’ to reinforce national
unity and loyalty, economic and political favours granted to his closest entourage
and civil servants were to become the main means through which Banda would
foster political alliances and ensure political stability (Thomas 1975). The overlap
of commercial and political interests that turned Malawi’s political elite into its
economic one remains a conspicuous feature of Malawi’s political economy up
until today, having outlived even the democratic transition.
The relatively peaceful transition to democracy in 1993 in line with many
other African states that was followed by the first democratic elections in 1994
could hardly conceal the actual strength of regionalism and ethnicity in Malaw-
ian political culture. In the first democratic elections, all the parties were region-
ally and ethnically dominated and won their votes precisely along those lines.16
Bakili Muluzi of the United Democratic Front (UDF), a Yao from the South and
Muslim by religion, became prime minister. His government faced strong oppo-
sition from the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) from the North and theMalaw-
ian Congress Party (MCP), but was able to remain in power.17 Despite Muluzi’s
attempt to intimidate the political opposition and even buy their votes, parlia-
ment narrowly defeated the amendment to the constitution that would have al-
lowed him to run for a third term in 2002. Instead, BinguWaMutharika, the min-
ister of economic affairs and a former World Bank economist, was nominated as
presidential candidate for the elections in 2004, which he won by a narrow mar-
gin.18 Having been handpicked by Muluzi as his predecessor, Mutharika was
seen as a puppet, with Muluzi still in control behind the scenes. However, with
his partly very unpopular policies, especially his anti-corruption measures in-
volving many of Muluzi’s allies19, he has shown considerable stamina.
15 For a detailed description of this sad chapter of Malawian history see Phiri/Ross (eds.) (1998)
Democratisation in Malawi. A Stocktaking. Blantyre; Africa Watch (1990) Where Silence Rules:
The Suppression of Dissent in Malawi. London.
16 Bakili Muluzi’s United Democratic Front (UDF) won most of the seats in the Southern Region
(47.3%), while Banda’s Malawian Congress Party (MCP) was mostly supported in the Central
Region (33.6%) and Chakufwa Chihana of the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) got all seats in
the North (18.6%) (Africa. South of the Sahara. 1996: 573).
17 By the end of the year, Muluzi added three new portfolios to his cabinet, all of which went to
AFORD, which by then had broken with the MCP. In making Chihana, the leader of AFORD, a
second vice prime minister, he was at least able to retain a working majority in parliament (Africa
Today 1996).
18 Bingu wa Mutharika (UDF) 35.9%, John Tembo (MCP) 27.1%, Gwandaguluwe Chakuamba (MC)
25.7%, Brown Mpinganjira (NDA) 8.7%, Justin Malewezi (independent) 2.5% [www.exunn.com,
03.08.2005].
19 The dismissal of high ranking civil servants and politicians in key positions who were close allies
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2.2.3 After Democratisation: Political Continuities and Discontinuities
A decade after the transition to democracy, the Malawian political system ap-
pears to be relapsing into authoritarianism. Despite the fact that Malawi suc-
cessfully held its third democratic multi-party elections in 2004, many observers
argue that the democratic transition has remained superficial, consisting solely
of democratic institutionalism and rhetoric. Behind the institutional façade of
democracy and multi-party elections, the authoritarian structures so deeply en-
trenched in Malawian political culture strongly persist and continue to domi-
nate Malawian politics (Phiri 1998; Englund 2001). While this has partly been
explained by the strong personal continuities of the major political figures, most
prominently Bakili Muluzi himself,20 recent political developments, including
rampant corruption and the increased use of violence to silence peaceful protest,21
sadly seem to confirm this observation.
Rather than having developed a ‘new’ democratic political culture, politi-
cians in Malawi seem to have simply adapted their “chameleon politics” (Englund
2002a:18) to the changing institutional circumstances. This expression, which
refers to the frequent shift in political alliances forged by Malawian politicians
to best fit individual political or economic interests, did not change at all with
the rise of a multi-party system and the introduction of popular elections. Over
the past five years, several notable politicians have shifted their party affilia-
tions back and forth between several parties and coalitions, without their anti-
democratic behaviour being seriously questioned, leaving little room for demo-
cratic principles to take root (Dzimbiri 1998).
Democratisation, human rights and poverty alleviation only seem to have
been incorporated within the political discourse as a means to gain access to in-
ternational donor money and political and economic favours in Muluzi’s new
democratic Malawi. Allegations of nepotism and corruption, including the buy-
ing-off of politicians, judges or other political key figures in favour of UDF pol-
itics, are numerous and have increased over the years.22 Although political and
economic circumstances have changed, personal self-enrichment on the part of
people in power, government officials and their relatives through public monies
and industries remains widespread, strongly echoing Banda’s politics of grant-
ing economic favours to his closest entourage for political loyalty and stabil-
of Muluzi by Mutharika resulted in speculation that Muluzi was going to canvass for support
with members of the parliamentary opposition in order to impeach the president Mutharika and
get rid of him [www.afrol.com/articles/15463, 03.08.2005].
20 Before moving into opposition, Bakili Muluzi had been the MCP-secretary (Englund 2002a).
21 During the demonstrations against the proposed government reform that foresaw the introduc-
tion of tuition fees for university education, a student was shot dead in 2001.
22 See Anders (2005).
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ity (Chirwa 2000; Anders 2005).23 Ethnicity, regionalism and increasingly also
religion continue to shape political spaces and boundaries: while the influen-
tial Christian churches twice supported the election of the Muslim Bakili Mu-
luzi, their fierce opposition against a third term in 2002 and the election of the
UDF in 2004 clearly had anti-Muslim connotations. This was not so much based
on political considerations, as on fear of losing the absolute monopoly Chris-
tian churches enjoy in Malawi: they fear that the construction of mosques and
the increasing role Muslim institutions play in the provision of education and
health services might decrease their religious, social and political power within
the country (Meinhardt 2004).
The regional voting pattern was also of overriding importance in the second
and third democratic elections.24 Ethnic and regional origin retained their signif-
icance as assets with regard to access to economic and political capital on both
national and local levels, although this time it was the South, being the home
of presidents Muluzi and Mutharika, that was disproportionately favoured to
other regions (Chirwa 1998).
Notwithstanding the local government structures finally put in place in 2000,
the centralist tendencies as regards decision-making and resource allocation con-
tinue. It appears that the enthusiastically put forward decentralisation process,
through which it was hoped to increase democratisation by the stronger re-
distribution of financial resources, decision-making power and planning capac-
ity on regional and local levels, has fostered party nepotism and corruption. In-
stead of empowerment and an increase of control by the people over the state
and its resources, the decentralisation policy in Malawi has led to a stronger
degree of control of the people by the state, which in many places means total
control on the part of the UDF and the de-facto resurrection of a single-party-
state. Its influence in formulating and implementing the Local Government Act,
including the timing of the process, allowed the UDF to gain control of almost
all local government structures by the time the Act was finally put in place.25
Prospects are thus not particularly encouraging forMalawi’s democratisation
process. With reforms apparently not taking root, the political system has been
23 Chirwa notes that the allocation of sugar distribution quotas of one of the sugar producing com-
panies belonging to the president himself may even be interpreted as a reflection of major political
events in Malawi, as the quota for Chakufwa Chihana, the leader of the opposition party AFORD,
was significantly reduced after he resigned from the coalition government (Chirwa 2000).
24 In 1999, AFORD gained 28 of 33 seats in the North, MCP 54 out of 71 in the Central Region and
the UDF 76 out of 84 in the South (Patel 2000: 46). In 2004, Mutharika and the UDF took almost all
the seats in the South. TheMCP got all its seats exclusively in the Central Region, while the North
was divided among the many small opposition parties and their northern leaders (Meinhardt
2004; [www.afrol.com/articles/12431, 03.08.2005].
25 The UDF holds 610 out of a total of 810 seats (Mönikes 2001).
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left with a very weak basis. In fact, political frustration and indifference seem to
be on the increase. The low participation rates in local government elections in
2000 and the presidential elections in 2004, which fell from 94% in 1999 to 59.4%
four years later, are a strong indication of rising political apathy. Despite the fact
that democratic political culture, with the guarantee of human rights, freedom
of speech and freedom of the press, was embraced enthusiastically and evoked
a wave of strong critical potential all over Malawi, room for civil and political
opposition and protest is narrowing down once more, while authoritarian ten-
dencies and political violence in society and among the political elite are flaring
up. Democracy seemed to have led to institutional and rhetorical changes, but
political practices remain, however, largely unchanged. Despite efforts by the
new president Mutharika to take corruption in hand and stabilise the economy
by distributing land and enforcing food security policies, the results are very
modest thus far. It appears that in the face of a continuous economic decline
and a political culture mainly preoccupied by self-enrichment rather than the
improvement of the living conditions of the poor, the appeal for democracy will
continue to remain weak, both with the populace and the politicians themselves.
2.3 Economic Policy
The economic growth of the Malawian economy after independence was to a
large part based on the continuation and expansion of the colonial economic
structure put in place by the British. By enlarging and fostering the dual struc-
ture of the agricultural sector, divided into large-scale estate farming producing
cash crops for exportation and smallholder agriculture to secure the domestic
food supply, Malawi achieved remarkable growth rates during the 1970s and
1980s.26 The agrarian policies put in place largely maintained the colonial eco-
nomic order, fromwhich the estate-sector profitedmost (McCracken 1983; Simon
1975). This also concerned the new land policy, which was largely a continuation
of British colonial land policy. Similar to the notion of “crown” land, the Land
Act passed in 1965 foresaw the transfer of all customary land into the hands
of government and the president. While this arrangement was promoted by
Banda as a means to individualise land ownership through leasehold arrange-
ments to private individuals, in practice it facilitated enormously the transfer of
large parts of uncultivated arable land to the estate sector. Between 1967 and
26 Between 1970 and 1980, the average growth rate was estimated at 6% per annum, while the vol-
ume of exports rose from US$ 48 to US$ 285 million in the same period (Chinsinga 2001). Annual
growth rates of tobacco production averaged 11.2% from 1960 to 1969, a figure that rose to an av-
erage of 20% from 1970-1980. The production of tea doubled from 3.7% to 6.6% in the same period
(Kydd & Christiansen 1982: 361).
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1994, more than 1 million hectares of customary land had been ‘lost’ in this way
from customary arrangements (GoM 1999/Vol. 1: 66). At the same time, the area
of arable land occupied by estates rose continuously from 2% in 1970 to 13%
in 1978 and 16% in 1984 (Hirschmann 1990), exacerbating further overall land-
shortages and the horrendous inequality of land distribution, which, as we will
see, constitutes one of the major social and economic constraints the country is
facing today. The colonial policy of assigning the production of high value flue
cured and burley tobacco, tea and sugar exclusively to the estates, while allow-
ing the smallholders only to produce the less profitable dark-fired and air-cured
varieties, was maintained. The high demand of the estate sector for a stable and
cheap labour force was secured via a highly exploitative ‘visiting tenant system’,
which was basically a variation of the colonial thangata-system (Kydd & Chris-
tiansen 1982).27
The smallholders, on the other hand, were to ensure the country’s food self-
sufficiency, mainly through the production of maize. Through a myriad of pric-
ing policies that forced peasants to sell their products at fixed commodity prices
far below world market levels to the Agricultural and Development Marketing
Board (ADMARC), huge financial gains could be made. They provided the fi-
nancial resources for investment in the Malawian economy, which was mainly
in the estate sector. The sizeable profits made from the estates and the industries
went almost entirely into the private pockets of Banda himself and the ‘Press
Corporation Ltd.’, a huge conglomerate of estates and industries. This pro-
vided the economic basis for political power, dominated by Banda himself: by
distributing estates and shares among high-ranking party functionaries, senior
civil servants, chiefs or high-ranking employees in the industries and parastatals,
Banda was able to secure and buy off political loyalty (Harrigan 2001; Chinsinga
2001; Anders 2005).
2.3.1 Labour Migration – An Institutional Pattern of the Malawian Economy
The policy of securing domestic consumption was also pursued in the indus-
trial sector, which largely consisted of import-substituting production, mainly
27 During the colonial period, the thangata-system was a quasi-feudal arrangement under which
peasants had to supply labour to the estates in exchange for the use of a plot of land. This highly
exploitative system, a major source of unrest in 1915 and the independence struggle in the 1950s,
was abolished at the end of the colonial period. The so-called ‘visiting tenant scheme’ developed
at the same time as thangata remained. This equally exploitative share-cropping arrangement,
under which families obtained land from the estates on the condition that they grew cash-crops
which they were then obliged sell to the estates at a usually very low price, provided the basis for
the success of the rural economic development strategy of post-colonial Malawi until the 1980s
(Kydd & Christiansen 1982).
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food processing and consumer goods industries, mostly clothes, sugar and to-
bacco. Due to a small domestic market and the limited opportunities for export
attributable to its landlocked position, Malawi’s industrial sector never achieved
substantial growth rates.
The lack of industrial development is also the result of a rigid minimumwage
policy that kept rural-urban income differentials low and – bymaking large-scale
rural-urban migration unattractive – guaranteed the availability of a large and
stable workforce for agricultural production, especially for the estate-sector (Si-
mon 1975). However, it also prevented the development of a stable industrial
labour force needed to increase and diversify industrial production. The focus in
labour market policy on the availability of a huge flexible labour force that could
be channelledwhere needed is still apparent today. Most of the industrial labour-
ers in Sector 7 who work in the tobacco processing industries are employed on
a seasonal basis, which does not allow most of them to establish themselves in
town on a permanent basis, as they are forced to return to the rural areas for
cultivation. This trans-local pattern of making a living, actually enforced and
institutionalised by the Malawian government, explains to a certain extent the
continuing and intrinsic importance of labour migration as a trans-local, rural-
rural and urban-rural practice as a means for economic survival up until today.
The same holds for labour migration abroad, which remained a salient fea-
ture of Malawi’s post-colonial economy. The remittances sent back to Malawi
from the labour migrants working in the mines in Zambia, Zimbabwe and South
Africa provided the second pillar of the national income. At its culmination in
the early 1970s, around 487,932 persons – or 10.3% of the Malawian population,
most of them young men – were working abroad, providing 10% of the national
export income (Bouzek 1992). In the late 1970s a strong return migration set in,
which was mainly fuelled by the rising demand in the rapidly expanding estate
sector, but was also heralding the rising economic difficulties in the receiving
countries starting at the beginning of the 1980s (Christiansen & Kydd 1983).28
Since then, Malawian labour migration has steadily decreased and today has
more or less ceased, at least officially.29 The fact that labour migration has virtu-
ally come to a halt has also induced a demographic change in Malawi, especially
in relation to urbanisation. Continuing poor economic performance and high un-
employment rates in Zambia, Zimbabwe or South Africa forced many migrants
28 Between 1988 and 1992, the South African government repatriated Malawian migrant work-
ers and refused further recruitment, arguing that they would contribute to a further spread of
HIV/AIDS in the country. While the incident caused not only considerable diplomatic turmoil,
but also divided the two populations, evidence suggests that HIV/AIDS was used as a smoke-
screen to get rid of the foreign labour force (for a detailed discussion see Chirwa 1998).
29 There is evidence of clandestine migration to South Africa and Botswana. We have, however, no
reliable data to confirm this.
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and their families to return to Malawi. Whereas before they would have stayed
in their home villages for a few months before departing again, the returnees
now largely settle in town. In addition, most people who before would have
gone abroad now settle in the city. Rural-rural labour migration, mainly to the
estates or increasingly often in search of arable land remains high nevertheless.
2.3.2 Structural Adjustment
The economic growth and expansion of the Malawian economy came to an ab-
rupt halt in 1978 when the sharp fall in commodity prices plunged the economy
into a deep recession. The narrow focus on the export of only a few agricultural
products, the low productivity of the smallholder sector caused by the rigid pric-
ing and wage policy, and an increasing budget deficit, led to serious balance of
payments problems (Mwanza 1999; Harrigan 2001). The situation was further
aggravated by the disruption of the rail route to the port of Beira-Nacala as a re-
sult of the intensified civil war in Mozambique. Being Malawi’s only means of
access to the Indian Ocean and carrying about 90% of exports, this dealt a serious
blow to the Malawian economy (Hirschmann 1990; Chinsinga 2001).
The economic crisis led Malawi to be the first country to adopt a Structural
Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1981, which was followed by series of sta-
bilisation programmes and loan facilities in the following years. Measures in-
cluded, amongst others, the removal of subsidies and guaranteed prices, includ-
ing the liberalisation of Burley-tobacco-production for smallholders, the privati-
sation of public enterprises, retrenchments in public services, and diversification
of investment. In the financial sector, the rationalisation of public expenditure
through the introduction of a cash flow budget system30, a revision of the tax
system, and the flotation of the Kwacha in 1994 to boost Malawi’s export compet-
itiveness, were the most important measures (Mwanza 1999; Chirwa & Chilowa
1997; Anders 2005).
However, while these measures all aimed at stabilising the Malawian econ-
omy, the effects were rather counterproductive: although GDP per capita in-
creased substantially, real capita growth was on average lower than in the pre-
adjustment period, amounting to 1.7% and 3%˙ respectively (Mwanza 1999).
While overall statutory nominal wages had increased significantly, high infla-
tion rates that reached 83% between 1991 and 1995 and the subsequent increase
in prices led to a decline in real wages and purchasing power, which particularly
hit the poorest sections of the population and contributed to a further widening
30 The cash-flow budget system, which is based on monthly allocations in order to reduce and con-
trol public expenditure and make the spending process more transparent, was introduced in 1998
(Harrigan 2001).
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of the income gap, which by then was already one of the most unequal in the
world (Chilowa & Chirwa 1997; Mwanza 1999).
Although industrial production did increase slightly, the impact on the over-
all structure of economic production in terms of a stronger diversification re-
mains marginal. Agricultural production continues to be the mainstay of the
Malawian economy, employing about 85% of Malawi’s labour force and con-
tributing to about 35% of the annual GDP (Chinsinga 2001). The decrease in
world prices for Malawi’s main export products in the 1990s further deepened
the crisis by substantially reducing the export earnings of tea, sugar and tobacco,
the major foreign exchange earner.31As a consequence, estates are increasingly
trying to diversify their cash-crop production by investing in other high-value
crops, such as chilli and paprika, pulses, cut flowers and the organic production
of spices (GoM 2000). Apart from pulses, which have overtaken cotton as one of
the major export commodities, their export volume is not yet very significant.
The fall in commodity prices and production of Malawi’s primary cash crops
in the 1990s also affected industrial production, which is largely based on food
processing. Production fell by 52% from 1998 to 1999 alone (!). In terms of per-
centage of GDP, this meant a further decline of 4% from 16% in 1994 to 12% in
1999. Tightening competition due to the trade and exchange rate liberalisation
that took place in the course of Structural Adjustment in recent years has also
forced some of the largest firms, such as Lever Brothers or the British American
Tobacco Company, to close down their production in Malawi (Harrigan 2001).
Government aims to diversify its domestic production by shifting industrial
production to the manufacturing industry (GoM 2000). Despite a cheap and
abundant labour force, the dependence on the import of production inputs, such
as machines and raw materials, together with a general scarcity of foreign ex-
change, renders production costs high.
2.3.3 Poverty Alleviation
The systematic neglect of welfare issues and social spending in Structural Aj-
dustment policies resulted in the further decline of the social status of theMalaw-
ian population, especially as regards health and education. In order to cushion
the most adverse effects of the adjustment policy, Malawi embarked on a new
programme that came to be known as the Social Dimension of Adjustment at the
31 Tobacco constitutes over 60% of all export commodities. The low prices achieved at the auction
floors are attributable to the decreasing quality of tobacco processing, the liberalisation of the
tobacco market which allows Malawian merchant companies to buy cheap tobacco abroad and
mix it with their own tobacco and finally, the negative impacts of anti-smoking campaigns that
saw large amounts of tobacco left on auction floors (GoM 2000).
Economic Policy 53
beginning of the 1990s and which became the predecessor of the Poverty Allevi-
ation Programme (PAP). Shifting its focus from a purely growth-oriented policy
towards a policy that tries to integrate poverty and social policy-related issues
into the development process, poverty alleviation was to become the official po-
litical and economic doctrine of the new democratic Malawi (Chinsinga 2001;
Harrigan 2001).
The Poverty Alleviation Programme, also referred to as the Malawian ‘new
deal policy’ with regard to the similarities of measures taken (Banda et al. 1998),
implied a shift in the economic focus of the economy from agriculture towards
commerce as the new motor of development. Measures focus mainly on the
enhancement of employment opportunities in the informal sector of the econ-
omy and the smallholder sector via improved access to credit-facilities, technical
skill training and better marketing measures, with which it was hoped to boost
both the economic and financial sector (Chinsinga 2001). The country experi-
enced an enormous upsurge in credit-initiatives for small- and medium-scale
enterprises. However, most of these very ambitious credit initiatives have failed.
Many of the funds designed to operate as revolving funds dried up, as many of
the beneficiaries defaulted or simply did not pay, because most initiatives were
strongly politicised and were used by politicians and voters to exchange eco-
nomic favours for political ones and vice versa (Chinsinga 2001; Harrigan 2001).
The strong intertwinement of political and economic interests thus remains
a salient feature, even after the transition to democracy, with the only differ-
ence lying in the economic framework. While Banda used to secure political
alliances via the donation of large estates to loyal politicians and civil servants,
Muluzi, as a businessman, has been granting economic favours and production
shares in commerce and industry to his political allies. This policy not only ham-
pers democratic development, but also major economic reforms, such as the new
Land Act put in place in 2002 that foresaw major land redistribution. Although
recognising the importance of the re-distribution of estate-land to smallholders
in order to address the problem of land inequality in the country, the interest of
many politicians and businessmen in retaining the status quo has been a major
obstacle to any policy being put into action so far (Chinsinga 2001).
Another salient feature of Malawi’s political economy that remained and
even increased with democratisation is the strong degree of donor dependency.
Banda’s pragmatic growth-oriented development approach and the largely cor-
ruption-free and very efficient administrative system gaveMalawi a lot of credits
with aid agencies, which Banda readily used (Simon 1975). The country’s high
dependence on donor money became fully overt in 1992/93, when the freez-
ing of donor aid caused by Malawi’s poor performance as regards human rights
and Good Governance provided a major reason for triggering democratic re-
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forms. The share of donor assistance is especially high in development, where
in 2001/2002 alone donor assistance accounted for 74% of total development ex-
penditure. Furthermore, donors also finance a considerable share of Malawi’s
balance of payments sheet: in 2000/2001, external sources financed nearly 75%
of the budget deficit (GoM 2001).
2.3.4 The Neo-liberal Consequences
Despite the poverty-oriented rhetoric of the PAP and the international finance in-
stitutions, the reforms andmeasures imposed by the latter remain largely growth-
oriented, gearing the vulnerable Malawian economy towards further liberalisa-
tion and deregulation, and have consistently undermined any poverty-alleviating
impact. In fact, poverty rates have increased since 1994, currently amounting to
65.3% of the population living with less than MK 10.47 – or roughly a third of
a dollar per day (MPRSP 2002: 23). In relation to the proportion of income that
households spend on food, poverty rates are even worse, amounting to 89.9%,
which translates into 49% of the rural and 93.4% of the urban population living
in poverty (Chilowa and Chirwa 1997). This is even more remarkable in the light
of Malawi having been food secure until the mid-1980s.
Whereas unfavourable weather conditions leading to periodic droughts and
hunger, such as in 2001 and 2002, and the low productivity of the smallholder
sector, are usually cited as the major reasons for the decrease in food security, the
underlying causes are mainly structural. In addition to the rising lack of land
and the small sizes of plots that do not allow for a diversification of production,
HIV/AIDS puts an enormous strain on the much-needed labour force.32 While
less labour is available due to the high death toll, much labour is also needed
to take care of the sick (Devereux 2002). The success of the so-called ‘starter
pack initiative’ that involved the free distribution of suitable cereal and legume
seeds and fertiliser packages and produced a record harvest in 199833 showed
that difficult access to farming inputs is yet another major bottleneck. Economic
liberalisation, including the removal of subsidies for fertiliser and seeds, has
made access to much-needed agricultural inputs costly for most Malawian farm-
ers.
Although its problems are well known, Malawi’s food situation has reached
32 One would tend to assume that the high death toll due to HIV/AIDS would at least ease pressure
in terms of food scarcity. However, at the time of the research, there was no indication to confirm
this tendency. Moreover, considering the decreasing productivity of land in general and the fact
that HIV/AIDS also destroys the much-needed labour force for food production, it remains to be
seen to what extent the stress on land and food security may be eased.
33 In 1998 the small-scale sector grew by 18.9%, which was followed by a growth of 13.4% in 1999,
which slumped to 1.7% in 2000 (GoM 2000; 2001).
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an alarming low since then. The delayed distribution of the starter packs, de-
layed rains in the Central Region and floods in the South of the country in 2001
led to the worst famines Malawi had ever experienced since the great famine of
1949 (Devereux 2002; Anders 2005). The famine, that caused the deaths of at least
500-1,000 people, was exacerbated by the fact that the government sold off all
the Strategic Food Reserves. The resulting maize shortage led to an outrageous
pricing policy at local markets, rendering maize unaffordable for most people.34
Although harvests were good in 2003, food production slumped to 37% of the
volume needed to keep the country food secure in 2004/2005, which means that
large parts of the country are facing another famine that – according to the in-
ternational community – will be worse than the one in 2001.35 In his analysis of
the famine in 2001, Devereux points at yet another aspect that is of major signif-
icance for social security. He argues that the severity of the famine was also due
to the falling ability of the population to cope with production shocks and food
scarcity (Devereux 2002). We shall see that the same can be said of many risks
and insecurities with which existing social security mechanisms and actors have
increasing difficulty to cope.
Projections for macro-economic development given by the Malawian govern-
ment and the IMF within the framework of the MPRSP are very positive, talking
about an average GDP growth of at least 5% during the next decade and an infla-
tion rate exceeding not more than 5% (MPRSP 2002). The 10% annual growth of
GDP this would require stands in sharp contrast to overall economic conditions
and current growth rates. The growth of GDP fell from 3.6% in 1999 to 2.1%
in 2000 (GoM 2001). In 2001, growth of GDP slumped to –1.5%, further reduc-
ing per capita income from US$ 160 in 2000 and US$ 156 in 2002 (UNDP 2005).
Against a backdrop of continuing famine and decreasing prices for Malawi’s
main export products, prospects for a recovery of the economy seem to be rather
bleak.
2.4 Social Policy and Social Development
Rising poverty rates and decreasing food security are also discernible in dete-
riorating social indicators. Though having slowed down over the years to 2%
34 Whereas ADMARCwas selling a 50 kg bag of maize at 850 Malawian Kwacha, a price that in itself
was already unaffordable for many Malawians, the prices with the local vendors were usually
much higher (Devereux 2002).
35 In response, the government has finally announced it is embarking on a programme of reform,
including a tax reform for smallholders and subsidies for agricultural inputs. In addition, the
government has started re-buying land in the South of the country from non-Malawian estate
owners to be distributed among landless farmers [www.sadocc.at/Malawi News, 04.05.2005].
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per year, which corresponds to a fertility rate of 6.1 births per woman, annual
population growth is still very high in Malawi. Early marriages, early first preg-
nancies and a lack of family planning mechanisms are the main causes attributed
to the high fertility rate. Around 30% of women have an unmet need for fam-
ily planning, i.e. they are not using contraceptives or practicing child spacing,
although they do not want to have more children or have children so quickly
(MDHS 2000, UNDP 2004). Under-five child mortality has declined since the
early 1990s, falling from 234 deaths per 1,000 live births during 1988-1992 to 189
per 1,000 between 1996-2000. Although this does signify important progress, the
rate of the downward trend is modest and remains very high compared to other
Sub-Saharan countries. What is more, due to HIV/AIDS, it is even expected to
rise again (MoHP Planning Department 2001). During the same period, mater-
nal mortality has increased from 620 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births to
1,120 (MDHS 2000).
Malaria is still the most widespread lethal disease in Malawi. However, the
rapid expansion of HIV/AIDS represents a major challenge to the country, af-
fecting mostly the economically active part of the population: 14.92% of the pop-
ulation between 15 and 49 is infected with HIV or suffering from the disease.
The HIV seroprevalence rate is generally lower in rural than in urban areas. On
average, the rural figures are around 11.2%, in semi-urban areas around 20.9%
and in urban areas at 25.3% (MDHS 2000).36 It is estimated that around 70% of
the population are not expected to survive the age of 65 (UNDP 2004).
Apart from HIV/AIDS, low nutritional standards and a high incidence of
easily preventable and curable diseases, such as Malaria, malnutrition, anaemia,
diarrhoeal diseases or pneumonia are the major causes for a steadily declining
life expectancy from 41 years to 37.5 over the last decade alone (UNDP 2004).
Only 20% of the population have access to health services, including child vacci-
nation, which has steadily decreased from 82% to 70% during the last ten years
(MDHS 2000). Chronic poverty is also evident in high rates of under-nutrition
(49%) with 25% of the children under five being underweight and 49% stunted
(MDHS 2000; UNDP 2004).
The adult illiteracy rate has slightly improved currently lying at 52.4%, al-
though female illiteracy is still very high at 39%. Educational standards have
improved significantly over the last decade due to the introduction of Free Pri-
mary Education (FPE) in 1994, leading to an enormous increase of net enrolment
ratios in primary and secondary schools. The low level of educational standards
36 The regional distribution in the same age group shows that the HIV/AIDS prevalence is lowest in
the Northern Region (9%), followed by the Central Region (11%) and the Southern Region (18%).
High incidences of migration, urbanisation and transportation are seen as the major factors that
contribute to high AIDS-prevalence in the South (GoM 2000).
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due to massive influx of students and a mushrooming of low quality private
schools has cast the enormous success of FPE in a more critical light.
Whereas rising poverty rates over the last decade, including the emergence
of HIV/AIDS, have contributed significantly to deteriorating social conditions,
social indicators have always been at a very low level in Malawi. In line with
Banda’s modernistic and growth-oriented development strategy, development
efforts and funds were concentrated heavily on economic investment, while so-
cial policy as a genuine field of state policy intervention was consistently ne-
glected.37 Investment in human capital was only justified to the extent that it ac-
celerated economic growth; social sector expenditure was solely valued in terms
of what it did in order to boost or sustain Malawian labour productivity (Pryor
1990; Kishindo 1997; Mwanza 1999). Here again, the British colonial legacy is
much in evidence. As in many other colonies, colonial welfare policy in Malawi
was confined to civil servants and their families, while social spending for the
wider black population was considered a drain on public spending, especially
in colonies that yielded as little economic return as did Nyasaland (Havinden &
Meredith 1993).38
2.4.1 The Welfare State as State Welfare
The colonial pattern of the welfare state as state welfare, i.e. exclusively con-
fined to those working for the state, still dominates Malawian social policy to-
day. Whereas the racial discrimination that prevented black people from enter-
ing the civil service was lifted and black civil servants took over from their white
predecessors, the “caste-like divisions of the colonial society” (Midgley 1984: 181)
remained by-and-large the same, confining welfare services to civil servants, the
military and the police.
Banda’s “FCR” doctrine (sufficient Food, adequate Clothing and a Roof for
all) stipulating a basic needs-oriented development approach, operated largely
on a rhetorical level and mainly served as a justification for the subordination of
social policy concerns in favour of a purely growth-oriented development strat-
egy and investments. In contrast to the ‘low-triangle-policy’ (Pryor 1990: 180)
of colonial government that only provided education on a primary level, it was
37 Between 1968 and 1983 the economic sectors consistently accounted for over 50% of the develop-
ment expenditures (Harrigan 2001).
38 The Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945 put more emphasis on social spending, af-
ter a committee on post-war reconstruction had heavily criticised the high incidence of poverty
and lack of rudimentary welfare in most British colonies. However, the colonial administration
heavily criticised those countries that really took advantage of these measures, arguing that social
spending would increase recurrent costs, whereas it was more important to invest in economic
growth (Havinden & Meredith 1993).
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the secondary and tertiary educational sector that receivedmajor attention in the
post-colonial era in an attempt to remedy Malawi’s chronic shortage of skilled
manpower in both the public and private sectors. Budgetary spending on ba-
sic education or adult literacy programmes, which became the first priority of
development efforts of so many post-colonial regimes, was more or less non-
existent. The same policy was by and large pursued in the health sector, where
the development of health care facilities beyond the existing – mostly mission-
ary – ones did not receive much attention, unless it was to sustain the Malawian
labour force.
Banda’s residual welfare approach is also discernible as regards the civil ser-
vice, which continues to enjoy the most comprehensive social security scheme
of the Malawian labour force. Instead of a contributory scheme, he introduced a
much cheaper provident fund based scheme. This mandatory saving system, in
which civil servants pay a certain share of their salary that they receive at the end
of their working life or which – in case of their premature death – goes to their
heirs in form of a lump sum, is still in place today. Civil servants are also entitled
to a variety of benefits, including institutional housing and travel allowances,
which as Anders points out may exceed their relatively low salaries consider-
ably (2005).39 They may also apply for salary advances, so-called ‘emergency
loans’ for the rental and purchase of housing, furniture, motor vehicles or other
consumer goods at very low interest rates and generous repayment conditions
(GoM 1991). Health insurance was not foreseen, as access to health services was
free of charge for all Malawians and was financed entirely by the state, rendering
additional health insurance unnecessary.
With the Civil Service Reform Programme put in place under the guidance
of the World Bank, a drastic restructuring of the civil service sector has taken
place, including massive retrenchments and cutbacks and modifications in the
social services (Anders 2005). One of these measures included the change of
housing policy (see Chapter 4), which made high-rent houses paid for by gov-
ernment unaffordable for many civil servants, forcing them to move into low
income areas, such as Sector 7, where the number of state employees and – in
due course – the prices for rents and social services have gone up dramatically.
The new financing mode introduced by theWorld Bank, that allows government
departments to spend money on a fortnightly basis only, makes access to salary
advances and emergency loans virtually impossible. In addition, death benefits,
travel warrants for employees and their families to visit their home villages, and
the provision of coffins and vehicles in case of death of an employee have been
39 Junior grade employees, such as gardeners or messengers, earn around US$ 25 per month; pri-
mary school teachers’ salaries reach between US$ 30 and US$ 45. The highest grades earn around
US$ 250 per month (Anders 2005: 20).
Social Policy and Social Development 59
reduced or modified, and in some cases they simply cannot be provided, due to
resource constraints (ibid.).
2.4.2 Labour Market Policy and Pension Schemes
Other major public social policy measures in Malawi concern the Workmen’s
Compensation Act (WCA). Put in place by the British in 1946, it foresees the com-
pensation of workers in case of fatal or disabling accidents or diseases contracted
in the course of employment. The act was revised in 2000 and converted into an
employer-financed social insurance fund that will ensure that claims are easily
and automatically effectuated and compensations paid in a quick and unbureau-
cratic manner (InterviewNo. 156; ILO/SAMAT 1998). There are plans to convert
the lump sum scheme into a pension scheme, which will provide the basis for the
latter to extend into a more comprehensive public social insurance scheme, en-
compassing other eventualities as well, such as maternity, sickness and death
(ibid). However, the fund, which is to be controlled on an autonomous tripartite
basis, was still not active when I left in 2002. Major conflicts with regard to the
assessment of contributions to be paid on part of the employers have impeded
the working of the fund so far (ibid; GoM 2000).
The restrained wage policy put in place by Banda in 1969 was lifted in 1993.
Wage policy nevertheless continues to provide an important regulatory frame-
work for improving labour conditions and social security within the very het-
erogeneous Malawian labour force and against the background of the almost
total absence of any other public welfare institutions. In 2000, the Tenant Act
was put in place to improve the labour conditions of tenant workers at estate
farms, including the provision of a fixed minimum wage, prohibition of forced
and child labour, and the entitlement to basic social security provisions, such as
paid maternity and sick leave (Malawi Government, Act No.6 of 2000). Since
democratisation, a Wages Advisory Board based on a tripartite arrangement has
been installed which monitors and adjusts statutory minimum wages on a regu-
lar basis. The high inflation rate and price increases have led to several upward
adjustments of urban and rural minimum wages within just a few years, but
wages remain very low.40 Furthermore, their significance is largely symbolic,
as hardly any enforcement mechanisms exist. This is especially the case in the
‘unorganised’ and ‘informal’ sector, where labourers often earn much less.
Since democratisation, trade unions have been re-emerging in Malawi. Yet
while they have achieved some progress concerning labour conditions, their
power is very limited, rendering any substantial reform process that would re-
40 In 2001, they stood at MK 50/day and MK 37/day in urban and rural areas respectively (GoM
2001).
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ally improve workers’ conditions an impossible endeavour. The limited impor-
tance of trade unions as political stakeholders lies not only in an overpower-
ing government, but also in the specific structure of the Malawian labour force,
which is organised to a minimal degree. In 2001, Malawi’s labour force encom-
passed around 4. 5 million people, of whom 90% were working in the agricul-
tural sector (GoM 2001). More than 90% of Malawians work in the ‘informal’
sector, being either self-employed or working in scarcely regulated and very in-
secure labour relations that usually do not provide any form of social protection.
Only around 10% of the Malawian population work in the mostly urban-based
‘formal’ sector of the economy, of which only around 30,000 workers, or 28%
of the Malawian labour force, are organised in trade unions.41 With the finan-
cial assistance of an international NGO, the Malawian Congress of Trade Unions
(MCTU) has initiated a project to sensitise and organise ‘informal sector’ work-
ers. However, as most workers simply lack the resources to pay membership
fees, the MCTU will be unable to sustain this effort in the long run (Interview
No. 148, Trade Unionist).
The plans for a Malawian-wide social insurance scheme based on the exten-
sion of the Workers’ Compensation funds to include all workers and employees
also foresees that the system is contracted out and administered by one of the big
private insurance companies of the country. This policy, in line with the new so-
cial policy framework of the World Bank, foresees the stronger incorporation of
the private insurance sector and is not new in Malawi. Due to the narrowly con-
fined structure of the welfare system, private companies and industries had de-
veloped their own in-house pension and health insurance schemes, which were
partly administered by private insurance companies. With the privatisation poli-
cies pursued in course of Structural Adjustment, a lot of these company schemes
were contracted out or closed down, as they were no longer considered afford-
able (Interview No. 150). The withdrawal and sale of insurance policies due to
economic difficulties is also discernible on an individual level. The economic
difficulties, coupled with a high inflation rate and increasing price levels, have
prompted many people to cancel their insurance policies, especially the urban
low and middle-income class (Interview No. 150; MASM 2002, Interview No.
149). Against this background, the government’s and donors’ ambition towards
the stronger incorporation of the private insurancemarket into the social security
economy of Malawi remains rather questionable.
41 At the moment, there are 17 unions united in the Malawian Congress of Trade Unions (tea, indus-
try, building, hotel industry, civil service, etc.) (Interview No. 148, Trade Unionist).
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2.4.3 Social Welfare
The extent of public social assistance in Malawi is very small both in quantity
and quality. The type of services provided have remained by and large the
same since independence, and include family welfare, children services, a re-
form programme for juvenile offenders, and specially targeted direct transfers
to specifically vulnerable groups, such as the Malawi Council for the Handi-
capped (MACOHA), and to victims of natural disasters (MoFYCS 2001; GoM
2000). With the introduction of the PRSP, social welfare services have gained
increasing importance, both in terms of amplification of services and funding
in order to maintain and improve the standard of living of the most vulner-
able groups in society (MPRSP 2002). Similar to the economic measures, the
‘social safety net programme’ follows a two-pronged approach, consisting on
the one hand of productivity-enhancing interventions especially designed for
land-poor farmers and the urban and rural poor with no alternative possible
sources of income, such as the aforementioned starter pack programme or pub-
lic works programmes (PWP). On the other hand, the programme also involves
direct-targeted transfers in cash and kind, so-called welfare support interven-
tions. These include targeted nutrition interventions for malnourished children
and vulnerable pregnant and lactating mothers, and direct welfare interventions
for those who are not able to take care of themselves, such as the elderly, chroni-
cally ill and orphans, in the forms of direct money transfers or vouchers (MPRSP
2002; MoFYCS 2001).
The sharp increase in the number of orphans due to HIV/AIDS42 and con-
straints as regards the question of their care has given special weight to family
welfare in recent years. Programmes to strengthen the capacity of local social
support networks in assisting orphans are the centre of attention (MPRSP 2002).
The latter include the family, religious institutions or other so-called ‘community
based organisations’ such as foster care parents, volunteer counsellors, home-
based carers and community-based childcare centres. Measures aim at improv-
ing the status of the orphans and the potential foster parents at the same time,
to ensure that orphans are able to stay within their community while receiving
adequate help at the same time. They include early nutrition programmes and
vocational training for older orphans, as well as the provision of child mainte-
nance allowances and special loans to increase the income capacity of the foster
parents (GoM 2000). The programmes also target disabled and elderly people
who also find themselves in an increasingly precarious position due to rising
poverty rates and HIV/AIDS (MoFYCS 2001).
42 In 1999, 390 000 children had been orphaned due to HIV/AIDS according to UNAIDS (Chirwa
2002).
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All in all, welfare services provided by the state remain very erratic and lack
any coherent policy approach. As such, they have also little substantial impact
on the well-being of the population. Most services in this sector are provided by
NGOs, which, especially on a local level, provide an enormous amount of social
assistance both in terms ofmaterial and care labour. With regard to HIV/AIDS, it
is estimated that 60% to 70% of relevant social services are provided by NGOs.43
Although the government does plan to increase direct transfers within the PRSP,
it is reasonable to assume that this will not alter the conspicuous importance of
NGOs as regards social welfare services.
2.4.4 Health Services
Health provision in Malawi involves a wide range of health care providers, with
the state being just one among many others. Within the modern health care sec-
tor, the Ministry of Health and Population (MoHP), together with other smaller
government departments, is the most important provider, running around 50%
of all healthcare facilities in the country. The Christian Hospitals Association of
Malawi (CHAM), a non-profit association of mission hospitals which is partly
government funded, provides around 20% of health care, while the remaining
32.4% are run by private non-profit and private for profit organisations, such as
private practitioners, large firms or estates, and groceries or shops (through the
sale of drugs) (MoHP 1998; Tsoka 1998). The latter category also includes na-
tional and international NGOs, which provide a substantial proportion of health
care delivery in Malawi, accounting for around 18.4% of total health care expen-
diture44, and working mainly in community-based health care programmes.
Apart from a chronic lack of drugs and facilities, themost pressing problem of
the health sector in Malawi is the uneven distribution of services, resources and
personnel: although most of the Malawian population lives in rural areas, health
care facilities are disproportionately focussed on the urban centres.45 To counter
this imbalance, a substantial shift in resource allocation has taken place in recent
years from central to district level, with special emphasis on local and commu-
43 Despite the importance of supporting initiatives related to HIV/AIDS, the Council of NGOs in
Malawi (CONGOMA) also criticises the heavy presence of NGOs in this sector as not being just a
genuine concern, but also as being demand driven (Interview No. 151). While donors now spend
a lot of money on HIV/AIDS, which is indeed an important issue, equally important issues, such
as water or agriculture, receive very little attention and projects.
44 CONGOMA estimates that NGO involvement in the health sector is much greater. As has already
been noted, this especially concerns programmes related to HIV/AIDS (Interview No. 151).
45 This heavy urban bias of health services is also evident in the health of the Malawian population:
“Rural dwellers who are ill are much more# likely to see a nurse than a doctor, whereas residents in the
cities are more likely to see doctors. This mirrors the situation on the ground in Malawi. Doctors are found
in the urban centres and not in the countryside.” (Chilowa et al. 2000: 22).
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nal levels. Notwithstanding this shift, secondary and tertiary health care, which
together account for 15% of the total health care facilities and are supposed to
provide specialised health care services only, continue to carry the major burden
of health care services in Malawi, consuming over two thirds of the ministry’s
financial resources. The major reason for this enormous resource inequality lies
in the fact that provision is primarily made for primary healthcare services. As
resources and personnel are scarce at the local level, many people tend to bypass
local and communal health care facilities and turn directly to district or central
hospitals in order to obtain adequate treatment. To counter this problem, ‘bypass
fees’ were introduced in central and district hospitals, in order to prevent people
from using higher health care services for primary health care needs. However,
the continuing low quality of primary health care services at local level has ham-
pered changes in peoples’ behaviour thus far. HIV/AIDS exacerbates the situa-
tion further, as health care facilities are overwhelmed with the increased need for
care. It is estimated that 70% of hospital beds in Malawi are occupied by patients
with HIV/AIDS-related conditions (GoM 2000).
The situation is slightly different for NGOs that are largely concentrated in
rural areas.46 The development focus of the government on rural areas and the
focus on rural poverty have encouraged many NGOs to follow the same route.
While they take over a substantial proportion of healthcare services in rural ar-
eas, they are not able to make up for the imbalance in public services.
The low quality of healthcare services, especially in rural areas47, forcesmany
people to seek the support of private medical service providers, where payment
is required for almost all services (Tsoka 1998). This includes the so-called ‘tra-
ditional’ health care sector, which is of enormous importance in Malawi. Tra-
ditional healers and birth attendants play for example a crucial role in health
care delivery, and are used simultaneously or consecutively to ‘conventional’
medicine.48
The importance of private health care is also discernible when examining
the major financial sources of medical care in Malawi. Government expendi-
46 Most NGOs are concentrated in the Southern and Central Regions, while in the North there are
only a few.
47 Officially, 80% of the population live within an 8 km radius of a health care unit. However, this
percentage decreases rapidly to 46% when applied to a geographical radius of 5 km (MoHP 1998;
MoHP 1999). In practice, most of the services show an even higher unequal distribution. In
addition, most of these dispensaries are often in very poor condition.
48 As of 1998, there were an estimated 13 000 so-called ‘traditional healers’ active in Malawi, who
are consulted in all kind of physical and spiritual matters, and 18 000 traditional birth attendants.
The latter play an important role in health care delivery, as around 25% of women giving birth use
TBAs (MoHP 2001). Since 1992, they have been trained by the Ministry of Health and Population
(MoHP), in an attempt to increase access and quality of primary health care on the local level
(Mwase 1998).
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ture, meanwhile, accounts for about only 25.2% of the sector’s finances, or 7%
of GDP. Apart from donors that provide 30% of all health expenditure49, the pri-
vate sector is the largest provider, accounting for 45%. Moreover, 26% of the
total amount, which is more than the government’s share, is provided by private
household’s out-of-pocket health expenditure (MoHP 2001).50 Most of these ex-
penditures are made by poor and rural households, who are large purchasers of
health care goods and services, mainly drugs.51 The purchase of drugs is usu-
ally the only medical treatment people can afford, as most people do not have
the money to seek medical care and advice in health facilities, thus rendering
adequate treatment often impossible.
There has been a lengthy discussion over the years in Malawi about the in-
troduction of user fees in hospitals and health facilities. With regard to the high
private expenditure on health care, proponents argue that it would simply make
a common practice obligatory. However, there are also concerns that user fees
will mean that people have even less access to medical services, especially as
most expenditure is purely reactive and is largely directed towards the purchase
of drugs.
The enormous drain of health care expenditure on household income has led
to plans to introduce a health insurance system (MoHP 1999). The schemes en-
visaged are commercially-based private-for-profit, or private-non-profit schemes
(MoHP 2001). Such schemes partly already exist in Malawi, mainly with private
companies and international organisations, which wanted to provide their staff
with additional health insurance.52 For people working in the ‘informal’ eco-
nomic sector, community based small-scale or micro-insurance schemes could
be a viable solution (MoHP 2001).
2.4.5 Education
The urgent need for an educated class of Malawian civil servants has made ed-
ucation one of the few social policy areas to have been considered a priority in
49 According to the MoHP, there are 20 donors involved in the provision of health care in Malawi,
both multilateral and bilateral. They mainly provide technical assistance and know-how, usually
using government structures for their programmes. Recently, donors have invested a substantial
share of their resources in administrative efforts, i.e. the decentralisation of health services, as well
as the management of preventive healthcare services (MoHP 2001; MoHP 1999; GoM 2000).
50 19% are provided by employers, either within dispensaries of public and private firms, or as part
of private insurance schemes.
51 Between 1999-2000, the poorest 60% of the population spend MK 881million on healthcare ser-
vices, while the richest 40% only MK 822 million. Expenditure on health services per household
per year constitutes around 10% of the total annual consumption (MoHP 2001).
52 The Medical Aid Society of Malawi (MASM), a private non-profit organisation, is the major
provider in this sector.
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Malawian development policy. Whereas in the immediate post-independence
period policy focused on the extension and improvement of secondary- and
tertiary-level education in order to fill the gap in skilled labourers left by the
British, the 1980s saw a re-orientation of the educational sector towards all lev-
els of formal education, particularly the primary level and the long-neglected
functional literacy leading to the establishment of a National Adult Literacy Pro-
gramme (NALP).
With the establishment of the Poverty Alleviation Programme in 1995, Free
Primary Education (FPE) became the centrepiece of education policy. As a con-
sequence, enrolment rates increased substantially from 1.9 million in 1994 to 2.9
million in 1995. At the same time, quality of education fell considerably, how-
ever. As well, dropout and repetition rates shot up significantly (GoM 2000)
and it is estimated that only 30% of the children starting primary school will
also finish complete their primary education (MPRSP 2002). There is also a se-
rious shortage of teaching and learning materials. Of the 45,788 primary school
teachers, only slightly more than half are fully qualified, which means that the
pupil-qualified teacher ratio is at 114:1. The low quality of education is further
aggravated by a lack of adequate infrastructure. The pupil-class ratio is 69:1,
while 10,000 classes are without a classroom, and 5,000 only have a temporary
one (GoM 2000; MPRSP 2002).
Furthermore, the suspension of school fees on primary level could not al-
ter structural inequalities in access to education, especially in relation to socio-
economic and gender disparities. While net enrolment rates for males and fe-
males are almost equal at primary level, dropout rates are significantly higher
among girls. This is even more pronounced at the secondary level, where fe-
males account for only 37% of total enrolment (MPRSP 2002). Early marriage
patterns and a high incidence of teenage pregnancies are the major obstacles pre-
venting girls from continuing their education. Moreover, highly unequal access
to education in relation to socio-economic disparities widely persists and has
only been shifted, as indirect costs for schooling have increased substantially.
Parents are increasingly asked to contribute to the maintenance of school build-
ings or to the purchase of teaching and learning materials. In addition, poverty
forces children to contribute to the household income, which usually delays their
entry to school and also requires that they leave early (Castro-Leal 1996).
Deteriorating educational facilities have led to a mushrooming of private
schools, especially in urban areas. Quality of education in most schools is, how-
ever, disastrous, as many people who have a basic education perceive the es-
tablishment of a school merely as a lucrative business opportunity. This is also
the reason why the government plans to integrate private schools into an overall
national scheme in order to ensure equal standards of teaching and an adequate
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curriculum, as provided in state schools. Facing an enormous lack of teaching
facilities, the government is also considering the possibility of partially funding
private and urgently needed education facilities (Interview MoE 2001).
2.4.6 The Scattered Landscape of Social Support
A distinct feature of the Malawian social economy is the fact that social services
are provided by a wide range of service providers, including the state, non-
governmental national and international organisations, and both the profit and
non-profit sector. While actors and providers have partly changed, the pattern is
an old and, again, colonial one. Education and health services in colonial Malawi
were largely provided by missionary stations and the private sector. Banda
maintained this strong incorporation of the non-governmental sector in social
services. Favouring his anti-social pro-capitalist development approach, mis-
sions, NGOs, international donor organisations and increasingly also the private
profit sector became important stakeholders in the provision of social services,
acting as “government’s filler gaps” (Kilembe 1994: 275).53 The enormous impor-
tance of non-state social securitymechanisms is also discernible in the confidence
people display towards these institutions. We shall see that people perceive local
NGOs and religious associations as much more reliable and accessible in terms
of social support than the state institutions or public programmes of which they
have heard only on the radio.
The fact that the social sector is institutionally and financially highly de-
pendent on non-governmental stakeholders renders the development of a co-
herent social policy rather difficult. In order to increase the efficiency, equity
and poverty alleviation impact of social services, the government has embarked
on a new policy: the so-called ‘Sector Wide Approaches’ (SWAPs) aim at bet-
ter coordinating and integrating the different providers and funds. By bringing
together the various stakeholders in order to discuss financing, management,
planning and service delivery, a better outcome of service provision, especially
in health care and education, should be achieved (Office of the Vice President
1999).
Although all stakeholders have welcomed this initiative, its realisation has
met with a great deal of resistance, including from donors and NGOs. Many
53 The NGO-sector alone provides 30% to 40% of all social services (Kalemba 1997; CONGOMA
1998). The largest sectors are (1) agriculture and food security, (2) health, and (3) education.
Economic activities such as credit facilities, management and trade associations have increased
enormously over the last years. According to estimations, NGOs run 70-80% of the sector’s activ-
ity. Human rights issues and environment and forestry have also gained importance (Interview
CONGOMA 1998; 2001).
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donors prefer to finance their own projects rather than contributing to a ‘com-
mon basket fund’. Shared coordination would also mean that planning priori-
ties would have to be coordinated and tuned with the national ministries and
other stakeholders, increasing the probability of colliding with the NGOs’ or
donors’ own interests. A ‘basket funding’ scheme would also include the financ-
ing of infrastructure, management and administrative structures. It is rather un-
likely that these measures, that in contrast to project work yield little ‘visibility’,
will attract much enthusiasm within the highly competitive donor environment
(MoHP 2001). The fact that donor programmes and projects are often based on an
integrated approach that encompasses also non-health or non-educational com-
ponents makes the coordination task even more difficult.
2.4.7 Adjusting Social Support: Privatisation and Collectivisation of Social
Services
The economic crisis at the beginning of the 1980s made the consistent neglect of
social policy since independence and its disastrous consequences visible. While
the economy had been growing at an extraordinary pace, Malawi’s pubic expen-
diture on health, education and welfare had risen only slowly to an average of
5.9% during the 1960s and had fallen again to only 5.3 % in the 1970s (Pryor
1990). Health conditions in Malawi were appalling, lagging far behind any other
African state and forcing Malawi, despite the economic crisis, to increase its so-
cial spending.
In the following years, social expenditure rose to an average of 7%. A special
health care plan was adopted that focused on the construction of and improved
access to primary healthcare facilities (Pryor 1990). In education, basic primary
education and adult literacy received increasing political and financial attention.
However, the slight increase in social spending at the beginning of the 1980s fell
considerably with the start of Structural Adjustment, whose public expenditure
reduction policymainly hit the social sector. Recurrent expenditure in health and
education fell dramatically from 10% and 15.5% to 3.17% and 6.53% respectively
(Chinsinga 2001: 30).
It was only with the transition to democracy and the adoption of the Poverty
Alleviation Programme (PAP) that social policy was attributed a new role in
Malawian politics, underlining its importance as an integral and complemen-
tary part of economic development and poverty alleviation. Expenditure on so-
cial and community services, including health, education and other social ser-
vices, increased substantially from 12.2% of total development expenditures in
1993/94 to 28.3% in 1994/95, increasing further to 37.1% in 1996/1997 and 51.4%
in 1997/98 (GoM 1996; 1997). Yet here as well the strong politicisation of the
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PAP is discernible. Political interests rather than incidences of poverty and need
appear to be the basis for targeting processes and the allocation of funds and
projects: “Political labels have invariably assumed precedence in lieu of the real poverty
situation of the beneficiaries” (Chinsinga 2001: 41).54
Improved access to social services and the development of community self-
help capacity in order to manage and improve their economic and social devel-
opment are core issues of the PAP initiative (GoM 1995). This includes especially
the development of infrastructure and housing, both of special relevance in ur-
ban areas. Through the provision of technical and managerial skills, so-called
community capacity building programmes are to empower local initiatives to
seek direct support with the donors or international NGOs in order to gain ac-
cess to infrastructure and – especially important in town – housing (see GoM
2000). The policy has met with considerable success, especially in urban areas.
With the assistance of the Malawian Social Action Fund (MASAF), a fund estab-
lished by the World Bank in close cooperation with the Malawian government,
up to now around 1,534 so-called community sub-projects have been finalised,
including schools, boreholes, tap water, electricity, clinics, roads, bridges, toilets
and other social infrastructure (ibid.).
While social spending is on the increase once more following a slump at the
end of the 1990s,55 overall economic conditions and the Structural Adjustment
Programme (SAP), with its continuing liberalisation and privatisation policies,
including the cutback in social services for civil servants or the removal of subsi-
dies for fertiliser and seeds, continue to undermine much of the progress made.
It appears that the new social policy agenda of the international donor commu-
nity, promoting the further liberalisation and individualisation of social security
responsibilities, will further undermine the social situation in Malawi and con-
tribute to increased insecurity rather than reducing it. In addition, it will further
increase the already high financial and institutional dependence of Malawian
society on donors and NGOs. Regarding the frequently changing agendas of
NGOs and international donors, whose programmes are usually confined to a
few years only, the provision of social services in Malawi risks being even more
erratic than it has been thus far, making the establishment of a coherent and sus-
tainable social policy evenmore difficult. It appears that social policy in develop-
ing countries and in Malawi is regressing into a residual welfare policy approach
that does not much differ from previous colonial patterns, where much social se-
curity was left to the individual or the family, while social services were mainly
managed by non-state private non-profit and profit organisations.
54 See the assessment report on the functioning of the Malawian Social Action Fund 1996-2001 by
Bloom, Chilowa et al. (2005).
55 In 2000, 58.26% of the development budget was allocated to social services; in 2001 this figure was
60.57% (GoM 2000; 2001).
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2.5 Conclusions
The social, economic and political development of Malawi is thus largely a con-
tinuation of colonial patterns which have only experienced slight changes. This
also concerns the high financial and political dependence on external actorswhose
colonial predecessors have meanwhile been replaced by international finance in-
stitutions, donors and NGOs. In this respect, Malawi has also always been a
highly globalised and internationalised economy that – despite different politi-
cal systems and development strategies – has never been able to loosen its de-
pendency.
Despite democratisation and poverty alleviation, the main beneficiaries of
economic growth remain, however, largely the same – the political and economic
elite of the country. This is also true for social policy. State welfare was always
largely confined to those working directly for the state. In fact, it is non-state in-
formal and traditional mechanisms that remain the main source and main actors
in the social security economy of most Malawians, including those in the urban
areas. Being often defined as a by-product or an additional layer of given social
arrangements and relationships in the literature (Leliveld 1994), we shall see that
they are actually central to the social security of most urban migrants. Urbani-
sation and migration change notions of risk and insecurity as well as the social
security mix in terms of which – traditional, formal and informal – mechanisms
people use in-between village and town. However, they continue to take place
in a trans-local and multiple social security space.
Chapter 3
Borderland Urbanisation:
Uncertainty, Insecurity and Poverty
in Town
3.1 Introduction
The academic debate on migration in developing countries has long been domi-
nated by an understanding of migration as an exclusively modern phenomenon
that only began with capitalist penetration and colonial domination. Based on
Todaro’s famous push-and-pull-model (1971), most early migration studies con-
centrated almost exclusively on economic factors as an explanatory framework
for migration flows and projections. These migration flows were assumed to
be entirely rural-urban, as it was the city as the centre of economic growth and
modernity that would stand at the end of each migrant’s journey that – yet an-
other assumption – had started in the village. Migration into the city would only
stop when the ‘urban bias’ (Lipton 1977), characterised by a significant urban-
rural income differential, would be out-balanced and an urban-rural economic
and demographic equilibrium achieved (for a critique, see Jamal &Weeks 1993).
Economic considerations also dominated the discussion around the city. In
its role as a moderniser that would expand at the same pace as the economy
would grow, the city epitomised the grand modernisation trajectory that was
expected to happen in more or less the same way everywhere in the colonised
world (Southall 1998; Freund 2000; Simon 1992). The notion of the city as a black
box of modernity was thereby not only related to its role as the economic motor
of growth and capitalist development: The city was also the place where the so-
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cial and cultural transformation of the African ‘homo ruralis’ (Coquery-Vidrovitch
1991: 44) into a modern urbanite would take place. This modernisation process
was considered irreversible, as the move from a predominantly sedentary life
within a small community based on kinship structures and dominated by con-
servatism and tradition into a highly mobile and individualisedmodernity dom-
inated by utility and rationality would imply a total break with the rural past
in geographic, economic, social and behavioural terms (for a critique see Silver
1990; Coquery-Vidrovitch 1991; Southall 1998; Ferguson 1999; Freund 2000).
Looking at the historical and current developments of migration and urbani-
sation processes in Malawi and Sector 7 specifically, this chapter argues that they
hardly fit a modernist and dualist explanatory framework. While economic con-
siderations do indeed play an important role in migration, we shall see that the
economic factor is just one amongst many others that make people move. More-
over, when people move they do not exchange one social, economic and political
reality for another. In contrast to modernisation theories, which perceived of mi-
gration as a one-way process between two completely different societies (for a
critique, see Jackson 1986), migration represents a pattern of exchange and de-
pendency between different social and economic environments, linking rather
than dividing them (see for example, Van Dijk et al. 2001). Rather than two sep-
arate geographic, social, or economic entities, we shall see that town and village
are tightly interwoven life-worlds within which and across which people move
and organise their lives and livings. This is also reflected in migration decisions,
which, far from being individualistic, are largely driven by trans-local consider-
ations that also involve social and economic conditions and insecurities in the
village.
These multi-local lives people are living (Glick-Schiller et al. 1992) also shed
a different light on urbanisation processes and the city. Urbanisation processes
are not isolated and confined to the city boundaries, but are linked to the wider
social, economic and geographic environment, which in turn influences its shape
and content. This encompasses both national and global levels, as has been em-
phasised by world system theorists (for example Wallerstein 1986), yet also in-
volves ‘the village’ or more generally, the rural hinterland. I shall argue that this
mutual influence and exchange that shapes the city is especially pronounced in
rural-urban borderlands, like Sector 7. It is in these fringe areas where a multi-
tude of lifestyles and living conditions within and across rural-urban boundaries
exist side-by-side, mixing and combining different geographic, social, economic
and cultural ways of living, and among which the modernist way of life repre-
sents just one amongst many others. I shall argue that this highly vibrant ‘bro-
ken’ or ‘marginal’ urbanisation and city taking place at the fringes of town not
only represents growing normality for a rising number of people: the social, eco-
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nomic, cultural processes taking place in such marginal cities are also central for
the understanding of current urbanisation and migration processes in Malawi
and, as far as the literature allows to conclude, also other bigger cities of the con-
tinent (for example Simone 2005; Simone 1997; Ferguson 1999; Ghannam 2002)
3.2 Migration and Urbanisation in Malawi
Migration constituted an important aspect ofMalawi’s social, economic, political
and historical development long before colonialist and European traders settled
in the area. Changing ecological conditions and particularly military disputes
over territories, which were often induced by the migration of different groups
in another area of the continent, have long been forcing people to give up their
living and move into other territories (see for example Wills 2001).
The arrival of organised trade and later, colonialism and capitalism, did have
a considerable impact on migration in Malawi nonetheless, substantially chang-
ing spatial relations and settlement patterns in the area. Especially the large
labour migration induced by the British, who used Malawi as a labour pool
for the economic growth centres in the South of the Federation, brought about
large population movements far beyond colonial and then post-colonial bound-
aries. A rigid British tax system requiring access to cash money forced hundreds
and thousands of young male Malawians into labour migration, mostly into the
mines of the Copperbelt in Northern Rhodesia andWitwatersrand in South Africa.
While many simply left the country in order to look for a job, a highly organised
recruitment system also existed, which, via large agencies, directly contracted
thousands of workers in Malawi for the mines in South Africa and Southern
Rhodesia.1 In the 1930s, around 25% of able-bodied Malawian men were work-
ing abroad (Fetter 1982: 90), a figure that rose to 30% in the post-war period
(Potts 1986: 95). In the 1960s and 1970s, the growth of the large-scale agricul-
tural sector in need of a rising labour force resulted in a decrease in international
labour migration, as migration flows were redirected towards the estates in the
South and centre of the country.
Both these migration flows had a considerable impact on Malawi’s economic
development, as we saw in the previous chapter. Migration as a deeply en-
1 One of the most important ones was WENELA (Witwatersrand Native Labour Association),
which contracted thousands of workers for the mines in South Africa. In 1951, Malawians ac-
counted for 30% of the able-bodied male labour force in Southern Rhodesia, a number that in-
creased to 40% in 1958. For South Africa the number was much lower, amounting to less than
10%; a fact that is generally attributed to a greater reluctance to migrate to South Africa: this was
probably due to the long distance, the need to for a contract, and apartheid (Potts 1986: Appendix
2.2).
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trenched pattern of the Malawian economy has also strongly altered its demo-
graphic structure and most notably, its urbanisation. However, in contrast to
many other African countries that experienced an upsurge of urbanisation dur-
ing colonialism, colonial urbanisation remained conspicuously absent inMalawi.
Apart from Blantyre in the South of the country, which had already been estab-
lished as an economic and administrative outpost against the rival interests of
the Portuguese long before the British officially took over, urban colonial devel-
opment practically did not exist. The administrative reorganisation of the colony
that had included the establishment of regional administrative and growth cen-
tres, the so-called ‘boma’, and the shift from the colonial capital from Blantyre to
Zomba in 1886, had all led to a slight increase in the urban population, which had
been attracted by new job opportunities (see Fetter 1982; Potts 1986). It did not
really alter the situation, however: Blantyre remained the only and biggest urban
colonial centre in Malawi, the centre of European settlement and commerce, and
the first town to have access to the Malawian railway line.
Most of Malawi’s economic and urban development took place outside the
country, mainly within the geographic and economic orbit of the Federation.
Whereas inner-Malawianurban growth and city development remainedmarginal,
Malawians who had migrated to the urban centres in the South of the continent
contributed to their rapid growth. By 1945, as many Malawians were living in
Salisbury in Southern Rhodesia and Johannesburg in South Africa as in Blan-
tyre, which at the time was the only Malawian city with over 10,000 inhabitants
(Fetter 1982: 93).
“(. . . ) Nyasaland’s involvement in the Southern African migra-
tory labour system meant that some of the urbanisation which might
have occurred within her boundaries in the absence of this involve-
ment, in fact occurred in, for instance, Salisbury or Bulawayo, on
the Rand in South Africa, and in the Copperbelt towns of Northern
Rhodesia” (Potts 1986: 102).
In contrast to this trans-local urbanisation, rural-urban migration within Ma-
lawi was insignificant, and was even lower than rural-rural migration, which
experienced a significant increase with the establishment of the big tobacco and
tea estates in the South and centre of the country after independence (Fetter 1982;
Christiansen 1984: 147). In 1966, Malawi had an extremely low urbanisation
rate, with 5% of the population living in urban areas; of which more than half
was living in Blantyre. The three biggest towns after Blantyre were Lilongwe,
Mzuzu and Zomba, each accounting for not more than 5,000 persons. Together,
these four cities accounted for 78% of the total urban population (Potts 1986:
106).
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The low level of urbanisation and the concentration of urban growth in a
few urban centres are still valid features of the Malawian urban landscape today.
Though having increased over the years from 8.5% in 1977 to 10.7 % in 1987
and 14% in 1998, the urban population of the country is still very low when
compared to other African countries (Potts 1986: 106; National Statistical Office
1993. Vol. II; National Statistical Office 2000a: xiv).2 The only significant shift
in urbanisation was the establishment of Lilongwe as the new capital of Malawi
in 1975, which made it the fastest-growing town in Malawi, with annual growth
rates of between 7% and 16% (ibid). Lilongwe’s growth rates slowed down in the
1990s, but remain very high nevertheless. In the period between 1987 and 1998,
Lilongwe had the second highest population increase after Mzuzu, amounting
to 95% or an annual growth rate of 6.1%. This meant that the population almost
doubled from 223,000 in 1987 to 440,000 in 1998 (National Statistical Office 2000a:
xiv).
Lilongwe’s spectacular growth rates are, however, only partly based on rural-
urban migration flows. As Potts has pointed out, much of Lilongwe’s exorbi-
tant growth rates in the 1970s were due to urban-rural boundary changes in the
course of its establishment during which large rural areas were assigned for the
further extension of the city (Potts 1986). The growth rates also have to be dealt
with cautiously when compared to the overall migration behaviour in Malawi.
Migration patterns are very volatile and mainly circulatory, which in turn would
suggest volatile, fluctuating urbanisation. This is to a certain extent confirmed
by Potts in her study of Lilongwe in the 1980s. Whereas gross rural-urban mi-
gration was high, most of the migration movements into town and within rural
areas were short term, i.e. seasonal or temporary, rather than for lifetimes or
for longer periods (Potts 1986). Chirwa’s more recent study (2000) also points in
this direction. He suggests that the general overall pattern of internal migration,
both within rural areas and between town and village, is largely short-term and
mainly oriented towards rural areas (see also Englund 2001).3 This would mean
that, for a large part of the population, rural areas, with their larger working
opportunities both in subsistence agriculture and on the estates, remain on the
whole more attractive than towns, where employment opportunities are gener-
ally lacking. Whereas an overall trend in the southern part of the continent sug-
gests an increase in rural return migration and de-urbanisation as a consequence
2 In Zimbabwe, the current urbanisation rate amounts to 35%, in Zambia 35.9%, Tanzania 35.4%
and Mozambique 35.6% (UNDP 2005).
3 Most of the respondents in his rural sample whowere about tomigrate moved either to rural areas
or to town. In contrast to the rural population, most of the urban population considered going to
the rural areas and only a few to other urban areas (Chirwa 2000: 113). This is also confirmed by
the 1987 census, which suggests that over 60% of the population did not leave their home district
(NSO 1993: xxxi).
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of the economic decline over the last decades (see for example Potts 1995; 1997;
Ferguson 1999; Tacoli 2001), one may thus conclude that in Malawi, the focus on
rural areas for migration never really shifted.
However, looking at the migration patterns from an urban perspective, a
more varied picture appears. We shall see that the adaptation and reconsider-
ation of urban-rural strategies has also taken place in Malawi, and many urban
migrants are indeed considering a rural return. At the same time, there are also a
considerable number of short-term migrants in Sector 7 who only come to town
for a few weeks or months in order to supplement their agricultural income. Yet
my data also suggests some counter-tendencies. Firstly, overall economic and
social constraints give the impression that rural-urban migration has increased
considerably over the years. The lack of land and labour, HIV/AIDS and the
hunger are forcing more people to move, towards the city as well as elsewhere.
Secondly, overall land scarcity suggests that for most of them, the return to the
village on a circulatory basis as it has been largely practiced so far will not be
possible any more. We shall see that this concerns migrants who have just come
to town, as well as those who have been in town for years. Unfortunately, the
lack of reliable statistical data does not enable further details to be established.
This also concerns inner-urban growth rates, which – in the context of overall
growth rates in Malawi – can only be considerable. This assumption is sustained
by an observation made by Englund (2001), who suggests that the rapid expan-
sion of the city, especially the growth of peri-urban areas in Lilongwe, has to be
largely viewed as a consequence of inner-urban congestion caused by an almost
complete absence of urban development, rather than by rural-urban migration.
This finding is also sustained by my own research. The spectacular growth rates
of Sector 7 from around 3,000 to over 8,000 over the last three years is largely a
result of inner-urban movements.
3.3 The Making of Lilongwe
Although economic and administrative considerations were put forward as cen-
tral arguments for a change in capital, the decision taken by Banda shortly after
independence in 1965 to create Lilongwe City as the new capital of Malawi was
neither a consequence of heavy urban growth rates nor of a specific economic
and administrative necessity. The establishment of a number of tobacco estates
during the colonial period had made Lilongwe an important growth centre and
indeed, had also induced a certain level of rural-urban migration: By the time
Malawi became independent, it was the third largest town, with a population of
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around 19,000.4 A shift of the capital from the South to the centre, it was argued,
would provide an important incentive for more even regional economic devel-
opment, from which not only the Central Region would benefit, but also the
poorly developed North. Finally, its central position would also make it easier
to administer the country.
However, these arguments – though they had a certain weight – could not
conceal that the decision was mainly a political one taken solely by Banda him-
self. While some observers argue that his close emotional and ethnic ties to the
Chewa played the most important role in the decision to move the capital to the
Central Region, the decision was also strongly politically motivated. The relo-
cation of Lilongwe to the heart of the country represented a symbol of national
unity and an important political move in trying to overcome ethnic antagonisms
and potential future conflicts; but Lilongwe was also a truly anti-colonial African
project par excellence, very typical of many independent nations at that time. Rep-
resenting the symbolic spearhead of a modern, dynamic and prospering Malaw-
ian nation yet to come, Lilongwe has always also been a project of modernity. It
was not only a new, but also a modern town that should be created. Lilongwe
should thereby provide the core of a larger national urban system that also en-
compassed various smaller towns on district level. This national urban system
was to help in dealing with the threat of rapid future urbanisation that was ex-
pected with expanding economic growth and contribute to more even urban and
economic national development (Potts 1986; Mabogunje 1990).
This “master plan” approach, which suggests the considerable controllability
and predictability of migration and urbanisation processes, is also discernible in
the outline of the city: The so-called ‘Lilongwe Master-plan’, which provided the
architectural, social, economic and political outline of the city, is based on a strict
land-use zoning scheme (Gerke & Viljoen 1968)5. The scheme divides the city
into functionally differentiated zones assigned to specific politico-administrative,
industrial, commercial, cultural and leisure purposes. This zoning was also ex-
tended to the residential areas, the strict spatial segregation of which followed
the social and economic status of its future inhabitants; low-density – high-
income areas,medium-density –medium-income areas, and finally, high-density–
low-income areas (Chilowa 1996). The strict residential segregation policy, which
also foresaw the creation of a large un-built area – a so-called ‘cordon sanitaire’ –
between the low income areas at the periphery and the centrally located high
4 At independence Blantyre had a population of 109,461, followed by Zomba with 19,666 inhabi-
tants and Lilongwe 19,425. The difference to Mzuzu with a population of only 8,490 inhabitants
as the biggest city next to Lilongwe is substantial (Potts 1986: 111).
5 For a discussion of the role of urban planning as a concept and expression of modernity and its
relevance for colonial and post-colonial urban planning in developing countries, see Mabogunje
1990.
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income areas and command structures, largely resembles the morphology of the
apartheid city. Indeed, the segregationist and racist character of the city has for
a long time been attributed to the fact that its town planners were from South
Africa. However, in her research on Lilongwe, Potts (1986) unmasks the concept
as a British colonial heritage that existed long before Lilongwe came into being
and South African town planners had arrived in Malawi. She shows that the
segregated city actually originates in the so-called ‘Garden city concept’ that the
British developed in the 19th century in order to counter and control the grow-
ing contradictions between the industrial city and the countryside in the course
of the industrialisation process within their own country. The segregated city
concept was designed to allow for gradual and controlled urbanisation, taking
the channelling of massive streams of labour migrants into account, and deal-
ing with their social, political and economic problems (ibid.). The equation of
the spatial order to the social and economic status of a particular area’s inhabi-
tants represented the modernist hierarchy, through which a migrant had to work
his/her way up from the poor periphery to the modern city centre in order to
become a fully urbanised and modernised towns(wo)man ( see Burgess’ organic
city concept 1996 [1925] ).
This modernist notion of a gradual and controlled urbanisation process is
also discernible in the suggested plot sizes and types of housing. Thus, the
master plan suggested large plot sizes and spacious one-storey houses for high-
density areas. In this way, the African Africans who were used to agricultural
production and open spaces could continue their rural way of life while slowly
adapting to the city:
“Traditionally, people in Africa have had plenty of space, and
this tradition is not likely to be surrendered in the foreseeable future.
Moreover, gardening is from any point of view an important activity
inMalawi, and it is desirable that most families should have a reason-
ably sized patch of ground for cultivation. (. . . ) The people inMalawi
are individualists, accustomed to open space; and set great store by
privacy. They do not yet for the most part accept the high density
and congested living conditions, which are normal in other parts of
the world. In spite of this, the layout allocates sites for multi-storey
development, which may become more acceptable as the population
become more urbanized, in the future.” (Gerke& Viljoen 1968: 44; 51)
This modernist ‘social-engineering’ character of the layout that reduced peo-
ple to mere chess figures who were to move in an orderly fashion between the
different zones of the city and modernity, had a strong political background.
Banda’s idealisation of Malawi as an essentially rural country and the focus of
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his development strategies on the agricultural sector were not only based on
economic considerations, but also political calculus. While he considered urban-
isation an inevitable consequence of modernity, he perceived rapid and uncon-
trolled urbanisation and the rise of an urban proto-proletariat as a major source
of political and social instability. In this respect, the Garden City concept pro-
vided an important technical framework that would allow the urbanisation pro-
cess to be controlled (see also Gerke & Viljoen 1968).
It was the urban migration process itself that was discouraged, however. Al-
though no formal policy directly controlled rural-urban migration, a range of
policies had been put in place that helped to reduce the incentive to migrate sig-
nificantly. Price controls on agricultural products, the subsidising of basic agri-
cultural products and the restrained urban wage policy that deliberately sup-
pressed urban wages in order to keep people in the countryside provided a very
effective de-facto control of urban-rural flows (Potts 1986; Chilhowa 2000; Eng-
land 2001).6
The effectiveness of these policies was amplified by a climate of fear that
helped to create a strong social auto-control mechanism among the population.
Every newcomer in townwho had no regular employment or place to staywould
be met with great suspicion as a person who could possibly get you into trou-
ble with the authorities if you helped them. It was common for people unable
to produce evidence of employment and a place to stay to be arrested and – at
best – sent back to the rural areas (Interview No. 47, City Council Officer).
This “keeping-the-town-clean-attitude” (Potts 1986: 127) was also integrated in
the town-planning scheme. Low levels of investment in infrastructure and social
amenities, and the virtual non-existence of subsidised low cost housing were not
only the result of lacking funds; the choice of the so-called ‘sites and services
scheme’, which left the construction of housing to the owners and required the
city to put only a very basic infrastructure in place (Chilowa 1996), was also a
deliberate decision to keep people from migrating into Lilongwe (Potts 1986).
“Since the urban population growth is already quite high, any
policy in the urban context should avoid making towns too attrac-
tive (sic).... it should not be possible to raise one’s standard of liv-
ing markedly by simply moving from a rural to an urban area. This
would be undoubtedly the case if access to most of the urban ameni-
ties... were substantially subsidized (TCPD, 1980a in Potts 1986: 21)”
6 The creation of so-called rural growth centres in each ‘boma’ or administrative district was also
part of a strategy to keep people out of the big cities and to avoid the creation of huge single cities
(Potts 1986). The lack of financial resources in order to develop most of these small towns and the
lack of income opportunities did not make them valuable alternatives to the big towns Blantyre
and Lilongwe (ibid.).
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To say whether this attitude has also impinged on the low priority given
to city development in general would be pure speculation – but the initial de-
mand projections for low-income housing areas, the so-called Planned Tradi-
tional Housing Areas (THAs), already lagged far behind actual needs at the
end of the 1970s. As early as 1977, the Capital City Development Committee
(CCDC) stated that over 10,000 plots would be needed, while only slightly more
than 1,400 had actually been laid out (CDDC 1977). Although plot allocation in-
creased over the following years, the development could not keep pace with the
growth of Lilongwe. So-called “squatter” or “spontaneous settlements” began
to emerge. In fact, these squatter-areas, which largely looked like traditional vil-
lages andwhichwere situated just at the edge or outside the city boundaries, had
been part of the city’s development almost since its inauguration, and hosted an
estimated 7,000 - 12,000 people in 1980 (Potts 1986: 276). Many of these ‘villagers’
that had settled in these rural-urban borderlands had actually been part of the
massive re-settlement that had taken place in the course of the construction of Li-
longwe City. Inhabitants of the villages lying within the future city boundaries,
of which many had actually been ‘urban’ migrants who had come to Lilongwe
for work7, were resettled within the city. Others were moved to rural areas, such
as Michinji, Ndowa or Kasungu, though many later returned to Lilongwe. Al-
though they had been living in villages, they were used to town life and its social
amenities. Returning from their largely involuntary re-migration to the country-
side, many re-settled just outside the city boundaries in these migrant villages.
Although they had already been assigned for the future extension of the city
in the 1970s, these areas had remained under customary law, underlying the ju-
risdiction of the Traditional Authority. Nevertheless, their inhabitants can hardly
be considered rural. This was also the case with the villages just outside Sector
7. Most of these villagers were engaged in the informal sector economy. While
they continued to cultivate for their own food needs and/or were engaged in
commercial agriculture, producing vegetables for the urban markets, many also
leased their land to urban migrants for cultivation purposes. This provided an
attractive additional source of income: Prices for a piece of land so close to the
city could reach up to MK 1,000 per acre per season. There was more money
to be made by leasing the land and resorting to buying food than by producing
food themselves, as most of them did.
While this land is formally under customary jurisdiction, the proximity to
town and the strong commercialisation of land and housing has strongly influ-
enced structures of authority. In most of these peri-urban areas, the Traditional
Authorities act as owners rather than trustees of the customary land, thus having
7 Already before its creation as a capital, Lilongwe City used to be a small, but important centre for
tobacco trading (Potts 1986)
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considerable authority in deciding how and to whom land is allocated or – more
commonly – leased (Interview No. 157, Paul Kishindo). In some areas this has
led to the establishment of a dual authority, in which the Traditional Authorities
continue to have authority over the allocation of plots (see also Englund 2001).8
At the end of the 1980s, inner-urban squatter settlements began to spring up
as well. Driven off by cramped living conditions and the increasing commer-
cialisation of housing in the planned THAs, people and local authorities took
matters into their own hands and started to allocate plots themselves. Accord-
ing to Chilowa, these unplanned THAs make up the biggest single housing cate-
gory in Malawian cities today, accommodating around 78% of the population in
Lilongwe City (Chilowa 1996: 8).
While land invasions were met with strong resistance on part of the City Au-
thority during the Banda era, the democratisation process that began in 1993 and
the growing laissez-faire approach of the state triggered off an enormous wave
of urban land invasions. In the fight for votes and faced with enormous resource
constraints in relation to city development, the strict enforcement mechanisms
regarding illegal housing were relaxed by the UDF-government. In the name of
democracy, people started constructing houses everywhere in the city, as well
as invading new areas without having to fear sanctions. This also included in-
vading areas not foreseen for settlement, but rather for public buildings or in-
frastructure. These new settlements were termed ‘multi-party-plots’ in order to
distinguish them from the Banda era, during which most illegal constructions
were demolished immediately, especially in inner-city areas. People were usu-
ally resettled in rural areas or allocated plots in other areas of town, and usually
provided with some sort of compensation.
The lack of economic and personal resources that could not keep pace with
the scale of urban growth and the enormous backlog of plot applications made
the City Council change its policy in the early 1990s. The ‘site and service scheme’
9 that had provided the basis for low-income housing areas was abandoned. In-
stead, a policy of ‘settlement upgrading’ was implemented. Most of the occupied
8 As we shall see in the next chapter, the power of the Traditional Authorities is also revealed by the
fact that land occupations are not always successful. The land invasion taking place in Sector 7
has also been a success, because the Village Headmen and the Traditional Authority let it happen,
applying their authority in return for plots and money.
9 In contrast to housing provision schemes, the ‘sights and services scheme’ required the city to
provide inexpensive land, security of tenure and the provision of a very basic infrastructure, i.e.
access to roads and water, while construction of housing was left to the owners (Chilowa 1996).
While the sites and services scheme had been promoted by international donors and organisations
since the 1960s in order to deal with rapid urban growth and the demand of housing and plots,
some scholars argue that the introduction of sites and services in Malawi already at the beginning
of the 1960s was a decision made to reduce costs and to ensure that towns did not become too
attractive (Potts 1986).
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areas were ‘legalised’ and incorporated into the city outline, which included the
registration of land titles. Where possible, the City Council surveyed the plots
in hindsight in order to fit them into the urban planning scheme. Whereas the
City Council admitted its responsibility for the provision of urban infrastructure,
“(I)nitially the THA layout will rely heavily on the residents’ self-help spirit to improve
the access to roads, drainage and pit latrines” (Lilongwe City Council 1993: 4). So-
called Community Development Committees (CDCs) were put in place that – in
cooperation with the City Council – were to identify potential donors for the re-
alisation of infrastructure projects and – as the local counterpart – also play an
important role in the projects’ implementation (ibid.). As a reaction to the on-
going land occupations and due to a further decrease in financial and personal
resources during the 1990s, the City Council has modified its practice further,
authorising private persons and groups involved in land occupations to act on
their behalf to survey the area under occupation. As such, they want to make
sure that the allocation and survey of plots is done in accordance with the city
layout and is compatible with the addition of infrastructure in the future.
3.4 Sector 7: A Urban-Rural Borderland
One of the ‘unplanned THAs’ to spring up in Lilongwe over the last decade is
Sector 7/Area 25A. Occupied in 1994 as a reaction to cramped living conditions
and high rents in the neighbouring areas, Sector 7 was one of the first ‘illegal
areas’ to be ‘upgraded’ by the City Council in 1995. The area was surveyed
and a Community Development Committee (CDC) was put in place, which was
responsible for taking care of the lacking infrastructure.
Since then, the area has undergone considerable changes. When I came there
for the first time in 1998 most of the plots were undeveloped and, except for
a borehole that had been put in place by the Member of Parliament (MP) of the
United Democratic Front (UDF) from the area during the first election campaign,
and some dirt roads, no infrastructure existed. The long north-south extension of
the area and the largely dispersed houses formed a strong contrast to the densely
populated neighbouring Area 25/A, giving one the impression of being in rural
Lilongwe rather than in the Malawian capital. Upon my return in 2001, the pop-
ulation had more than tripled, amounting to more than 8,000 people, and almost
all of the plots had been occupied, changing the appearance of the place from
one where there “was just bush and they (people, B.R.) were hunting beasts” (In-
terview No. 54, Young poor man) to a very ‘urban’ place. Not only were there
more people andmore houses - the area had completely changed its architectural
landscape. The tiny houses made of adobe and covered with plastic sheets and
tyres that had dominated the area three years before had largely given way to
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bigger houses, mostly made of burnt bricks and covered with iron sheets. While
many of them were private houses, many of the houses were also constructions
by ‘Habitat for Humanity’,10 an AmericanNGO that had been allocatedmore than
200 plots in order to provide cheap housing for poor people. The most conspic-
uous change was, however, the fact that a number of huge constructions were
under way, that with their stylish design and the high protective fences around
them resembled houses normally found only in the richer residential areas of the
city close to the centre. The infrastructure that the local community development
had managed to build in the area with the support of a number of donors had
apparently attracted not only a lot of new but also richer inhabitants.
While Sector 7 was one among many that had been occupied and upgraded
shortly after democratisation, the very active CDC in the area, consisting mainly
of retired civil servants and educated businessmen, had succeeded in attract-
ing donors’ interest in Sector 7, perhaps as a result of having been exposed to
the Malawian bureaucracy and the international donor community. As a result,
the project was incorporated in an urban poverty programme financed by the
GTZ (German Technical Cooperation) in cooperation with the Malawian Chris-
tian Service Committee (CSC), a large national NGO, in 1998. With the assis-
tance of the project, which aimed at fostering the self-help spirit by supporting a
number of CDCs in Lilongwe through the provision of technical assistance and
know-how in preparing project proposals, the CDC was able to obtain fund-
ing for major infrastructure development. In 2000, water kiosks funded by the
Malawian Social Action Fund (MASAF) were put in place. Since 2001, the area
has also had access to electricity financed by the European Union (EU), which
also made the connection to the telephone network possible.
The strong performance of Sector 7 also generated some extra donor money
from the GTZ for the construction of a school block for a primary school in 2002.
Plans were also made to seek further funding for an extension of the school, in-
cluding more classrooms and a the construction of a secondary school, to enable
children to avoid the long and – due to increased motorcycle traffic – dangerous
walking distances. Most people were actually using the schools in the neigh-
bouring areas 25A and 25B, as well as the Protestant Dzenza Mission’s large
boarding school, which lies a few kilometres south of the area and hosts a sec-
ondary school. As we shall see in the next chapter, the project has encountered
major difficulties. When we left the area, neither the primary school was in use,
nor were there any hopeful signs for a realisation of a further extension. The
introduction of free primary education in 1994 and the lack of school facilities
10 The organisation had rented a considerable part of the area in 1995 in order to provide low cost
housing for low-income people on a long-term loan basis. I will come back to this organisation
later in the chapter.
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have also led to an upsurge of private primary and secondary schools in Sec-
tor 7, including pre-schools. Their quality differs substantially, however. While
some schools provide a proper teaching infrastructure and qualified teachers,
most schools in the area are initiatives by housewives or unemployed people,
whose education does often not go beyond a primary school leaving certificate.
This means that the quality of the classes usually held in private houses or half-
finished buildings all around the area is extremely low, and one cannot avoid
the impression that for many, the income-generating effect rather than teaching
quality is the central motivating factor.
Plans for a health care centre within the area also existed. While most of the
poorer people walk long distances to the central hospital to get free assistance,
others attend private health care centres in other areas, which are largely catered
for by NGOs or churches, such as the health care station of the Mission Station.
In 2001, the area allocated for the construction of a clinic was sold – illegally – to
the Kingdom of God Church, which should have included a school and a health
care centre accessible to all the inhabitants of the area. When we left the field,
however, only the church was in place. One major problem is posed by the road
system, which consists entirely of dirt roads put in place by the people using
them. They are of very poor quality, and make access during the rainy season
impossible. This is also one reason why the private minibuses which provide for
inner urban transport have not extended their services into the area, meaning
that people have to walk at least 30 minutes to get to the closest bus station and
into town. During my field stay, a funding proposal with the European Union
(EU) was under discussion, but it was rejected due to high costs.
Provision of infrastructure meant an improvement in living conditions for
most inhabitants of the areas. However, this did not mean that everybody was
able to access it. The inhabitants of the ‘habitat-houses’ were not allowed to con-
nect to the electricity unless they had fully repaid their loans, in order to avoid
further repayment problems for their housing loans. In most cases, however, it
was simply high connection charges and consumption fees that stratified access
to electricity.11 Nonetheless, illegal hook-ups to electricity by poorer households
were in fact very common.
Economic constraints also structured access to tap water from the newly in-
stalled kiosks. The privatisation of the LilongweWater Board in the course of the
new Structural Adjustment Programme led to a substantial rise in water prices.
The increased price of water from 50 Tambala to 70 Tambala12 per bucket made
water unaffordable for the poor majority of the population. The approaching
hunger made matters worse, as water was one of the first things to economise
11 The connection fee of MK 1,300 was more or less what poor people would earn in a month.
12 One Malawian Kwacha has 10 Tambala. In 2001, around MK 40 were equivalent to US$ 1.
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on. People started to use water from the borehole again, and the mostly unpro-
tected open wells that richer plot owners had drilled at their plots to be used for
household purposes. As a consequence, water-related diseases such as diarrhoea
increased once more, exacerbating the alreadyweak health conditions due to the
precarious food situation, especially among the poor and the children.
3.5 The Social Structure
The increase in infrastructure over a period of three years described in the previ-
ous section was also accompanied by a change in the social structure of the area.
Sector 7 has not only experienced an urbanisation in terms of its quantitative ex-
pansion, but also a qualitative urbanisation, in terms of a deepening stratification
of its social structure.
In 1998, many of the people living in the area were poor migrants who had
only come for the season to work as construction workers within the area or as
seasonal labourers in the close-by tobacco processing industry of Kanengo, many
of them from the surrounding villages and districts. They were renting the tiny
constructions put in place by the plot owners who had bought or occupied a
plot, but who had no money to develop it properly, most of them lower rank
civil servants or other low-income persons,13 who planned to develop it later
in life, when they retired or had more money. In the meantime, they had built
tiny, largely very shabby constructions that allowed them to keep the plot, while
at the same time providing some additional revenue.14 Another common ar-
rangement that usually ran within families concerned relatives who were asked
to look after the houses of, or survey ongoing construction activities for, their
absent kin, often migrants working abroad or in other Malawian towns. In ex-
change, they were allowed to stay rent-free in the mostly unfinished houses.
People occupying their own plots were very few, most of them employees in Ka-
nengo or in other private or state companies in the city centre. Some were retired
civil servants who had acquired a plot with the money from their final lump sum
payment upon retirement.
In 2001, this had changed considerably. Most of the plots had been occupied
in the meantime. A lot of those people who had still been constructing their
houses in 1998 had moved into the area, many of them into one of the ‘habitat
houses’, the number of which had increased significantly since 1998. At the same
time, a considerable number of higher income people, many higher rank civil
13 For a categorisation of civil servants in Malawi see Anders (2005).
14 If the plot was not developed within six months from the purchase date, the City Council had the
right to evict the owners from their plot and assign it to somebody else. This regulation was to
ensure that the already low number of plots was used efficiently (Interview No. 68/1998).
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servants or people having their own private companies, had come to the area.
They had bought a plot in the area and/or developed their own plot, which they
had bought when Sector 7 was occupied, in order to develop it upon retirement.
Most of the poorer people I had interviewed in 1998 had left the area fleeing high
rents, or had been forced to sell their plots. They either rented out their houses
or sold them to higher-income people, moving to close-by ‘villages’ in the rural-
urban borderlands. Many were becoming tenants on their own plot, renting the
servant’s quarters in the backyard of the plot they had sold, or – while renting
out their houses – were squatting in Sector 7 or other areas in order to generate
some additional income.
The changes occurring in Sector 7 had not only been caused by the increase
in infrastructure that had in turn made the area unaffordable for many poor peo-
ple due to rising rents. Especially the ‘sudden’ inpouring of civil servants, many
of whom belonged to the higher income class, had mainly been a consequence
of a major policy reform of the civil service as part of the conditionality set by
Structural Adjustment and the Good Governance policy of World Bank and IMF
(see Anders 2005). The reform of the civil service, aiming to create a more ef-
ficient and effective state bureaucracy, included, amongst other things, a ma-
jor social policy reform, which also foresaw changes in the housing allowance
scheme. While previously most civil servants lived in houses provided or paid
for by the government, the new scheme foresaw that government would with-
draw from the costly lease of houses and instead pay housing allowances that
would make up a certain percentage of the salary and would be differentiated
according to grade. The introduction of this policy met with strong resistance,
especially on the part of low rank civil servants whose salaries were so low that
they would have received almost nothing as a housing allowance.15 The intro-
duction of monetary allowances meant that most civil servants, even those get-
ting a high housing allowance, were forced to move into cheaper areas, as they
could no longer afford to pay the high rents in higher quality areas in other parts
of town that had been formerly heavily subsidised by the government (ibid.).
The availability of basic infrastructure, together with comparatively cheap rents
and prices for plots and houses, rendered Sector 7 a very attractive alternative.
For many, the move into Sector 7 was merely the early fulfilment of what they
had planned to do in any case upon retirement, when they would have been
forced to leave their government houses, especially for those who had already
bought their plot in the area.
Yet the big new houses that had appeared in the area, together with their
stylish rich and very urban inhabitants, could not conceal the overall deteriora-
15 For a more detailed discussion of the civil service reform and the conflicts around its introduction
see Anders 2005.
86 Borderland Urbanisation
tion in social and economic conditions: especially as a result of the high inflation
rates and the rising price levels that had hit both richer and poorer parts of the
population. While their big houses still expressed a great deal of wealth when
compared to the average low-income inhabitant of Sector 7, we shall see that
these houses hosted an increasingly impoverished civil service also struggling
to maintain a certain standard of living. Many of the low-income people who in
1998 could not afford special consumer goods, but did not particularly struggle
to make ends meet, now found themselves in an increasingly precarious posi-
tion. The poor people who had managed to stay in the area, mostly in small or
unfinished houses made of unburned bricks, could only do this thanks to the
specific tenant arrangements mentioned above that enabled them to spend noth-
ing on rent. The only ‘winners’ of this development were a small middle-class
that had developed over the years, and which had succeeded in extending its
wealth via a variety of ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ sources of income.
The social structure of Sector 7 had also experienced a significant change on
the ‘horizontal’ level. Whereas in 1998 most people did not know each other
or only knew each other from their time in Sector 7, by 2001 a certain degree
of gentrification had evolved. Friends, workmates or ex-neighbours from other
areas who had heard about plots or houses for rent or sale in Sector 7 were mov-
ing in, creating clusters of social relations and support networks in immediate
geographic proximity. Some of the families established in Sector 7 for a longer
period of time had succeeded in finding houses or plots for their relatives, who
migrated from other places in Malawi. In addition, many children of people liv-
ing in Sector 7 who had married off in the meantime had also established them-
selves in the area, often in close proximity to their parents’ homes, with a lively
exchange of children, food, gossip, information and labour taking place.
3.6 Income and Occupational Structure
The social stratification of the area is closely interrelated to income and occu-
pational structure. Most people in the area were working in so-called ‘informal
working arrangements’. This also included most people engaged in permanent
employment, which was the main source of income for the majority of the people
in our sample. Permanent employment here thus indicates not only occupations
in the ‘formal’ sector economy, ranging from low income jobs in the public and
private sector, such as watchman or cleaner in schools and hospitals or chain
worker or in one of the big production companies, but also more highly skilled
and higher paid jobs, such as civil servant, technician, and accountant in the
nearby schools or the para-statals and companies in the commercial centre of Li-
longwe. Furthermore, it also encompasses occupations in the ‘informal sector
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economy’ on a permanent basis, such as those employed as carpenters or panel
beaters in big garages and workshops in Sector 7 or the neighbouring areas, or
the drivers of private minibus or transport companies. Apart from some high
rank civil servants or people employed in high-skills jobs in private industry,
most of the employees belonged to the low-income group, earning around MK
2,000 to MK 4,000 – equivalent to US$ 50 to US$ 100 per month. Most of these
people had to travel for their work. Employment opportunities in close spatial
proximity, especially outside the informal economy, were rare. The industrial
complex of Kanengo, about 4 km from Sector 7, where mainly tobacco process-
ing industries are found, was closest, although employment opportunities there
were mostly seasonal. They usually started in May and finished in October or
November, depending on the tobacco yield.
Another major source of income was business and trading activities, rang-
ing from the petty trading visible everywhere to large-scale businesses. Busi-
ness activities were highly stratified along social and gender lines. While large
scale business activities, such as car garages, minibus ventures or transport ser-
vices, were confined to the richest income strata, a business and trading class
had emerged over the years, which made up the tiny middle-class of the area,
together with the lower-rank civil servants. They had succeeded in establishing
solid business activities, either having their own workshops, for example weld-
ing, carpentry, panel beating or building, or being involved in trading, for exam-
ple selling second-hand clothes or food items on a large scale, such as chicken,
maize, cassava or Irish potatoes. Usually people rented a kiosk at one of two
main markets in Area 25A or 25C for this purpose. This tiny middle class, for
whom the business activity was usually one among a variety of sources of in-
come, had in part become considerably richer over the last years. Most of these
businesses were family ventures and involved the whole family being engaged
in the preparation and the selling of the items. This also held for petty trade,
mainly in food and firewood, and for larger scale business, which often involves
the poorer strata of the population.
Business activities were also gendered: men usually engaged in larger scale
trade, while petty trade was mainly carried out by women and children, often
as an additional source of household income. In this case, they either moved
around within the area, or found a corner at the market, where they sold dough-
nuts, cooked potatoes or vegetables. Some women also had a small kiosk in
front of their houses, selling directly from their plot. The introduction of micro-
credit-schemes in recent years has led to changes in the gender structure of busi-
ness, and more women are now engaged in larger scale business. However,
economic stratification has remained basically the same, as it was mainly the
richer or better-off – and often married – women who were able to provide the
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security and collateral for a loan. We shall see that deteriorating social and eco-
nomic conditions had also forced many unemployed men into the otherwise ex-
clusively female domain of small-scale business and petty trading (see Chap-
ter 6).
Apart from petty trade, it wasGanyu – casual labour or piecework based on a
day-to-day basis – that provided the main important source of income. Whereas
it rarely provides the only household source of income, it is an important addi-
tional source that is done in seasonal alternation to other income activities or by
different householdmembers. Thus, many womenwere engaged inGanyu activ-
ities, while men were engaged in trading or permanent employment. Many men
employed in business increased their income with additional Ganyu activities.
Due to high levels of construction activity in Sector 7, many opportunities for
Ganyuwere available within the area; brick moulding, drawing water and build-
ing were the main activities people were engaged in. As construction activities
were mainly confined to the dry season from March until October, employment
opportunitiesunderwent considerable fluctuation. The high supply of labour, es-
pecially in the dry season when a lot of seasonal migrants from the surrounding
villages would come into the area – often only on a day to day basis – resulted in
a highly competitive labour market that added an additional insecurity to an al-
ready fragile income source. Being paid on a day-to-day basis, or in instalments
that depended on the completion of a certain part of the construction, Ganyu
workers were paid very irregularly: not only did they often get their money late,
but often had to struggle hard to get their money at all, or to get the amount they
had agreed upon beforehand. Many of these working conflicts ended up in front
of the Chief (see Chapter 4). This was especially the case with women: most of
them complained that landlords, or the foreman of their working colony, would
often pay women last, and that women would have to wait and quarrel for their
money the most. Together with business and trade, the deteriorating economic
conditions had especially hit this already extremely volatile income sector and
therefore, had hit the poorest people the most. The increase in prices, especially
for imported building materials, had resulted in significantly less building ac-
tivity in the area and by the same token, diminished working opportunities and
lower salaries.
Pensions and social allowances made up another important part of the in-
come structure. This group consisted almost exclusively of retired civil servants
or their widows, as they are the only people in Malawi entitled to publicly-
provided old-age-allowances. One man got a soldier’s pension in compensation
for his service in the British Army during the SecondWorld War; but the amount
was negligible. Another specific case was our landlady Mrs. Gomonda, who re-
ceived a widow’s pension from the provident fund of the United Nations, as her
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husband had worked as a driver for the United Nations International Children’s
Emergency Fund (UNICEF).
Another important income-generating activity that had gained increased im-
portance over the last years was subletting houses. The commercialisation of the
land and housing market in Lilongwemade the subletting of houses an attractive
economic activity, providing a steady, fairly stable cash source of income for a
considerable number of people in Sector 7, also for the low-income group. Those
who had been in town for a longer time had often already acquired a second or
more plots in town, often in other recently occupied areas in Lilongwe. Like-
wise, there were people in Sector 7 who had a house in another area in Lilongwe
where they had lived before moving into Sector 7 either to occupy another plot
or for renting purposes. The decision regarding where people would move to
usually depended on the differences in rents in the various areas.
3.6.1 Urban Agriculture
Agricultural production played an important role in the economic activities of
Sector 7. Just over half the families we interviewed were involved in cultivation.
Many had leased land in nearby villages or commuted to their villages to con-
tinue cultivation. Some had the opportunity to use the land of relatives within
the Lilongwe Area, or had illegally occupied a piece of land along the road to the
airport, where they cultivated some ridges of maize or potatoes. Richer house-
holds who had rented land in the nearby village often also hired labourers from
these villages to cultivate their land. In most cases, however, the women and
children took care of the fields. For those cultivating in their home villages, sea-
sonal migration of women and children for the cultivation period was frequent.
Often, it was also relatives in the village who – in exchange for salt and sugar or a
share of the harvest – were hired to cultivate the migrant’s fields. Most migrants,
especially those from far away, left their maize in the villages anyway, arguing
that transport costs were too high to bring the maize to town. Instead, maize
was sold in the village when prices reached their peak, and the money raised
was brought to town. More often, however, the maize was left in the village to
be consumed or sold by the rural kin as a form of in-kind support. While these
cultivation arrangements provided an important source of food insurance for
the rural kin, they also constituted an important place-making strategy for the
urban kin. The continuation of cultivation in one’s absence was not only an im-
portant symbolic action for confirming one’s membership in the lineage and the
village, it was also of enormous importance in securing and maintaining one’s
entitlement to the land.
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Due to the high rents for cultivation in town16 and the enormous land pres-
sure in the rural areas – the latter being a major reason for urban migration – it
is not surprising that the poor and very poor cultivated the least. They usu-
ally have a small kitchen garden on their plot and/or “illegally” cultivated some
ridges here and there along the road or in public spaces, such as empty plots
allocated for the further extension of the school, the clinic, the market, etc. This
phenomenon was not new, but we could observe that it was particularly strong
in 2001, when food was scarce and hunger was spreading. Generally, a lot of
people, both rich and poor, who had not cultivated for years expressed their in-
tention to lease land in town or migrate back home in order to cultivate again.
The high food prices and more importantly, the scarcity of food becoming in-
creasingly overt during the second half of 2001, made cultivation an important
alternative once more for rich and poor alike: “Renting land in town for cultiva-
tion is not necessarily cheaper since one has to have money for rent, seeds, fertiliser and
labour but it is more convenient and more secure, since you have your own maize and do
not depend on buying” (Interview No.10a, Mr. Chincanda).
Between 1998 and 2001, kitchen gardens and the keeping of animals, such
as chickens, guinea fowl or ducks markedly increased. Whereas chickens were
raised for commercial reasons, most of the other animals were kept for private
consumption or served as food insurance for the hunger period: most people
would not eat the animals themselves, but rather sell them at the market and in
exchange, buy cheaper but more abundant food, such as Nsima17 or beans. Most
crops grown in the kitchen garden were vegetables, such as turnips, cabbage
or green maize and potatoes: food that was particularly nutritious and could
be consumed during the rainy season when the maize was still to mature. Al-
though some richer people sold some of their vegetables at the market, produce
from kitchen gardens was almost exclusively used for the grower’s private con-
sumption, especially for the children (Interview No. 13, Mr. Phiri).
Urban agriculture did have a clearly commercial aspect for some people,
however. Cultivation enabled some to speculate on the maize prices, i.e., peo-
ple bought maize when it was still cheap and kept their own maize for the rainy
season, when maize was scarce and prices extremely high. Many sold their over-
production to their neighbours or at the market as an attractive additional source
of income. Some women also rented land for the cultivation of vegetables in the
very fertile swamp area (dambo) south of Sector 7 in order to sell them at the
market.
16 A piece of land could cost around MK 1,000 to 1,500, equivalent to US$ 25 to US$ 30 per season,
depending on size and proximity to town.
17 Nsima – the staple food of Malawi – is a thick, rather tasteless porridge made of boiled maize
flour – Ufa. It is accompanied with relish, i.e. all kinds of vegetables or meat.
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3.6.2 OccupationalMix
The most conspicuous feature of the occupational structure was that most house-
holds depended on a variety of sources of income, a characteristic I shall call the
‘occupational mix’.
This trend ran through both the rich and poor income strata. While the mix-
ing of diverse sources of income had already been a strong feature in 1998, es-
pecially among poorer households, it had also increasingly spread to the richer
households over the years, largely as a reaction to the overall economic decline.
This mix usually involved various members of the household. It was very com-
mon to find that a person engaged in permanent employment was also involved
in other business activities, which were usually being taken care of by his or her
spouse, the children, or distant relatives deliberately called from the village for
this purpose. These businesses ranged from large-scale ventures, such as the
selling of second hand clothes or bricks, to petty trading of foodstuffs or vegeta-
bles or freezers, small pieces of frozen soft drinks that were popular refreshments,
especially with children.
Case 3.1: Trans-local Income Mix – The Chalira Family The Chali-
ras have lived in the area since 1998 and were one of the first fami-
lies to move in. In 1998, the small family, which included two chil-
dren at that time, depended entirely on Mr. Chalira’s income (Mr
Chalira was working at the para-statal ESCOM, the Malawian Elec-
tricity Company as an employee). Later, they had developed a veri-
table income economy over the years that included the whole family
and extended beyond the city boundaries. With a small loan from
some school friends, Mr. Chalira had started rearing chickens in the
backyard of his plot, which turned out to be a very good business for
a while. In the same backyard, his wife was cultivating vegetables
and bananas, mostly for their own use, but which – when she had
produce in abundance – she would occasionally sell at the market, or
to neighbours. Since the beginning of 2000, they had also brought the
son of a distant kin to town. He helped Mrs. Chalira with household
chores and the poultry business. In the afternoons, he was usually
found at the market selling freezers or drop scones that Mr. Chalira
fried in the morning. Both Mr. and Mrs. Chalira were also cultivat-
ing maize in their home villages. They had assigned relatives to take
care of the cultivation and provided fertiliser and seeds. Mrs. Chalira
usually migrated for a month or two during the rainy season to over-
see the cultivation, but the maize was usually left in the village. Due
to food scarcity and high maize prices, they had also thought about
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starting cultivation in town for their own consumption. Mr. Chalira
also planned to send his children to the village during school holi-
days in order for them to learn about village life. Although he was
not sure that he would go back to his home village upon retirement
and hoped that his children would achieve a higher level of educa-
tion and better paid jobs, he considered farming an essential part of
their education. Even if they remained in town, they should learn
to be self-reliant, which also implied an apprenticeship in cultivation
skills.
While for richer people like the Chalira family, the income mix usually meant
an economic expansion that also implied a rise in income, for the poorer part
of the population, having a variety of sources of income was merely a means of
survival. This is also revealed in the type of income sources they were involved
in, which – in contrast to the richer households – mainly consisted of largely
volatile and short-term sources, such as Ganyu or small-scale business. The in-
security and low profit of these sources of income not only implied that more
people within the household were forced to be economically active in order to
make ends meet, including the children, it usually also forced one person to be
engaged in various sources of income at the same time or in sequence, depend-
ing on seasonally fluctuating working opportunities and incomes. For example,
people engaged in petty trading often alternated with Ganyu in the construction
sector during the dry season, which provided a more profitable source of income
during this period. Often the division of labour ran within households, as men
would do their small-scale business at the market while women engaged in con-
struction activities.
The case study also shows that income diversification involves a trans-local
aspect. Whereas in many households the woman with the children would mi-
grate back to the village for the season in order to cultivate, others came to town
for the season, migrating back to the families they had left behind in the villages
at other times. This involved many of the seasonal labourers working in the to-
bacco industry in Kanengo, who, unless they remained in town in the off-season,
usually working in small-scale business, went back to the rural areas for cultiva-
tion. Others again, especially those living closer, i.e. within Lilongwe District or
Dedza, commuted on a regular basis between rural and urban areas, switching
between and combining both rural and urban economic opportunities.
Case 4.2: Trans-local Economics Mai Johnny comes from a village
in Dowa. She and her husband arrived in town only recently. They
came here in order to expand their business. They had had a grocery
in the village for ten years, and with the profits they made, had man-
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aged to build two houses with iron sheets. Then they decided to try
doing business in town. They closed the grocery and used the capital
to get to town. At the moment, Mai Johnny is selling vegetables and
other small items, like charcoal and soap. Her husband has estab-
lished a bicycle spare part business. They have sublet the grocery in
the village. Mai Johnny only goes back for the cultivation period, as
they have enough land in her husband’s home village. In the future,
they plan to take over the village grocery again. In fact, they plan to
live off both town and village: they want to bring their agricultural
products into town and use the profits to buy urban consumer goods
to be sold in their village grocery. They know that this will involve a
lot of moving, but they want to base themselves in town.
The combination of rural and urban economic activities does not automati-
cally entail rural agricultural versus urban cash labour production, and this is
also true for those who live in town. Many urban business women, in particular,
had expanded their economic space into the rural areas, commuting on a day-to-
day basis into the surrounding villages on specific market days in order to sell
Chitenjes or second hand clothes.
These multi-local economics also challenges notions of rural-urbanmigration
patterns. The case shows that trans-local living strategies involve a series of dif-
ferent migration trajectories that may run within one household. As we shall see
in Chapter 5, this does not only concern economic considerations and insecuri-
ties. People mix different migration patterns, alternating between long-term and
short-term migration, according to economic and social needs and opportunities
both (with)in town and the village.
3.7 Politics between Chieftainship, City Administration
and Party Leadership
Looking at the politico-administrative structure of Sector 7 one finds that vari-
ous systems of governance exist side-by-side, encompassing both customary and
state structures. The mix of different legal and administrative systems is very
typical formarginal townships in Lilongwe, especially those that have grown out
of spontaneous settlement structures, mostly at the periphery of town. Although
formally they were all under the jurisdiction of the Lilongwe City Council, the
somewhat artificial creation and expansion of Lilongwe, including the arbitrary
incorporation of traditional Chewa villages, has favoured the development of
parallel systems of governance. In specific policy fields, customary law con-
tinues to have even more legal relevance and enforcement authority than state
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regulations. For example, Englund (2001) shows that in Chinsapo, a marginal
area in the North of Lilongwe City close to Old Town, the land and housing mar-
ket continues to be controlled by the Traditional Authority.
This was not the case in Sector 7, where land and housing were regulated by
the City Council. In fact, we shall see that the ‘upgrading’ of the area by the City
Council meant important legal security for the migrants who had ‘illegally’ in-
vaded the area and occupied the plots under the leadership of a few local party
officials of the newly elected United Democratic Front (UDF) and private busi-
nessmen.
The village headman played a central role in the area nevertheless. First of
all, as the local authority figure, he had an important representational and coor-
dinating function. He played a central role in the organisation of funerals: He
was usually called on to testify the death of a person, and was the main organ-
iser of the event, which would involve hundreds of people. He would divide
the different tasks among the friends, neighbours, religious associations, and the
various burial associations, such as the cooking, the praying, and the transport to
the graveyard. He usually also held a speech, in which he announced the amount
of money or material support people had contributed to the funeral ceremony.
On these occasions, he addressed wider issues as well, such as current problems
within the community or wider subjects, such as democracy or HIV/AIDS. We
shall see in the next chapter that he also played a central role in the local devel-
opment processes, especially as regards the infrastructure projects. Being well
educated and having many years of experience working with foreign compa-
nies, he was very versed in dealing with donors and international NGOs and
became one of their most important counterparts. He also played an important
role in organising and motivating the community to participate in development
projects, which all required the financial and material assistance of the inhab-
itants of Sector 7. Despite the urban bias of many state institutions, including
the public court system that would allow people to have easier access to these
structures, the Chief played a central role in local dispute settlement. He usually
held court once a week. The cases dealt with were family issues, labour dis-
putes, and minor cases of theft, domestic violence and witchcraft. In fact, most
of the disputes were dealt with within the local area. On the one hand, this was
a matter of convenience. As we shall see later in the book, most disputes evolv-
ing around labour issues concerned Ganyu, which were dealt with in immediate
vicinity. Mostly, however, people simply did not have the knowledge and still
less, the money, to appeal to state courts. This was usually only done in spe-
cific cases when a great deal was at stake, or where, as in the case of property
grabbing, people had also gained the knowledge and the courage to appeal to
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the state authorities through public campaigning.18 The Chief also retained
an important function in case people wanted to appeal to the state courts. As the
major authority in the area, he kept the major data of people, giving testimony of
identity, residence, and a person’s legal record, all of which needed if one wished
to marry or bring an issue before the court or the police. These data were also
required by many NGOs for people to access support. Most micro-credit projects
asked for proof of local residence and the legal record of their loan applicants.
As a reaction to the growth of Sector 7 and in order to be able to fulfil his
tasks, the current village headman had reorganised the administration of the
area. The area had been divided into two areas, both with their own village
headman. He further subdivided each area into ‘sub-chiefdoms’ equivalent to
one row of houses, each with its own female or male sub-head(wo)man. These
sub-chiefdoms represented an intermediate structure to which people could re-
port in case anything required the presence of the Chief.
Other important stakeholders in the community were the local party branches,
spearheaded by the UDF, which represented the strongest party within the area
and also provided the local councillor elected in 2000. Whereas the power of the
UDF party had already been strong in 1998, the actual implementation of local
government, which had been suspended since 1994, considerably increased its
influence on the local level. As we shall see in a later chapter of the book, this led
to enormous conflicts within the community. The village headman and the com-
munity’s local self-help initiative had filled the administrative and functional
vacuum left by lacking local state structures, only to see their power and achieve-
ments ‘hijacked’ by a highly politicised local structure dominated by an increas-
ingly authoritarian UDF. 19 Apart from changing administrative structures, we
shall see that local power structures in Sector 7 were far from providing a static
and stable power structure. As I shall discuss later on, the urbanisation of the
area has also considerably changed political power constellations and both cus-
tomary and state legalities.
18 As regards the discussion on property grabbing see Chapter 7.
19 Whereas under Banda the Traditional Authorities had been totally under the control of theMalawi
Congress Party (MCP), acting as its political satellites of power and coercion (Magolowondo 2001:
10), the new Local Government Act foresaw a diminished role for the Chiefs. The new local
government structures, the so-called District Assemblies, have both political and administrative
authority, and are composed of electedmembers, the so-called Members of the Assembly or Coun-
cillors, representing the various district or city wards. Traditional Authorities are ex-officio non-
voting members and only have a consultative function. The major responsibility and function of
the City Assemblies lies in the formulation of policies and decisions on local governance and de-
velopment: These are the consolidation and promotion of local democratic institutions and demo-
cratic participation; the promotion of infrastructure and social services; and economic develop-
ment within the wards/districts (The Programme Manager Decentralisation Secretariat 2000: 4).
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3.8 Mobile Migrants: Motivations and Experiences
Themajority of themigrants in our sample came from the Central Region (52.4%),
while 22.3% came from the Southern provinces and 7.9% from the North. There
were a substantial number of so-called ‘international migrants’ (12.7%), who had
been working abroad as labour migrants in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s and had
returned toMalawi in due course, most of them after the transition to democracy
in 1994. These labour migrants also accounted for 3.2% of foreigners in the area;
Zambians and Zimbabweans who married Malawians in the migration and had
come to Malawi with them.20
Most of the adult population in Sector 7 were first generation migrants, i.e.
people who had been born and had grown up in the rural areas. Whereas most
of the children were born in town, the share of second-generation migrants was
very small, which confirms the very volatile migration trends in Malawi. These
second-generation migrants were exclusively the offspring of a generation of
civil servants who had decided to remain in town after their retirement at the
end of the 1980s and 1990s. Apart from a few relatives who had come directly
from the rural areas, most of the current inhabitants of Sector 7 had come from
other – mostly neighbouring – urban areas. One family came from within the
area, having lived before in one of the many villages scattered along the city
boundaries.
Looking at the migration trajectories of the people reveals that Malawians
are extremely mobile. For most Malawians, migration is an intrinsic part of their
lives, often from a very young age. Following the migration itineraries of indi-
vidual migrants one is able to trace a continuous movement within rural areas,
between rural and urban areas, between andwithin cities, and even between dif-
ferent countries. Migration to town is thus usually only one movement amongst
many others. In this respect, even for those who had bought or constructed a
house in the area, Sector 7 was simply one place among many others on their
migration itinerary; for some only for weeks and months, for others for years.
For most migrants, the migration to Sector 7 was not their first time in town.
Some had already been in the city for education purposes. Others had been
forced to leave town and return to the village for a while, because they had lost
their work or fallen ill. There were also a considerable number of inter-urban
migrants who had lived in other Malawian or foreign towns before coming to
Lilongwe. They had either been transferred from work, or had changed town,
20 It is interesting to note that from the eight internationalmigrants, five come from eastern provinces
in the North and three from the eastern provinces in the Central Region. An explanation may be
the closeness to the borders of Zambia and Zimbabwe, which might have made international
labour migration easier.
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expecting better working and living conditions in Lilongwe thanMzuzu or Blan-
tyre.
As diverse as the places people were going to or coming from were the rea-
sons and motivations for people to migrate. While the decision to migrate usu-
ally involved awhole bundle of different aspects andmotivations, economic con-
siderations often played a central role. For most migrants, rural land and income
scarcity provided themajor reason for their migration into town. These economic
considerations were, however, not always as simplistic as modernist assump-
tions of a rural-urban income differential caused by a predominantly rural sub-
sistence economy versus an exclusively urban cash economy, or as the migrants
themselves tended to suggest (see for a critique Jamal & Weeks 1993). With
economic liberalisation and incoming consumer goods and new technologies,
money also gained importance in village economies (Loiske 1995). At the same
time, growing land scarcity due to ecological changes and demographic pressure
made cash income-generating activities an important alternative to agricultural
production and a means of survival in the rural areas. Although cash income-
generating activities in the village existed, they were few. Moreover, most of
these working opportunities were within agriculture, which meant that they
were highly volatile and insecure, as they were dependent on the agricultural
calendar and good weather conditions.
In this situation, town simply represented an important alternative where
income-generating activities could, in contrast to the village, be found more eas-
ily. While for educated migrants the move to town continued to be related to
‘expectations of modernity’ (Ferguson 1999), including permanent employment,
a career, and a modern lifestyle, most migrants simply expected to find a broad
range of cash labour opportunities that would allow them to make money more
easily than in the village. The wide range of working opportunities, ranging
from casual labour to large-scale business, was also perceived as the major ad-
vantage of town over the village and the major reason for migration. It was also
what defined town: “Town life is when you are working and when you are able to
provide yourself with the basic necessities” (Interview No. 59, Mr. Namutwa).
The ample working opportunities that town offered were not only linked to
individual dreams for oneself or one’s core family; expectations towards town
almost always had a trans-local dimension. Most peoples’ expectations of pros-
pering and getting rich in town also involved the idea that they would then be
able to support their rural kin they had left in the village.
“In my life, I have achieved to buy the things I wanted for me and
my family. I also had the goal to support my parents so that they
have a better life, e.g. building a house for them and making sure
that they have better food and food throughout the whole year, but I
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failed. They still stay in their own house. I am the only son and my
parents expect me to do this, also because I stay in town.” (Interview
No. 45, Mr. Msmba)
The quotation shows that expectations in this regardwent far beyond regular
support and were an integral part of migrants’ urban lives and plans, also reach-
ing far into the future: most migrants had the dream of building or buying their
own house in Sector 7. At the same time, they dreamed about building a house
in the village for their parents and close kin, to which they might eventually be
able to move, too, if they wanted , or to which they might be forced to return in
old age.
Trans-local expectations were thus not necessarily confined to the rural kin
left behind, but also implied future social security considerations on the part of
the urban migrants. However, although many migrants had left the village be-
cause of lacking employment opportunities, high expectations were also in evi-
dence on the part of their parents and siblings that they would do so. The latter
had usually invested a lot of money and undergone major economic sacrifices in
view of the prospect that at least one of their family would be able to migrate
and attain a well paid job which in turn, would also allow the rural household
to prosper, or finance the education of the next sibling or cousin.
“In 1983 after having finished school I went to Lilongwe to look
for a job. My parents did not tell me to go, but after secondary school
I could not find a job in the village, and I somehow saw that I had to
go. Parents do not educate children in order to be paid back, but that
children are able to support themselves. Yet they were very happy
that there were fewer dependents to feed when I left.” (Interview
No. 50, Mr. Gondwe)
“I was not worried when my children went to town, because I
knew that they are only here in town to work and afterwards they
will come back to me. When your children are leaving and go to
town you are not worried, because if this child is a good child, it
will support you and you have less children at home who you have
to support. I encouraged my children to go to town (. . . ), and I en-
couraged also others to go, like my son in Botswana and the one in
Mwanza (Southern Region). At the moment I think that all my chil-
dren should stay in town, because in the village there is not enough
food. But if they are tired of town life they should come back.” (In-
terview No. 49, Mr. Pindani, mother of a female migrant who was
visiting her daughter in town)
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While the educated ones largely left the village in order to achieve something
in town, many young children also migrated for education purposes. Educa-
tion facilities in town were usually considered to be of a better quality in town
than in the villages, especiallywhere secondary school educationwas concerned.
Moreover, schools in rural areas were often difficult to reach, forcing pupils to
walk long distances on a daily basis. Education purposes were, however, not
only confined to schooling. We shall see that skills-training, such as carpentry or
welding, often in the workshops of some distant relative with the aim of open-
ing up a workshop in the village after one had finished the apprenticeship and
had returned to the rural areas, provided an important resource transfer between
village and town.
Additionally, social and emotional reasons for migration had always played
an important role. Economic decline and the consequences of HIV/AIDS sug-
gest that they have gained increased prominence as regards the decision to mi-
grate over the years. Disputes with relatives or witchcraft accusations were often
mentioned as reasons that had made people leave. Clearly, many of these con-
flicts had socio-economic roots, being related to disputes over land, inheritance
or rising income inequality, all of which had increased enormously with rising
land scarcity and the general economic decline. However, in all these migration
histories, the social and emotional aspect played an important role, as it was so-
cial alienation and psychological pressure that had made it impossible for the
migrants to remain in the village, even if they had an economic basis. Some of
our respondents, who had set up well-run businesses in the village, had to leave
the village because of witchcraft accusations, fearing for their lives and those of
their family. To display one’s ‘otherness’ by having more money, an iron sheet on
one’s roof, eating different food or being economically successful was considered
by many to be much easier in town.
“In the village, despite of witchcraft and problems with relatives,
it is better. You have your land and you can employ people to do the
work for you. Everything is cheaper. But it is still better to stay in
town, although you have to pay for everything. In town you live as
a free person. But in the village, you cannot do anything to develop
yourself. People would start talking and you can even lose your life.”
(Interview No. 35, Mrs. Makwanda)
Although witchcraft and gossiping also occurred in town and had increased
over the years, it was considered to be much more effective in the village con-
text where the social structure was more close-knit and where social control was
much higher. In fact, the kin was considered the most dangerous ‘mmfiti’, since
“they can influence you more”(Interview No. 22, Mrs. Mateju). In town, where the
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social structure was more loose and where relatives were only a few and usually
did not live too close, witchcraft was considered less of a danger.
Migration motives may also change over time and differ in importance in the
course of the individual life cycle. The first migration move usually took place at
a very young age for education purposes to other villages or into towns or board-
ing schools. At a later stage, people usually migrated for work and/or because
of marriage. This migration pattern usually also shows a gender bias. While
individual labour migration is still largely skewed towards young men, migra-
tion for marriage to town is a female migration pattern. However, the marriage
itself was hardly the only motive that women had when moving to town: es-
pecially for young women, marriage was often perceived as a means to be able
to leave the village and get into town. Unless they had relatives in town with
whom they could stay, they usually did not have the economic means and social
relations to go on their own. Most of these trans-local marriages were arranged.
It is common that migrants in town marry a woman from their home village
or home district, which is usually arranged by the kin in the village. Most of
these young women had high hopes that they might be able to continue or finish
their education or do some business in order to support themselves and their
relatives in the village. This was also the case with migrant women who were
already married and who came to town together with their husbands or more
often, joined them after they had established themselves firmly in town. Some
of them, indeed, had dreamed the modernist dream of the urban housewife who
did ‘nothing’ all day long apart from doing the household chores and cooking
while their spouses worked. Many, however, had their own business aspirations
that they wanted to realise in town. Women migrants were thus far from be-
ing mere “associates” (Adepoju 1995: 94) to their husbands, as migration theories
have for a long time suggested. My data suggest that with rising economic dif-
ficulties and HIV/AIDS, individual female labour migration has increased over
the years. Many villagers reported that young women, many of them orphans,
would migrate to town on their own in search of work or a husband; many of
them, however, would end up in prostitution.21 My data is not sufficient to es-
tablish the extent of these individual female migration streams.
21 In her study on female sex workers in Malawi, Van de Borne (2005) shows that sex work is a
blurred issue that cannot be reduced to prostitution as an income-generating activity. Although
for most of the young women who come to town this does not materialise, she shows that sex
work is first and foremost a way to find a man prepared to regularly support them, either as a
husband or as a ‘sugar daddy’.
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3.8.1 Migration for Social Security
Migration is an important social security strategy. This aspect is not always ob-
vious, but often implicit or secondary to other – economic – considerations to
migrate, such as the fact that urban migration may enable the support of the
rural kin left in the village.
Migration to town may, however, also involve very concrete social security
considerations, such as access to urban social services or the search for material
support or social care. The economic decline due to Structural Adjustment and
the consequences of HIV/AIDS have, in fact, significantly increased migration
for social support in Sector 7. The increasingly tight economic situation, together
with chronic food insecurity in the village due to rising land shortages and lack
of agricultural inputs had already led to an increase in migration over the past
few years. Despite the fact that most people in town could not afford to culti-
vate, town was, in fact, considered more food secure. Options for coping with
food insecurity and hunger, which were discussed with specific intensity in the
upcoming hunger period, were considered to be broader and more varied in
town. These ranged from more possibilities of doing Ganyu to begging, stealing
or prostitution; all strategies that in the face of an overall lack of money and a
certain degree of purchasing power were not considered viable in the village.
In addition, one’s social network, encompassing close-by relatives or employees
who could be asked for money or food, was perceived to be more reliable and
accessible than people in the village, who would be in a similar situation.
“In town death of malnutrition happens not very often, because
three quarters of the people have food. If they see someone without
food, they share the little they have. In the village it is very hard for
people to assist each other, because they do not have enough them-
selves.” (Interview No. 37, Mrs. Chizale)
“In the village when you lack food you can stay without food for
three days or even four, until you find some Ganyu with somebody,
such as gardening, and he will give you food in exchange. And then
it is not sure if he gives you the food. In town you stay without food
for a maximum of one day, because the next day you can go to your
company and ask to borrowmoney in order to buy food.” (Interview
No. 45, Mr. Msopa)
The rising wave of people continuously pouring into town in the course of
the intensification of the hunger crisis seemed to confirm these observations.
The loss of the harvest had not only made them food insecure, but also led to
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a breakdown of social support networks, as it had hit almost everybody. Many
of these ‘hunger migrants’ engaged in Ganyu for food or simply begged in the
streets. Even the empty maize husks that people left outside the maize mills and
which were usually considered garbage become a highly appreciated resource
over which starving people would fight.
The major reason for so many people moving in the search for support was
HIV/AIDS. A new stratum of migrant children, most of them orphans, had
started to emerge over the years, moving in-between town and village, in both
directions. On the one hand, a large number of orphans were sent to the vil-
lage to be taken care of by their rural relatives after the death of their parents
in town. On the other, there were a lot of orphans from the villages who had
come to town on their own, or had been sent to town by their rural relatives
to be taken care of by their urban relatives. HIV/AIDS has also set in motion
many old people, turning upside-down the migration dictum that one has to
leave town and go back to the village having reached retirement age. However,
we shall see that, together with the children, HIV/AIDS had also left many of
the old people in the village ‘orphaned’. Instead of being properly taken care
of by their children, many of them had been left without any adequate sup-
port. In addition, many have also inherited a number of orphaned grandchildren
to look after. While rurally-based grandparent-headed households were finan-
cially supported by their urban-based children, other old people have moved
into town with their orphaned grandchildren. They were financially taken care
of by their rural kin, while they took over the care-labour. There were a consider-
able number of old people in Sector 7 who had explicitly been called on by their
urban kin for this kind of arrangement. In this way, their urban-based orphaned
grandchildren could remain in town, where they had grown up, and where they
could continue their education, which would provide them with better chances
for their future than they would have had in the village. Apart from HIV/AIDS,
rural-urban migration streams of elderly people were also related to changing
rural re-migration patterns in old age. Because many of their children would
remain in town, and against the background of a generally declining support
structure in the village, many old people decided to migrate into town to stay
close to their children.
HIV/AIDS also increased the number of migrants that came to town in search
ofmedical care. It was common for older people and the seriously sick to come to
town for medical care, to be taken care of in better-equipped urban hospitals (see
also Chapter 2). However, the high number of people with severe and mostly
HIV/AIDS related diseases had generated an enormous stream of sick people
that overstretched not only the capacity of the urban health centres, but also of
the medical expenses of the urban kin. In fact, most of the sick people who had
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come to town for medical care were often simply taken care of at home, as the
urban kin lacked the resources for further medical expenses.
3.8.2 International and Inner-UrbanMigration
A considerable number of the migrants in Sector 7 were international migrants,
both Malawians who went abroad and foreigners who had migrated to Malawi.
Most of them can actually be described as returnee migrants. The return to
Malawi had mostly not been on a voluntary basis, but had largely been induced
by changing political and economic conditions in their host countries, where
they had spent more than 30 or 40 years of their lives, or had been born as
second-generation migrants. Although in most countries the economic and so-
cial position of Malawian guest workers had been worsening since the 1980s,
many had migrated back to Malawi only following the transition to democracy
in 1994. Used to a more liberal political climate and better living conditions,
many of them had not wanted to return to Banda’s authoritarian Malawi. The
urban literature of Lilongwe suggests that most international migrants returned
to the rural areas (see for example, Chirwa 2000; Englund 2001), yet my data
from town provides a more differentiated picture. Looking at the migration his-
tories that the international migrants in Sector 7 had experienced, it appears that
the fact that they had re-migrated into town is largely related to their economic
capacity to do so. Some of them had indeed tried to migrate back to the villages.
The difficult social and economic climate, including massive threats of witchcraft
had, however, induced many of them to re-migrate to Lilongwe. At the same
time, many international migrants came directly to town. Although they main-
tained a close relationship to the village, they had not wanted to go back there.
Many of them came from a foreign city and – used to town life – could not imag-
ine taking up a rural lifestyle again, including agricultural activities. This was
especially the case for those whose children had been born and raised elsewhere,
and who did not experience Malawi as their home.
Especially in the context of urbanisation, migration is usually only discussed
and analysed as mobility between the village and town or vice versa, assuming
this move is the most significant one in terms of social or economic differences
or in terms of adjustment. However, my research has shown that inner-urban
moves are highly significant as regards migration. Asking migrants for their mi-
gration history, many experienced their inner or intra-urban moves in the search
for work, cheaper rents, having run off or having been chased away by difficult
landlords to be an integral part of their migration itineraries. These changes had
implied social and economic changes that some people experienced as difficult
as the supposedly so significant move from the village into town. This is espe-
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cially visible in the context of the rich newcomers, the civil servants. For many,
the move into Sector 7 meant de-urbanisation and de-modernisation in terms of
housing and infrastructure, as well as socially and politically, thus requiring a
considerable degree of adaptation. While for many in Sector 7, the area was per-
ceived urban as urban can be, they often described their move into the area as
a migration into a village structure which they perceived as totally alien to their
previous living conditions.
3.9 In Town, Everything is Money: Food, Poverty
and Insecurity in Sector 7
The motivations that set people in motion and the migration patterns they fol-
low are thus much more complex and diverse than push and pull models solely
related to economic considerations or any other modernist stereotype related to
the city. Moreover, taking a mobile view reveals that town and village overlap
significantly as regards economic and social considerations and responsibilities.
At the same time, migration to town provides a whole range of new insecurities
and uncertainties migrants have to copewith. These insecurities often reflect dis-
appointed migration motives and expectations. The all pervasive poverty made
matters worse, even to the extent that, in terms of insecurity, many migrants no
longer saw the difference between town and village.
Case 4.3 “Mr. Klaver”: There is no difference between village and
town Joe Klaver is the second-born son of Mrs. Klaver, a widow I
had met in 1998. She had meanwhile been forced to go back to the
village with three of her youngest children. She had been surviving
on the income of her small-scale business and the generous support
the husband of one of her daughters in town had provided. But since
the daughter had divorced things had got worse, and she had de-
cided to go back.
Joe and three other brothers remained in town. Their mother wanted
them to follow her, but they did not want to go to the village. They
were born in town and used to a different lifestyle. Although the
mother still had land in the village, Joe did not want to become a
farmer. He wanted to stay in town where the economic opportuni-
ties were much broader and also less exhausting than farming. Due
to the economic difficulties, he and his brothers had been forced to
leave secondary school. But he still had hopes that with his small-
scale business he might earn enough money to send at least one of
his brothers to school and provide him with a good education.
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Since his mother departed, he had moved to a smaller house on an
adjacent plot that his father had bought when he was still alive. With
the help of some friends and his brothers, Joe had managed to build
a small house there, which he moved into with his wife, their baby
daughter and his brothers. The bigger house, a beautiful construc-
tion with a colourful kitchen garden, he had rented to friends from
church. The rent provided an important regular cash income in ad-
dition to the highly volatile profits from his fish and rice selling busi-
ness in which the whole family was involved. While he usually went
to Dedza or Salima to purchase the fish he then sold at the central
market in Lilongwe Town, his siblings and wife took over the local
market in Sector 7 and also engaged in door-to-door selling. This was
especially done with rice, which provided the basis for the rice por-
ridge, which was usually taken in the mornings. If business was low
and during the dry season when labour opportunities were high, Joe
and his younger brotherswere also engaged inGanyu, mainlymould-
ing bricks for the construction of houses within the area.
During my field stay it became increasingly obvious that Mr. Klaver
was sick, apparently suffering from AIDS. He had been ill for quite
a long time, which made the economic situation of the family worse.
His sickness, and the fact that he was not able to pay for medical
treatment that would have allowed him to feel better, prevented him
from working. He was neither able to go to the market to sell nor to
coordinate business activities, such as getting the cheaper fish from
the village. Moreover, the food shortage rendered business very diffi-
cult. Fish and daily rice porridge in the mornings were the first things
people would economise on. While the monthly rent was supposed
to be sent to the mother in the village, providing a trans-local cash
income source for her, most of the time it got stuck in town, where it
was needed to feed the family. “My relatives are just surviving. Today
when they come back, they will be surprised to find lunch. I cannot support
them the way I want.”
While insecurities differ, Joe Klaver’s story reflects well the major insecurity that
all people in town, no matter how rich or poor, perceive the same, i.e. the all-
pervasivemonetisation of town life. While people came to town in order tomake
money, the fact that money is the basic resource needed in order to access almost
all basic needs was experienced as a major constraint. “Without money you do not
buy Ufa, water, fertiliser or relish” (Interview, No. 26, Mai Chincunda). These were
also the items people spent most of their money on. Unless one cultivated in the
106 Borderland Urbanisation
village or had money enough to rent a field for cultivation in the neighbouring
villages just across the urban border, food always had to be purchased either at
the ADMARC (Agricultural Development and Market Association), the public
marketing board for agricultural products, or from private vendors at the mar-
ket. Food expenditure made up the biggest share of all household expenditure,
followed by housing rents, drinking water and fuels for burning, such the widely
used firewood or charcoal (see also Chilowa et al. 2000; Roe 1990; Chilowa & Roe
198922).
Structural Adjustment has made matters worse. The skyrocketing price lev-
els of basic consumer goods and food items as a result of price decontrols and
the flotation of the currency in 1994, which has led to enormous periodic deval-
uations of the Malawian currency since, have eaten up a large share of peoples’
incomes, making it increasingly difficult to satisfy even the most basic needs
(Anders 2005; Chilowa et al. 2000). Alone the 80% (!) depreciation in August
1998 led to an enormous increase in maize prices. The price for a 50kg bag of
maize, which is considered enough to feed a family of four for a month, shot up
from 80 MK to 250 MK. While the tripling of the maize price had already led
to heightened food insecurity in urban areas, the food crisis in 2001 made mat-
ters worse. Although ADMARC finally decided to freeze the maize price at MK
850 (!) to make maize affordable for even the poorest of the population, for most
Malawians this was still much too high. Manywere forced to buy small amounts
of maize at much higher prices from private market vendors, where prices were
usually much higher.23
While hunger made food a central concern for the people in Sector 7 in this
particular year, for most migrants, food insecurity was a chronic problem. Most
households did not have enough money to provide for an adequate food trans-
fer for the whole family, not to mention extra expenses, such as the rent for land
for cultivation, health care expenses, school items, or school fees for the chil-
dren. This was particularly apparent towards the middle of the month, when the
monthly income was already spent. The expenses for daily consumption were
then met by the daily profits made from petty trading, which usually amounted
to a few Kwacha only. Other strategies included a change to cheaper and lower
quality food, different eating habits, and drastic reduction of food intake: The
first meal to be left out would usually be breakfast, and then lunch. It was com-
mon for parents and older children to not eat in favour of younger and weaker
22 Already at the beginning of the 1990s, Roe showed in her study that food expenditure took up
more than 60% of household expenditures (Roe 1990, see also Chilowa et al. 2000). This percentage
rises, the poorer households are and the lower their income (Chilowa et al. 2000).
23 This also explains why most of the people who were getting maize from the villages or from their
own urban cultivation were partly selling it at the market. The high prices made it more profitable
to sell the maize and buy cheaper maize at the – still cheaper because fixed – ADMARC level.
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persons within the household. While the reduction to one meal per day for many
poorer people was almost daily normality, it also became common among peo-
ple who did not account for the poorest part of the population with rising prices
and the ongoing hunger season. People would also change to cheaper ndiwo or
relish, such as cheap vegetables, beans, chickpeas, pumpkin leaves or turnips.
However, for the majority of the people, this so-called ‘poor relish’ used to be
common throughout the year. The consumption of meat or cheaper dried fish –
if affordable at all – was for most people a monthly or weekly occasion. Snacks,
such as fruit (bananas or sugar cane) or nuts (groundnuts) were hardly affordable
for the poorer people. Fruit in particular was extremely expensive and rarely
eaten.
While the hunger crisis had made almost everybody food insecure, it was
poorer people, and especially children, who were faced with chronic malnutri-
tion (see Roe 1990; Chilowa et al. 2000). It was also perceived as a major inse-
curity, which would hit the old, children, and the sick; those who were strongly
dependent on others for their support and who would suffer the most. It not
only drained energy, but accelerated sickness and death.
Food insecurity in townwas also related to the volatile nature and low salaries
of most urban incomes, which was seen as a major source of insecurity. This was
especially the case for those who had come to town with the expectation of find-
ing a permanent job. Although it was no guarantee of a high salary, people who
had a permanent job were nevertheless considered better off: at least they had a
regular, monthly income upon which they could rely andwhich allowed them to
plan a future. Ganyuwas regarded as a coping strategy that one would consider
if any attempts to get a permanent job had failed:
“Ganyu is not work. You do it if you do not have any other way to
go or any other possibility. I have just finished school and I want to
use my education. I want a permanent job. If I stay without work for
a long time, I can always resort to Ganyu, just like moulding bricks or
gardening.” (Interview No. 28, Patson Kagama)
Nevertheless, many of these educated young Malawians, to a large extent
men, were forced to live on insecure sources of income. Employment was in-
creasingly difficult to find, and those who had a job lived in a constant fear of
losing it. At the same time, the scarcity of employment opportunities also made
access to new job opportunities more difficult. This was not only due to the
increased competition: Job-hunting had also become a highly profitable field
of corruption. Gaining access to employment with private companies or state
agencies had always needed good personal relations that were often bound by
common tribal or regional origins. Whereas these tribal access criteria continued
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to play a vital role, in 2001, many jobs were only accessible after having paid
bribery, which seemed to provide an attractive additional income source. This
not only concerned ‘formal’ working relationships but was also common prac-
tice in the informal sector economy, such as making people pay in order to learn
a craft or a trade in one of the workshops.
Trans-local economics as envisaged by many migrants also turned out to be
much more difficult to realise than expected. In fact, many migrants simply had
to give up on the idea, facing high transport costs and lacking the money to buy
agricultural inputs or pay relatives to work in the fields in their absence. This
insecurity was mainly mentioned by women who had come to town with the
expectation of engaging in business while continuing agriculture in the village.
This resulted in immediate insecurity, which was keenly felt in the hunger pe-
riod. However, we shall see in one of the following chapters that the fact that
they were not able to cultivate might have far-reaching, serious consequences in
the future andmight significantly reduce their trans-local social security options.
The importance of the continuation of cultivation in the village is also revealed
by the fact that the insecurities and anxieties people mentioned in town were
strongly related to village realities. The hope for good rains or concerns that
one’s house may burn down during the clearance of land just before cultivation
in the village far away were mentioned alongside insecurities and anxieties re-
lated to the immediate urban reality.
We have seen that the social structure was seen as a major advantage of town
life, allowing for more social, personal, and material freedom. However, the
looser social structure in town was also the source of many anxieties and uncer-
tainties. This concerned personal relationships, which were perceived as much
more volatile and short-lived than in the village; this made the provision of and
access to support a major uncertainty, as trust relations were considered to be
much more difficult to establish:
“In town it is difficult to make friends, because you cannot trust
them. Today they say they are friends and you chat, and tomorrow
you find them not being so friendly anymore (. . . ).” (Interview No.
5, Mr. Mangona)
Yet, as we shall also see in the following chapters, support relations in town
are not to be squeezed into a simplistic urban-rural dichotomy of a reliable rural
kin versus unreliable urban non-kin. Gaining access to support was also per-
ceived as being more difficult with the proper kin. This was especially the case
for social security migrants who had come to town with the expectation of find-
ing relatives who would be able to support them and who – instead – were often
facing tremendous difficulties. We shall see that it was not the lack of material
In Town, Everything is Money 109
care alone that was at stake. Especially in the case of old and sick people, the as-
pect of care labour had become increasingly important, as the high death toll due
to HIV/AIDS had made it a central and increasingly scarce resource. The diffi-
culties related to support relations with kin in town were also related to town
itself, however. People complained that town changed kinship relations – the
more liberal and loose social climate in town, it was claimed, allowed for more
deviant kin behaviour, which also resulted in more difficult access to support.
Town life had also changed marriage practices, which was a major concern
for women, especially for those who had not undergone the customary village
marriage ceremonies:
“If you are married in town and your husband wants to divorce
you, he may just dump you if your relatives do not know anything
about your marriage. If you are married in the village, the relatives
back home know about the marriage and you can go there if you
have problems. You can discuss with the ankoswes in the village and
they can send you back to your husband and he has to take you back.
(. . . ) It is always more difficult if ankoswes are not around, but some-
times relatives in town may assist you and can act upon instead of
ankoswes.” (Interview No. 27, Mrs. Msimba)
The quotation also reveals another insecurity that women were experiencing
more strongly than men, i.e. the absence of proper kin as an important social en-
vironment. The lack of presence of the wider kin group that would allow them
to control the behaviour and income of their husbands better, and help main-
tain their own social and economic power position, was especially mentioned by
women who had experienced their move into town as a major decline in their
economic and social status. This was especially true of women from matrilin-
eal societies, who traditionally have more control over economic resources than
their patrilineal counterparts. HIV/AIDS has further challenged marriage as a
social security institution. The loss of the spouse has become a major anxiety
for many women, especially against the background of the widespread practice
of property grabbing. We shall see that many women tried to secure their legal
entitlements through marriage with additional securities, such as legal titles on
land and houses, in order to counter the attempts of their husbands’ kin to steal
their property, in case of their husband’s death.
Finally, insecurities related to town also concerned the urban lifestyle. On
the one hand, town enabled one to display one’s lifestyle without fearing major
sanctions, such as dressing and eating habits, haircuts, and ways of talking and
walking. On the other hand, the urban lifestyle was also perceived as a source of
insecurity, especially if one was not able to adapt to the most basic conventions
110 Borderland Urbanisation
or dress codes, such as not wearing the same clothes every day or wearing dirty
clothes:
“In the village you go without shoes and just in shorts. But here
in town you always have to dress like a gentleman, clean and with
shoes. I prefer in a way the village life. The differences between rich
and poor exist, but they do not show-off and rather hide their wealth,
dress like the poor, because they fear witchcraft. In the village you do
not think so much about difference. Here in town, people with more
money are enjoying life. They show off and it makes me feel bad
and it is even worse, when I know that they have the same level of
education than I have.” (Interview No.5, Mr. Mangona).
Dressing well was, however, not only an important asset for being able to
show off or display one’s wealth: it was also perceived an important aspect of
social life itself. Being dressed properly meant that one could attend school,
go to work and participate in social life, because “(. . . ) if you do not have proper
clothes, you cannot go anywhere. You do not feel comfortable in the presence of friends,
if you do not have nice clothes, and you become shy” (Interview No. 29, Mr. Machizo).
This aspect was especially felt by those who otherwise found themselves at the
bottom of the social ladder, such as the poor or the orphaned. Clothesmade these
‘defects’ invisible to a certain extent, providing an important aspect of belonging
and a ‘normality’ that made other social differentiations less important or visible.
3.10 Conclusions: Expectations of Modernity Reconsidered
Migrants in Sector 7 usually have great expectations when they arrive from the
countryside. Many of them dream the typical migrant’s dream that Ferguson
(1999) has poignantly referred to as ‘expectations of modernity’. These expecta-
tions are usually expressed in terms of achieving economic well-being in order
to care for one’s family and being able to live a modern life with all its amenities
and consumer goods. For most migrants, these expectations will most probably
not come true, and their dreamswill be shattered by a harsh social and economic
urban reality. However, this modernist dream tells only half of the story. People
usually also bring an alternative, more realistic version of town with them when
they move, having been nourished by previous visits, or by urban kin who had
come to the village and told them about life in town. This is also evident in the
different expectations that people have. While people continue to expect to earn
money in town, for many this expectation is not necessarily related to ‘formal’
sector employment or the typical modernist dream of the poor migrant who ‘has
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made it’, but simply to the existence of a wide range of largely ‘informal’ cash
income generating activities.
Taking a trans-local perspective reveals that this realistic version of town also
encompasses the close interrelation of town and village. Most migrants in town
are living multi-local lives, maintaining strong social, economic, cultural and
geographic links with their place of origin. This multi-local lifestyle consider-
ably influences social and economic behaviour, including the migration patterns
of urban migrants, such as we have seen in the case of trans-local economics.
Whereas migrants chose an urban-rural life in order to enhance their economic
possibilities, urban migration is also related to strong expectations on the part
of the relatives and kin left behind. This is also discernible in the insecurities
and uncertainties urban migrants have. As we have seen, town and village are
in this respect closely interrelated, their needs and insecurities reaching far into
each other and providing a constant presence and often a burden in the migrants’
lives.
However, even these highly realistic expectations of town are largely not ful-
filled. The consequences of Structural Adjustment policies and HIV/AIDS have
led to an overall decline in the social and economic situation. The decline in liv-
ing conditions is extremely pronounced in town. And as more people migrate
to town in search for labour, support, or care, more of them are faced with an
extremely difficult situation. Although town is still considered more food se-
cure, malnutrition is extremely widespread. At the same time, social support
and care networks are becoming increasingly overburdened by a rising num-
ber of support seekers who are being displaced from rural areas by hunger and
increasingly perforated kinship networks due to HIV/AIDS.
A multi-local approach also challenges the notion of the city. Modernisation
theorists have for a long time considered the marginal areas of the big cities to
be ‘learning areas’ for future migrants, who will eventually move out of these
areas to be incorporated into the real city lying at the geographical core of town.
While most people in these areas are, indeed, economically marginalised and
impoverished, these borderlands differ substantially from these simplistic mod-
ernist notions. Looking at the dynamics of urbanisation processes taking place
in these borderlands and the number of people they encompass, it seems that
this urbanity and modernity increasingly provides the normality of the city. This
new urbanity not only includes rural newcomers, but also increasingly people
from within the city that are drifting back to the margins, being de-urbanised
and de-modernised by Structural Adjustment and Good Governance. Overall,
social and economic conditions appear to render the modern, urban way of life
increasingly difficult, even for the few who had made it, reducing modernity to
an increasingly marginal strategy that only a few can afford.
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This does not mean that rural-urban differences, uncertainties and coping
strategies are disappearing or dissolving into a range of hybrids that have taken
root in the absence of a proper urbanisation or modernisation process. However,
the analysis has shown that the ‘rural’ and the ‘urban’ as the defining and con-
fining elements of the city are far removed from a dualist understanding, but are
much more ambiguous and blurred. Urban-rural boundaries are highly volatile,
as people have started to fall back on different strategies, mixing strategies, tac-
tics and resources anchored in both rural and urban social, economic, cultural
or legal sites in order to cope with insecurities both in the village and in town.
While these strategies and tactics partly produce close trans-local linkages and
spaces within which rural and urban spheres almost coincide, rural-urban rela-
tions also show clear lines of division where rural and urban social, economic,
cultural and legal domains are strictly separated. The extent to which people are
able to shift rural and urban boundaries is of enormous importance for social
security, being a central means in negotiating rights and obligations of support
in a trans-local social security economy. While social and economic conditions
in both the village and town influence this boundary-setting process, it differs
according to gender, age, the social and economic status and the issue at stake.
Chapter 4
Constructing Legalities, or
Urbanisation Redefined:
Place-Making Strategies in a
Rural-Urban Borderland
4.1 Introduction
In the last chapter we saw that urban migration encompasses a wide range of
different expectations that only partly correspond to modernist notions related
to the city. These different expectations also encompass different migration tra-
jectories. The way and frequency with which people move between town and
village or other places reveal that the city is far from providing a place of perma-
nence for most migrants. Rather, the city should be repositioned within a wider
trans-local economy that encompasses both the city and the countryside, and
within which and across which people move.
The trans-local perspective has, however, also revealed that town has gained
new significance, as ever-changing social, economic and demographic condi-
tions have also challenged the notion of the city. From being a transitory resi-
dence and working exile for a growing number of people, the city has turned
into a ‘place of permanence’, even though this does not mean the end of moving.
Whereas the return migration to the village is increasingly difficult to realise for
many and is viewed with considerable ambivalence by others, many people are
forced or choose to remain in town. This shift in the meaning of the city also
involves intensified place-making strategies on the part of the migrants, such as
buying plots or building houses.
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This chapter focuses on these urban place-making strategies, looking into
how people are gaining access to social amenities, housing and plots, and other
public institutions and services, such as policing and judicial services. In this
chapter, these urbanisation processes are specifically looked at from a legal per-
spective. Juxtaposing formal and legal means and institutions of gaining access
to the city with the informal, illegal ones, the chapter argues that urbanisation
processes develop their own legalities that lie far beyond formal/informal, le-
gal/illegal or permanent/transitory dichotomies and notions of town. This is
especially visible at the urban margins, such as Sector 7, where the struggle over
the city is a highly dynamic and contested one. In the absence of functioning for-
mal mechanisms that would permit people to gain access to town and its social
amenities, we shall see that people resort to their own means of accessing and
developing the city. The legalities that they create, here understood as a series of
more or less institutionalised rules and regulations in order to gain access to the
city or deal with situations of conflict and dispute, mix customary village law,
formal state law and new ‘informal’ rules and regulations that develop out of
the daily context. These legalities may be perceived as highly illegal and deviant
behaviour when viewed from a state and a customary law perspective: yet this
is not necessarily the case. We shall see that for the local population, these legali-
ties actually represent highly efficient and effective arrangements and provide an
important organising framework for daily life in town (see also De Sousa 1977;
Perdomo & Bolivar 1998). These legalities are far from being static, but represent
everyday, often very specific, situational constructions and practices of ‘legality’
‘formality’ and even ‘justice’ (see for example Simone 1997, Fernandes & Varley
1998; Ghannam 2002).
The analysis of these processes of “management and control” (Simone 1997: 3)
also refers to a second point I want to make. The literature discusses strategies
in the city and strategies of gaining access to the city as largely separate issues.
Literature on the ‘making of the city’ (Castells 1972), or on how people are gain-
ing access to land and housing in the absence of public resources, have for a
long time been at the core of urbanisation studies (see for example Gilbert 1994;
Gugler 1997; Rakodi 1997; Lomnitz 1997, Knauder 2000).1 At the same time,
another strand of literature has evolved that – seeking to challenge modernist
notions of urbanisation and migration – discusses the continuing importance of
rural-urban network relations, including the period of re-migration to rural areas
and the continuous efforts of urban migrants to maintain access to the village.
1 Much has also been devoted to the political dimension of these processes. Especially in civil
society, the debate of the potential of these ‘new social movements’ as regards their role in the
transition and the sustainability of democratisation processes has gained prominence (for example
Rakodi 1997; Fernandes & Varley 1998; Mukumbe 1998; Rondinelli 1990).
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However, urbanisation processes are hardly discussed as intrinsic aspects of a
trans-local social security economy. We shall see that gaining access to the city
is not only an act of urbanisation, but also represents a series of social security
strategies and as such, is a reaction to the insecurities in town. While this may
be an obvious truth, we shall see how strongly these strategies are intertwined
and embedded in a wider trans-local economic and social context. As such, they
are not isolated urban processes, but also influence wider network relations, the
allocation of resources within the city and eventually, changing perceptions of
needs and (in)securities.
4.2 Constructing Legality I: ‘Illegal’ Plot Allocation
We have seen that the fact of migrating to town does not alter the crucial impor-
tance that urban migrants attribute to their land in the village. Although people
are engaged in wage labour and may never return to cultivate, land maintains
its value as a productive asset. To a certain extent, this is also the case in town.
We have seen that in the context of urban agriculture, land remains an impor-
tant productive asset in town as well, representing an integral part of the urban
income portfolio.
The main function of land in town is its exchange value; i.e. that it is some-
thing that can be leased, sold or bought (Simon 1992). We shall see that the
commoditisation of land is also spreading in rural areas– but in town, the land
market and land speculation, especially in relation to housing, is significant. This
holds especially for cities like Lilongwe, where public housing schemes have
never existed and where an inadequate supply of plots on the part of the pub-
lic administration (see Chapter 3) have created a highly profitable and contested
housing and land market over the years. This has been exacerbated by rising
urban mobility and an increase in desire for ownership and permanence, which
has been discernible all over Sub-Saharan Africa over the last two decades (see
Simon 1992). Whereas for many the possession of land and housing is a basic
necessity, it is increasingly used as a form of security that may provide a perma-
nent source of income when rented out and is an asset that may be sold when
necessary.
The growing demand for a house or a plot of one’s own, and the resulting
increase in land speculation, has also become apparent in Sector 7. In 2001, more
houses and plots than ever had changed ownership in the area, representing the
climax of a movement that had already started in 1998 and indicative of a ten-
dency visible all over the marginal and cheaper areas of Lilongwe (InterviewNo.
47, Civil Servant at the Lilongwe City Council). In 2001, Sector 7 also became the
scene of a new land invasion, which took place in the west of the area. The prod-
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uct of a previous land invasion itself, it now became a battleground in which
‘formal’, ‘informal’ and ‘traditional’ actors and institutions fiercely contested ac-
cess to plots and housing in the newly-invaded neighbouring area commonly
referred to as ‘down there’. At the same time, plot allocation became a site of con-
testation over the meaning of the city itself. It not only revealed the dynamism
and ambiguity of the geographic boundaries between ‘town’ and ‘village’, but
also the notions of identity and legality spanned between rural and urban life
worlds and formal and informal processes of urbanisation.
4.2.1 Illegal Land Invasion or “The Democratisation of Appropriation”2
While in 1998 the area was just emerging, filling with inhabitants and strug-
gling for a basic infrastructure, upon my return in 2001, Sector 7 had developed
considerably. A basic infrastructure had been established successfully with the
assistance of international donors and local NGOs.3 Many of the tiny houses
made of unburnt bricks and covered with plastic sheets and tyres which had
characterised the neighbourhood had disappeared, giving way to big concrete
constructions with iron sheets and sometimes, high protective fences.
Yet there was hardly any time to reflect on the many achievements and
changes that had been taking place: a few days after I had established myself
with my research assistant Nellie in the area, a land occupation started at the
western end of the area that was to continue throughout our stay. The land in-
vasion started on a weekday at the beginning of the dry season. As we found
out in the course of the event, this was a strategic moment, as it is only dur-
ing the dry season that construction activities, including the moulding of bricks,
are met with favourable weather conditions – an important pre-condition for a
successful land invasion.
A large crowd of around 100 people, headed by a so-called ‘plot allocation
committee’, flooded the land beyond the western boundary of Sector 7, which
demarcates Lilongwe Urban from Lilongwe Rural West. Members of the com-
mittee started measuring plots according to the ‘conventional size’ of 12 × 26
used by the City Assembly, demarcating them with sticks and stones, and divid-
ing them among the people. This was done according to a list on which people
had to register beforehand. Already days before the actual allocation started,
committee-members were moving around in Sector 7 and Area 25 telling people
that the City Council was going to allocate plots in this area. Those interested
had to register on a list and were told to participate in the ‘allocation’ when it
started in order to receive their plot. Plots were not free, but sold at prices rang-
2 Anders 2005: 204.
3 See 4.4
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ing fromMK 1,500 to MK 3,000. These prices were slightly lower than those usu-
ally charged by the City Council,4 a fact that mobilised many people to register.
Most people were also given a form, for which they had to pay extra (between
MK 50 to MK 200), which confirmed their ownership of their plot. It was a sim-
ple copy of a plot application form in use at the City Council. People were told to
clear the land and start building as soon as possible in order to prevent eviction
by the police. When the houses were finished, the City Council would come and
give them a plot number, which they would then be able to put in the form and
which would finally confirm and ‘legalise’ their ownership.
Most people knew that the forms were fake. There were lengthy discussions
about whether these forms were ‘real’ and had ‘legal’ value or were simply a
worthless piece of paper that the plot allocation committee sold in order to make
moremoney. However, most people had bought one nevertheless. And although
the forms were fake, they did indeed provide some security. Apart from the psy-
chological effect on the plot ‘owners’ of possessing an ‘official’ document with
the coat of arms of the Republic of Malawi that documented their ownership of
the land, the form had also practical value: when confronted with this official
document, the mostly illiterate villagers on the other side of the boundary who
tried to chase the urbanites from ‘their’ land usually retreated from taking fur-
ther action when they saw the official form. As it turned out, it could also prove
to be decisive when defending one’s land rights against other occupants who
claimed the ownership for the same plot. As it was common practice for plot
committee members to sell the same plot several times, the form represented an
important asset in the struggle to keep one’s plot, or at least force the committee
members who had issued the form to look for an alternative one.
The form was, of course, not sufficient. One had to be present at the plot
for days and weeks, and it was only when foundations were laid and bricks
moulded that one could be sure of having created an effective ownership. Yet
the form could provide a decisive additional weapon in the battle for the plot.
Finally, many plot owners hoped that the City Council would sooner or later
give in and legalise or ‘upgrade’ the area once faced with the rapidly growing
piles of bricks and foundations being laid out within days of the invasion, as had
happened so often before during the last years. In this case, the form could then
finally reveal its ‘true’ legal value.
The chances were indeed high that this might occur. Beforehand, informa-
tion had seeped through from within the City Council that the City had plans to
survey the area sooner or later in order to counter land pressure. The change in
policy by the City Council, that did not foresee any significant financial or ma-
4 According to the Chief, people pay MK 3,920, or around US$ 80, for a new plot when they apply
to the City Council (as of June 2001).
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terial compensation for the villagers’ land any more, guaranteed that resistance
from the villagers to the ‘illegal’ land invasion would probably be rather weak.
The plot committee, which consisted of some rather sombre local ‘business-
men’ and was headed by the local chairman of the United Democratic Front
(UDF) to give the whole enterprise an official and ‘legal’ status, played an im-
portant role in organising the land invasion and in mobilising the people. The
land invasion was, however, also the product of a broad political coalition of in-
stitutions and authorities that together guaranteed for its success. Apart from the
Traditional Authorities (TA) from the villages and the police, it included the local
party structures of the United Democratic Front (UDF), the local UDF-councillor,
and the City Council, which was dominated by the same party and in which the
councillor for Sector 7 held the position of the vice-mayor of Lilongwe. The local
City Council branch office and employees of the City Council living in Sector
7 and Area 25A had organised the forms and fed the local committee with in-
formation on where the City Council planned to survey areas in the future, and
thus, where chances were high that the City Council would legalise the ‘illegal’
occupations sooner or later. They also provided daily information on which ac-
tion the City Council was going to take in order to deal with the plot allocation
during the weeks and months of the occupation. There were rumours that the
local ward councillor had been promised a number of plots in exchange for non-
interference with the occupation. In addition, the traditional authorities played
a decisive role. This included the Group Village Headman of the area, who at the
same timewas an employee of the City Council. This dual role as Traditional Au-
thority and City Council employee gave him a special position of power. While
his institutional role enabled him to have free access to special information on
the City Council’s future plans and projects, he used his role as a Traditional
Authority to break the resistance of the local village chiefs. Last but not least,
the plot allocation also involved the local police branch. Promises of some plots
in case of a successful and smooth invasion muted the rather slow and shallow
resistance of the police officers, who were for the majority residents of Sector 7
and thus, had a strong personal interest in gaining access to plots.
Although according to state law the people in these borderlands had no for-
mal right to the land and would not even get compensation, this did not mean
that they had no vested interest in it. On the contrary, the fact that they have
lived in the area for many years, including having cultivated the land, made
them powerful stakeholders in the land invasion with a clearly defined economic
interest.5
5 In fact, before invading this area, the plot committee had already made attempts to invade an area
further north along the urban-rural boundaries, but had encountered fierce resistance from the
police, the Traditional Authority and – last but not least – the villagers themselves, who had no
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These various stakeholders provided the institutional and political landscape
within which the land invasion took place. When the invasion started, the vil-
lagers’ first reaction was to go to the police. But after having talked to the City
Council, the police refused to interfere. They argued that they could only in-
terfere upon an instruction by the City Council. The ward-councillor was very
sympathetic to their cause, but also said that she could not do anything, as the
City Council had no official knowledge of the incident. She promised to use her
influence as the deputy mayor to pressurise the City Council into taking action.
At the same time, it was clear that she would not interfere. The leading figures
in the plot allocation were the same local UDF-politicians and activists who had
helped to vote her into power, and it was clear that she would not stop them from
continuing with the allocation, nor would she have them arrested by the police.
She even invited plot occupants to her house, encouraging them to continue the
invasion and promising them her support.
This support consisted in deferring official action indefinitely: When the City
Council finally took action and a letter of intent arrived at the police, giving
them the authority to chase away and arrest people and warning them that their
houses would be demolished if they continued building, two busy months of
building activities ‘down there’ had passed. By that time, most of the plots in
the area were already cleared; piles of bricks had popped up like mushrooms,
and some houses were already half-finished. The councillor arrived with some
officials from the City Council and warned people that they would be arrested.
The police tried to chase people away and some were even arrested, but were
soon released again. The whole incident resembled a performance to satisfy the
official rules of the game, rather than an event with serious consequences. The
battle had been won.
And it seems everybody was satisfied with the outcome, even the villagers.
The fact that the land occupation was a ‘fait accompli’ did not really seem to
bother most of them. Although they were still complaining that they had lost
all their agricultural land and that they were not able to cultivate anymore, most
of them seemed to be satisfied with the outcome nevertheless. Many had antici-
pated it in any case. As we found out later, they had participated in the negotia-
tion process with the plot committee on the division of the plots almost since the
beginning of the land invasion, and had been promised some extra plots for sale
in exchange for their cooperation and as compensation for their income losses.
Although the villagers continued to portray themselves as the rural victims
of the whole affair, it soon became clear that their resistance to sell the land and
to give in to the urbanites had been a strategy to increase their leverage in the
negotiation process, rather than an expression of simply wanting their land back
interest at all in getting rid of their land.
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in order to continue their ‘rural’ way of life. Rather than being driven by the
fear that they would not be in the position to cultivate any more and would
have to face starvation6, their fight for their land, including their appeal to the
City Council, the police and the Traditional Authorities, was a strategy to ensure
they were adequately compensated and ‘got the best out of it’. This also sheds
a different light on the violent confrontation between the villagers and the town
people at the very beginning of the occupation, when town people started to in-
vade and measure out the area in order to designate building plots. A few hours
after the invasion, around 200 villagers wearing Nyaumasks7 came into the area
and attacked the town people with stones and sticks, trying to chase them off
their land and ‘back into the city’. The whole incident, in which one man was
injured, lasted about an hour, and it was soon clear that the occupants had ‘won’.
Although Nyau masks are usually not in use for defence purposes, the incident
brought considerable turmoil and fear among the occupants. Talking aboutNyau
to people in Lilongwe town, especially those from other regions, one can sense
that there is a strong respect and mistrust towards this secret society in town,
with which at least everybody who tried to lease some land in the neighbouring
villages had been in contact or knows horrible stories about. The strategy of the
villagers seemed to work. Many occupants started to doubt their decision and
it took a lot of effort on the part of the committee to keep the people in place
and continue with the land invasion. Talking to the villagers afterwards, they
confirmed that this action had nothing to do with performing Nyau in the tradi-
tional sense. They said that they had merely ‘borrowed’ the masks in order to
instil fear and respect among the urbanites and in order to increase their leverage
in the division of land by establishing a symbolic claim on it.
Whereas the villagers’ strategy seemed to prove them right, the strategy of
the urban occupants also seemed to work out in the end. Although the houses
had not yet received official recognition on the part of the City Council, the
houses were growing fast as the rainy season approached and people were con-
fident that in the end they would win and that the City Council would sooner or
later upgrade the area.
The struggle over the city thus involves a series of strategies and material
6 For their own consumption, many had already found other solutions. Apart from buying food,
many cultivated the land bordering their villages to the other – rural – side of Lilongwe. Others
had resorted to using relatives’ land lying further out in rural Lilongwe or they had leased land,
just as the urbanites did.
7 Nyau (also known as gule wamkulu, the big dance) is a male secret society in which Chewa boys
are customarily initiated and which parades its masked dancers, especially during funerals and
Chewa girls’ initiation ceremonies (see Englund 2001). While Nyau is condemned as pagan by
Christian churches, it represents an authority distinct from these churches and local politics at the
same time (ibid.).
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and symbolic resources anchored in different economic, social, political, cultural,
and finally, legal orders and domains. These different legalities do not necessar-
ily correspond to ‘formal’, ‘informal’ or ‘traditional’ spheres of law. Rather, the
process of gaining access to land involves an intense ‘forum shopping process’
(K. von Benda-Beckmann 1994) during which people recur to different legal fo-
rums, institutions and mechanisms. While people ‘shop’ between different legal
forums, they are also involved in an intense re-negotiation and re-creation pro-
cess of law. By mixing and recycling notions of law and legality pertaining to the
different legal domains, they create new legalities and re-fill them with new or
additional meaning(s), as became apparent in the case of the application forms
for plot allocation, which developed a series of different legal meanings in the
course of the allocation process; or as regards the exchange of land for plots for
the villagers, which from a state law perspective would not have been necessary.
The extent to which people are able to appropriate different legal forums is, how-
ever, not unlimited. The case study shows that social status, economic resources,
political, physical and symbolic power are decisive in gaining access to different
legalities as well as in imposing them (ibid.).
Moreover, the case study clearly shows that the construction of a different
legality or illegality, widely perceived from a state law perspective as a means
to gain access or control over urbanisation processes, is not only related to the
poor and marginalised informal city and city dwellers. The image of the poor,
marginalised and powerless, who in the absence of the state take matters into
their own hands and work their way through to the city by-passing or opposing
state law, has for a long time dominated the view of the ‘informal’ city. This has
also included the so-called ‘street level law’, which was understood as a parallel
set of law that had largely developed in the absence of or as a substitute for
a malfunctioning and authoritarian state law (see de Sousa Santos 1977; for a
critique Perry 1998; Ghannam 2002).
Although this informal law has beenwidely interpreted as an act of resistance
and emancipation against an authoritarian or absent state, the case study shows
that the land invasion ‘down there’ has favoured other interests than those of the
landless urban poor. In fact, it seems that the ‘illegal’ and ‘informal’ urbanisa-
tion processes from below have been colonised by other, much more powerful
public and private stakeholders and interests. Looking at the events and series
of interventions, one could not get rid of the impression that the land invasion
somehow resembled a carefully staged and timed performance in which both
‘official’ institutions and ‘illegal’ perpetrators were following their respective of-
ficial roles and rules, while other issues were actually at stake. Though the lack
of resistance on part of the City Council was largely explained by a lack of pub-
lic resources, the lack of resistance to the land invasion seems to suggest that the
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invasion was also largely in the City Council’s interest. Lacking resources and
effective enforcement strategies to make an extension of the city work, the illegal
invasion of an area that would anyway be legalised thereafter and incorporated
into the city seemed to be the lesser evil. At the same time, the land invasion sim-
ply meant big business. As much as it has been an important means for the poor
to gain access to a plot, it has also been a great commercial and political success
that has largely favoured the local party elite. In this context, Nientied and van
der Linden conclude in their research on Karachi that, “to many politicians and
government officers, the illegal subdivisions constitute an arena, where they can operate
and get their votes and profits from without ever having to challenge the system or to
make functional demand. Since the whole operation is illegal, demands by definition are
always for favours, rather than for rights. And because all actors depend on each other,
they are careful not to disturb the balance in the system.” (Nientied & van der Linden
cited in McAuslan 1998: 28)
The manifold legal constellations to which people recurred in the course of
the process, shifting skilfully between customary and state law, the use of Nyau
masks and the police force in their attempts to enforce or defend their claim on
land, shows that urbanisation processes are constituted by different legal orders
that exist side by side, with state law embodied in the City Council regulations
being no more than one legal system amongst others. The use people make of
these legal orders thereby does not necessarily correspond to the specific legality:
The fact that the villagers had a legitimate claim on their land based on custom-
ary law provided, for example, important leverage as regards their bargaining
space in the course of the land invasion. At the same time, the central position
of power that the United Democratic Front (UDF) has achieved on the local level
can be considered to be yet another legal order in itself, one which is strongly
based on its power as de-facto the only political party and its own particular
interpretation of democracy.
The question of gaining access to land played a crucial role in the land inva-
sion and indeed, signified that many poor urbanites would finally get their own
plot and housing in a cheap and quick un-bureaucratic manner.8 The case shows
that the land invasion was also a response to wider changing material and social
conditions taking place in other areas of Lilongwe, which engendered a spatial
re-organisation of the town. The civil service reform had triggered off consider-
able movement of the urban population within Lilongwe City. The introduction
of the new housing allowance scheme and the abolition of the government policy
of providing housing for civil servants meant for many a further decrease in liv-
8 Following usual procedures and having nomeans to bribe or exchange favours with an influential
person in order to gain access to a plot, we were told that people may have to wait up to 15 years
(!) before getting a plot via the City Council.
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ing and housing standards.9 This particularly concerned the middle and higher
income civil servants for whom government had leased houses in the typical
middle-class areas, such as Area 47, 18 or 15 on favourable lease terms that were
terminated with the new scheme. Although housing allowances in general are
high, most civil servants were not able to afford the new – significantly higher –
market rents that the house owners introduced. Many of them were forced to
move to cheaper and poorer neighbourhoods, largely situated at the margins of
town, where rents were still cheap and a basic infrastructure in place, such as
was the case in Sector 7.
In fact, in Sector 7 a massive change of ownership has taken place since
1998. I have already mentioned that many low-income civil servants had al-
ready bought a plot at the time the area was invaded. They planned to move
there when they retired, investing their lump sum payment upon retirement in
the construction of a small house, as many inhabitants of Sector 7 had done be-
fore them. Many civil servants now simply brought forward their move to Sector
7, leading to hectic building activity in the area. Most of the higher income peo-
ple that had settled in the sector had, however, only discovered the area in the
course of the housing reform, and decided to take advantage of low rents and
land prices and the existing infrastructure within the area.
Notwithstanding this, most civil servants perceived the move to Sector 7 as
an economic and social decline. Finding themselves in the midst of an urban area
in the making with no access to plumbed water in the houses and no flushing
toilets not onlymeant a decrease inmaterial living standards; the relatively close-
knit social structure in Sector 7, the way people behaved and dressed, which
was perceived as rural and traditional by most newcomers from richer areas,
also signified for many a decline in their modernity and urbanity of their way of
living.
For the poor, on the other hand, who had contributed significantly to the
urbanisation of the area by gaining access to basic urban infrastructure, the ur-
banisation of their area by the rich eventually turned against them. For many
of them it meant social, economic, and further spatial marginalisation. Many
had not succeeded in developing their plots and shelter since the land invasion
in 1998. For a long time, this had not been a problem. It was usually enough
to put a pile of bricks on the plot in order to be considered developed by the
City Council, which in turn was the precondition for not getting evicted. The
rising pressure on land in the course of the housing reform and rising urbanisa-
tion has, however, led to stricter enforcement of the eviction rules10 by the local
9 For a detailed discussion on the housing allowance and Good Governance reform in Malawi see
Anders (2005).
10 If a plot owner is not able to start constructing a shelter on his/her plot within six months from
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City Council office, which has forced many of the poorer people to leave, selling
their plots to people who were in search of a place to stay. Apart from those who
had succeeded in getting a plot ‘down there’ where they could remain for a lit-
tle while, some returned to the rural areas. Others again moved to other poorer
neighbourhoods, which were usually less developed and where rents were still
cheap, or where they could move in with relatives. This also included the many
tenants who were no longer able to pay the rising rents in Sector 7 or who were
forced to leave because the plot owners wanted to sell their land. From the really
poor people in Sector 7, only those who hadmanaged to acquire a plot when they
were still better off and those who had special tenant arrangements11 managed
to remain.
Looking at the development of the land invasion and the gentrification of
Sector 7, it seems that history has come full circle: It was once again the very
poor who were forced to move and to start again from scratch, fighting over land
and infrastructure, andwho were expropriated from an urban development pro-
cess that they themselves had largely initiated. While development projects and
international donors declare the poor to be the target and agents of their own
development process, it appears that they have little bargaining space to defend
their city against richer and more powerful interests that, in the face of a crum-
bling modernity, are increasingly usurping these urban development processes
targeted and carried out by the poor.
At the same time, the marginalisation process that led to the land invasion
was also motivated by land speculation following rising prices for land and
housing triggered off by government reform. While many people only sold their
plots when they were forced to, rising land prices motivated many inhabitants
to re-sell their plots and houses hoping for a considerable profit to be invested
in a business venture or in a house in the village upon their return.12 Apart from
the plot allocation committee, whose major interest was money and for whom
the plot allocation was primarily an attractive source of income, most occupants
saw the land occupation as an opportunity for quickmoney in an environment in
which ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ labour opportunities were becoming increasingly
scarce, thus endangering the urban income portfolio. They planned to re-sell
their plots as soon as possible, as most of them did not have the money to de-
velop the plots anyway. In fact, the better off among them already owned houses
and wanted to have additional plots in order to re-sell them and profit from civil
the day the plot is acquired, the City Council has the right to withdraw the plot and re-sell it to
somebody else.
11 Special tenant arrangements include, for example, agreements in which tenants look after houses
for absent urban migrants. In exchange, they do not have to pay rent.
12 According to the City Council Site Officer in 2001, the year that the new housing allowance scheme
was introduced, more plots than ever were sold within Sector 7.
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servants’ need for housing. Others planned to build a small house on the newly
acquired plot. They wanted to move there, while renting out their houses in
Sector 7, which were much better equipped, had a basic infrastructure and were
closer to town.13
4.3 Constructing Legality II: Infrastructure and Social Services
“With development there are also more social problems.”
(Interview No. 71, Local Development Activist)
Similar dynamics are discernible when looking at the conflicts evolving around
access to infrastructure and social services. In contrast to the land invasion,
which was largely directed against an absent and truncated state that was neither
willing nor able to provide an adequate infrastructure for its urban inhabitants,
the struggle over infrastructure and local development was actually taking place
because of the sudden strong presence of the state that challenged existing power
constellations and access criteria to social services. In this struggle, donors and
local NGOs played an important role.
NGOs had taken up a leading role in local communal development over the
last years. The lack of financial resources from the state for the development
of local infrastructure (Aina 1997), and a changing development doctrine on the
part of donors and NGOs in favour of small-scale local community develop-
ment projects, had given them a particularly prominent position over the last
two decades (see for a critique and discussion Craig & Mayo 1995; Abbott 1996;
Azevedo 1998). This corporatist approach to local development, which is be-
lieved to be more sustainable and easier to manage, not only implies the by-
passing or only marginal involvement of state agencies and close cooperation
with local grass-roots organisations and indigenous NGOs, it also means that
donors are more directly involved and more visible as local players. Apart from
the material and social resources they provide, their presence at the local level
also refers to the additional institutional framework they provide, i.e. the pol-
icy principles, rules and regulations which define criteria of access to support,
infrastructure or otherwise. The latter is also referred to as ‘development law’
or ‘project law’ by some authors (for example, Weilemann 2005, K. von Benda-
Beckmann 2001). In the first place, this refers to the concrete project level, such
13 Many of the houses they constructed resemble the enormous houses found in the residential areas
from which most of these civil servants came, and are separated from the rest of the area with high
fences. In fact, one could observe that plot owners and tenants often changed roles: while they
constructed large houses with iron sheets and high fences in the front of the plot, they themselves
planned to live in a small house in the backyard, usually referred to as the ‘boys squatter’, a
colonial term which denotes the shelter for the servants.
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as the rules and regulations defining access criteria for the implementation of
projects. For example, many small-scale projects on local level require that the
recipients contribute at least 25% of the whole project costs in money or kind
in order to ensure the ‘ownership’ of the project.14 On a more general level, it
refers to the range of policy principles and paradigms underlying development
cooperation, the most recent ones being poverty reduction, the focus on gender,
or participation, ownership and empowerment.
As we shall see, this ‘project law’ became an important additional legal arena
in the conflict surrounding access to infrastructure that evolved within the com-
munity upon the arrival of the higher income strata. Moreover, this conflict be-
came particularly pronounced with the establishment of the new local adminis-
trative structure, which completely re-shuffled the local balance of power and by
the same token, ownership and access to public services.
4.3.1 ‘Development and Politics do not go Together’
The development of the infrastructure in Sector 7 was mainly the result of the
people who had first come into the area during or shortly after the invasion.
Soon after the area had been ‘legalised’ and upgraded by the City Council, a
handful of mostly educated low rank civil servants and businessmen had formed
a so-called ‘Community Development Committee’ (CDC) as the organisational
base from which they wanted to organise and lobby for the development of the
area. These CDCs, which also developed in other ‘illegally’ occupied areas in Li-
longwe, should not be understood as autonomous and informal structures that
came into being as spontaneous movements. They formed part of the new urban
policy of ‘upgrading’, which had been adopted by the City Council at the be-
ginning of the 1990s and which foresaw that the development of infrastructure
should be largely left in the hands of these local ‘self-help groups’. In the absence
of any public financial resources to provide community infrastructure, the CDCs
were to provide a new institutional framework to facilitate community-initiated
development by approaching donors and NGOs directly. The City Council’s
role was to provide credible institutional back-up for the local CDCs towards
international donors and NGOs and the specific know-how needed for the es-
tablishment of urban infrastructure, for example, the urban planning framework
or technical data on water or sewage.
Although the locals in Sector 7 were very active and motivated, first attempts
to approach donors and NGOs yielded little success. Only after Sector 7 was
included within the so-called Urban Poverty Alleviation Programme (UPAP) in
14 See for example for the Malawi Social Action Fund Bloom, Chilowa et al. (2005).
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1997 did things start to move. The project had been put in place by the Ger-
man Technical Co-operation (GTZ), but was largely handled by its local counter-
part, the Christian Service Committee (CSC), a large and very popular Malawian
NGO. Trying to combat rising urban poverty in Malawi, the project aimed at en-
hancing the capacity of urban communities to obtain access to non-governmental
funding for the financing of community based projects, mainly infrastructure
and small-scale enterprises. So-called community facilitators were trained on
needs assessment, proposal writing and project management and implementa-
tion. The CDCs were adopted as the central operational structures of the project.
Since the involvement with the UPAP-project, the development of the area
sped up significantly. Since 1998, major achievements have been made. Electric-
ity has been put in place in most of the area, funded by the European Union.
The eight water kiosks that finally allowed for direct access to tap water were
financed by the Malawian Social Action Funds (MASAF), The World Bank fi-
nanced funds for small-scale projects for social development. In 2000, the Ger-
man Embassy provided funding for the construction of a school block, which
should eventually develop into a complete primary school.
While in the beginning the project proceeded well and community partici-
pation was high, the implementation of the Local Government Act and the first
local government elections in November 2000 brought the whole project – and in
due course, local development efforts – to a standstill. Contrary to its purpose,
i.e. to facilitate communal development, the introduction of local government
and the election of the ward councillor became a major challenge to local de-
velopment efforts. The project and community development as a whole became
a fierce battleground for political influence and personal favours, in which the
major purpose of the development efforts, namely to provide access to social
services, was completely pushed into the background.
Local politics and political influence has always played an important role
in development work within Lilongwe, where the political structure has tradi-
tionally been more heterogeneous than in the South and North of the country.15
This political heterogeneity was also reflected in the CDC, in which members
of all-important political parties and other – traditional and religious authori-
ties – were represented. This was not just coincidence. The incorporation of all
15 While the Southern Region of Malawi is a stronghold of the UDF, the MCP dominates the Cen-
tral Region and Afford the North. Lilongwe – although it is in the Central Region – has a special
position. This is related to (1) the fact that the UDF has a traditionally stronger position in urban
areas, (2) the capital of Malawi hosting the political centre; thus one can assume that the UDF
finds strong support among the political and administrative elite, (3) Lilongwe having a very het-
erogonous structure in terms of its migrants, who generally come from all over Malawi, whereas
towns like Zomba or Blantyre appear to be more homogenous in terms of their regional and tribal
composition (Ott et al. 2000: Appendices).
128 Constructing Legalities, or Urbanisation Redefined
major political stakeholders was also enforced by the project, because it guaran-
teed that ‘talking development’ – as one of our respondents put it – was always at
the centre of interest, although major political controversies existed among the
members.
However, local government structures and the victory of the UDF-candidate
in the first local elections severely worsened the fragile balance of power . De-
spite informal agreements that foresaw a certain transition period in order to
maintain a personal continuity with projects already started, most CDCs in Li-
longwe were immediately dissolved by the new – mainly UDF – councillors and
substituted by local UDF-activists.
This was also the case in Sector 7. The Christian Service Committee refused to
work with the new UDF-CDC, arguing that it was too politicised and politically
imbalanced and fearing a loss of credibility within the community. More than
about the politicisation of the process, the Christian Service Committee was wor-
ried about the fact that the newly-elected committee had no know-how in com-
munity mobilisation and project management, both required in order to work
for community development. The fact that the old CDC consistently denied as-
sisting the new CDC in performing their tasks made matters worse. Most of the
old CDC-members felt that the personal effort, time and energy they had hith-
erto invested in the projects had been betrayed by the new CDC, who instead
claimed that they had been achieved by the UDF-councillor, the party and Pres-
ident Muluzi himself.
This held as well for the Christian Service Committee (CSC) and the inter-
national donor community, which both felt that their development efforts were
being expropriated and misused for political reasons. While organisations such
as the CSC acted as the missing link created by the abolition of the old local gov-
ernment structures in 1994, acting as a ‘place-maker’ for the new structures to
come, their achievements, experience and guidelines with which they were run-
ning the projects were not considered at all. On the contrary, the introduction
of the local government process has turned out to be counterproductive in run-
ning projects, completely turning upside-down their aims, principles and target
groups. For instance, a local leader of the ‘business-peoples’ party’ UDF encour-
aged the community to share the money ‘earned’ at the water points16, which
was meant for the payment of the water bills and for the maintenance of the
water point, as an additional source of income among the users, which in turn
almost led to a closure of the water kiosk.
The Christian Service Committee has now started to re-train the new CDC.
Apart from community mobilisation and skills training, major emphasis is put
on training in transformation and civic education. The target group includes
16 Tap water is sold at a current rate of 50 Tambala per bucket.
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all the key stakeholders in development, i.e. the old CDC, facilitators, the com-
munity, the Chief, the ward councillor and local politicians. Apart from some
new CDC members, the old development committee members never attended
the meetings and neither did the councillor: personal rivalries, serious political
divisions, and most notably the low interest on the part of the councillor and
the UDF-establishment in the community development process, are believed to
be the major reasons. It seems that most of the new CDC members view their
election into the new CDC as being only marginally related to the fact that they
are now in charge of community development. Instead, they view their new
position as a starting point to kick-off their career within the local and national
UDF party hierarchy: Asked about his future plans for Sector 7, by which we
meant future development plans, the new chairman of the CDC told us that he
was planning to run in the next elections as an MP for the UDF-party.
Many inhabitants of Sector 7 view the decreasing importance and growing
politicisation of community development very critically. Especially those who
have been living in the area since 1998 and have invested a lot of time andmoney
in communal development, attending meetings and paying their share for the
projects, feel that their efforts in making development work are being spoiled
and retarded by the political power struggle. At the same time, the ownership
that local party leaders and the councillor claim for the community projects has
also led to a shift in expectations away from donors and NGOs and towards
government. Increasingly, people are refusing to participate and pay for devel-
opment, claiming that it should be actually the task of government to provide
for local infrastructure: “Why should we participate and contribute to build a school,
when it is the duty of our government to do that?“ (Interview No. 16, Mr. and Mrs.
Mseu)
The rapidly vanishing self-help spirit within the community had already had
an impact on current projects. The school project, which should have been ex-
tended into a complete primary school encompassing all grades, has come to
a complete halt and no new projects have yet been submitted. Some old CDC
members are now trying to push for communal development efforts on their
own, using their skills, know-how and good personal relations with donor or-
ganisations to realise some projects, such as the roads project or the individual
tap water pipes. Motives for these strong individual efforts to improve com-
mon infrastructure were not altogether altruistic. Many of them pertained to the
middle-class, who had meanwhile constructed additional houses they intended
to rent out to higher income people – mostly civil servants who, in turn, also
expected better social services. Whereas this group of people tried to push for
infrastructure in order to satisfy their new clients, they also hoped that the civil
servants, with their special channels to government and the donor community,
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would further facilitate access to infrastructure in a quick and ‘unbureaucratic’
fashion, which would no longer need to depend on this communal, participatory
donor approach. And in fact, it seems that this will also be the policy in future:
when we left the area, there were rumours that some richer civil servants were
getting individual tap water installed on their plots together with some commu-
nity development experts, who had helped them by giving their written consent,
needed for the City Council to take action.
In order to counteract these developments, the Christian Service Committee
and the GTZ had plans to broaden the development structure by giving more
consideration to other communal, more ‘neutral’ and ‘natural’ power structures,
such as the Traditional Authority and the religious associations. However, it ap-
peared that the steadily rising political influence of the UDF, fostered still more
by the implementation of the Local Government Act, would sooner or later also
succeed in co-opting the Chief. The stalwart, self-declared non-partisan develop-
mentalist17 became increasingly challenged within the community. The fact that
he had been offered the chance to become the new Group-Village Headman of
this part of Lilongwe, a position that is assigned by the President of the Republic,
met with a very mixed reaction within the community. Especially his opponents
in the local development committees perceived this new position of power very
critically, arguing that it was simply an attempt to silence the hitherto so-critical
and active Chief. Although the latter denied this, his refusal to take action in the
conflict around infrastructure as well as in the ‘illegal’ land allocation for many
confirmed the fact that he had already changed sides.
With the new wave of democratisation in many countries in Africa and else-
where at the beginning of the 1990s, decentralisation programmes have experi-
enced a renaissance on the international development agenda. Especially in the
context of the civil society debate, they were viewed as an institutional and ad-
ministrative guarantee to enhance and strengthen political participation and em-
powerment. Only the successful participation and incorporation of local move-
ments and initiatives would ultimately guarantee successful democratisation in
developing countries, enhance political equity and ultimately further state legit-
imacy (Wunsch 2000; Rondinelli 1990; Mukumbe 1998; Aina 1997).
At the same time, effective decentralised state structureswere also considered
necessary structural elements of economic development and by the same token,
poverty reduction. Through their political and fiscal autonomy, local govern-
ment structures were perceived as being more efficient and effective in deliver-
ing services and tackling local needs, which in turn would enhance local welfare.
Their presence at the local level would also make them more responsive to peo-
ples’ needs andmore able to adapt to local circumstances and conditions. Finally,
17 He called himself “Mfumu ya chitukuko” – a Chief who is development-oriented.
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greater direct accountability on local level would control corruption more effec-
tively and as such, would enhance Good Governance (Steineich 2000; Manor
1995).
However, looking at the struggles over access to public services in Sector 7,
the opposite seems to be the case. Similar to experiences in many other coun-
tries (see Mukumbe 1998 for Zimbabwe and Samoff 1990 for South Africa), the
implementation of the Local Government Act in Sector 7 actually led to a cen-
tralisation of local power structures. The fact that the UDF won almost all seats
in the local government elections led to the establishment of a de-facto single
party state which – similar to Banda’s MCP – has its power base firmly rooted in
the local grass-roots level. By hijacking the relatively autonomous and vibrant
local community structure of the CDC, they were able to convert it into a major
political propaganda instrument of the party that claimed development efforts
thus far achieved were achievements of the party and the state. Taking over the
CDC enabled the UDF to control other important local forces, like the Chief and
the NGOs, whose influence over community development was curtailed signif-
icantly. At the same time, the CDC became the major political springboard for
aspiring local political forces. Rather than as an asset to further communal de-
velopment, its newmembers saw the CDC as the first step in their party political
career.
This change in power structure also led to changing expectations towards
the political establishment. After a short period of liberalism and democratic
self-determination, the decentralisation process and the strong presence of the
UDF at the local level have led to the resurrection of clientelism as a typical
political behavioural pattern; a means of gaining access to state resources and
infrastructure. The worsening social and economic conditions on the one hand,
which made it socially and financially increasingly difficult for people to en-
gage in their own development, and on the other, the arrival of a higher income
strata, which at the same time also represented a political class, i.e. the civil
servants, seem to have reinforced this development, stratifying urban develop-
ment further. Some community members, including the Chief, had hoped that
the presence of civil servants would indeed facilitate their efforts towards a fur-
ther improvement of the public infrastructure for the well-being of the whole
community. Instead, the case suggests that urban development became more
and more individualised, favouring richer and more politically influential com-
munity members. Whereas the community development project had started out
as broad community-based project that would allow especially poorer people
to gain access to infrastructure, the project became increasingly driven by the
interests of a few, who, through their political and economic power, were con-
trolling and channelling the development process. Instead of a participatory and
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locally-driven development process, the democratisation and localisation of gov-
ernance had favoured corruption and particularism, further marginalising those
who should actually have been the major beneficiaries, i.e. the poor and less
influential.
This also concerns the role of NGOs and donors. The case shows their im-
portance and power, as well as their limits, in shaping and controlling local
conflicts and urbanisation processes. Contrary to their largely ‘a-political’ or
‘non-partisan’ image, the case reveals how closely they are interwoven as actors
within local power and legal structures. Their know-how and financial resources
have given them enormous power in shaping local development and local power
constellations, rendering the members of the CDC highly recognised local au-
thorities. At the same time, the implementation of the new local power structure
has severely challenged their existence as local actors as well as their project law
and principles. The conflict over who owns the development and controls access
to it has shown how politicised these concepts actually are. On the one hand,
the development arena has become a fierce battleground over political influence
that has had little to do with development at all. On the other, we have seen how
deeply development processes and principles may be transformed in actual so-
cial practice, being subverted and expropriated from their original meanings and
re-defined by different social actors and contexts. Principles of ownership and
self-initiative that were targeted towards the whole, largely poor community,
became highly stratified with the implementation of the Local Government Act
and worsening social and economic conditions. The self-help initiative became a
highly individualised effort that largely ran between party-members and rich in-
habitants of the area, who solely aimed to increase the value of their houses and
in due course, their rents. NGOs and donors have reacted to this development,
re-defining their projects, project laws and procedures by retiring to more ‘neu-
tral’ and less political grounds. However, in the face of generally rising political
influence, it seems that rather than a retirement to neutral ground, the adequate
incorporation of the political class into a participatory approach is what is actu-
ally required.
4.4 Constructing Legality III: Jurisdiction Between Chief and
State
A third major field within which the dynamics, contradictions and stratification
of urbanisation processes are clearly evident is the field of jurisdiction or dis-
pute settlement. As shown above, urbanisation processes are based upon a mix
of different legalities – and the same holds for other legal institutions, such as
dispute settlement mechanisms. Non-state laws and dispute settlement systems
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also play an important role in many ‘proper’ urban areas, where they exist side
by side with state law. In some fields of intervention, such as plot allocation,
they may even have more legal relevance and enforcement authority than ‘for-
mal’ state regulations (see for Lilongwe Englund 2002b).
However, it is especially in these ‘upgraded’ and not-yet or only marginally
urbanised areas, where the presence of the state is generallyweak and the Chief’s
position as judicial, political and administrative authority still strong, that the
co-existence of different legal systems develops particular dynamics. The so-
cial, economic and political structure of these areas still in the making, and the
changes and turmoil they are facing in the course of urbanisation, is reflected
in the construction of different legalities, as well as the shift in importance of
different domains. This urbanisation of legality is also reflected in the changing
role of the Chief: and we shall see that rather than disappearing, his judicial,
administrative and political function and authority are changing.
4.4.1 ‘The urbanisation of the Traditional Authority’18
When I started planning my research in Sector 7 in 1998, I collected a research
permit from the University of Malawi and was planning to go to the Lilongwe
City Authorities to inform them of my stay in Sector 7. Thus, I was surprised
when my Malawian colleague suggested that we would also have to consult the
Chief of the area. It was a local NGO involved in the development of infrastruc-
ture, with which we had already made contact, that eventually presented us to
the Chief. We informed him of our intentions and asked for permission to stay
in the area for the next six months. He found us a house to stay in close to his
own place, for safety reasons, as he said. He organised a watchman and a girl
to carry the water. Finally, we also had to present ourselves to interested com-
munity members whom he had summoned one afternoon, urging the people to
collaborate with us and participate in the interviews.
It seemed that his status within the community did not really differ from
the village context. He was highly appreciated within the community, as well
as by the town officials, the NGOs, religious associations and the local party
branches of the UDF and MCP, which were still relatively weak at that time.
There were rumours that he had been put in power by the UDF party leadership,
who had organised the land invasion of Sector 7. However, little importance was
attributed to this fact.. Since Banda, and even before, people had become used
to the fact that the Chief would be under the influence of the ruling party, and
democracy was not expected to change this.19
18 Interview No. 115, Chief Mpande.
19 The principle of indirect rule that the British introduced in Malawi and that incorporated the
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Apart from the administrative and organisational tasks alreadymentioned in
the last chapter, the Chief’s major responsibility was dispute settlement. Issues
discussed concerned labour disputes, especially those involving casual labourers
working in the building sector. Disputes usually evolved around claims concern-
ing unfulfilled payments formoulded bricks or constructed houses, to be paid by
the employer or the future owners of the house. Many among the claimants were
women working as water carriers, who, usually faced more difficulties getting
paid than their male colleagues. Family disputes, such as domestic violence or
maintenance claims for extra-conjugal wives and children, also made up a large
proportion of court cases. Finally, he also dealt with ‘petty crimes’, such as theft
or fraud.
Most of his verdicts, which especially in the case of labour disputes usually
involved the payment of considerable sums of money, were executed and people
abided by his ruling. It seems that his authority was largely based on the same
principles as in the village context. On the one hand, the lack of another judi-
cial force within the area, and the fact that many migrants had not been in town
for long, provided a quasi-urban environment in which his power as a village
headman remained largely intact. On the other hand, the tight social structure
and the strong social cohesion in Sector 7, especially discernible among its ’au-
tochthon’ inhabitants, provided an important basis for his authority. This was
also the case for the builder and brick moulder community, which – although
most of their members came from outside – knew each other very well, having
worked together at different building sites and which almost represented a com-
munity apart. In this respect, the physical presence of the Chief in the immediate
vicinity of the working environment was not only a spatial convenience for em-
ployers and employees – it was also important in terms of generating the social
pressure needed to reach and settle agreements. Non-compliance with an agree-
ment or – worse – not showing up at the Chief’s court would have challenged
one’s social status within the community severely. By the same token, it would
have endangered one’s position as an employer or worker. Especially those em-
ployers who did not treat their workers well and were often found in front of the
court faced difficulties recruiting good and motivated workers for the future.
The spatial and social cohesion of his community also played an important
role in the argumentation of the Chief in dispute settlements. Especially in cases
of theft, or family and neighbour disputes, the Chief strongly emphasised their
social and communal dimension. They were not only illicit acts, for which so-
lution, punishment and compensation needed to be sought; they also violated
the social structure of the community and its moral values. The concluding re-
marks of the Chief and the Chief’s council always emphasised the importance of
Traditional Authorities was maintained by Banda’s MCP (see Chapter 2).
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a functioning social structure and good communal and – in case of family dis-
putes – conjugal relationships. The punishment or the agreement reached was
always also interpreted as a step towards the healing of both the individual and
the communal structure.
Yet the Chief could not do without the state authority. While he urged people
to comply with his ruling, he also warned them that – if they intended to ignore
his verdict – he would have to inform the police and the lower state courts in
order for them to take the matter further. In case of crime and violence, this
meant that the police were informed and people arrested. At the same time, he
told those who were not satisfied with his ruling that they were free to appeal
against his judgement before higher state authorities. The subtle threat that he
would appeal to the very same state court system, which people were, however,
free to use if not satisfied, usually worked well: in most cases people complied,
even if they were not happy with the outcome of a dispute. This was especially
true for those people who had little or no knowledge at all of how to gain access
to the state courts in the city. They did not usually have sufficient economic
resources at their disposal to pay for the issuing of necessary documents and
lawyers. But even if they did have the resources, many decided against it. The
prospect of being involved in a dispute for an endless period of time, as was
often the case with state courts, made many refrain from this option.
The extent to which people complied and refrained from taking matters fur-
ther also depended strongly upon the issue at stake. In case of property grab-
bing, for example, most people simply by-passed the Chief and went straight to
the district commissioner and the magistrates’ courts. In such cases, there was
usually too much at stake for both victims and perpetrators to accept the verdict
of the Chief. The reason for the loss of his authority in this realm was also due
to the fact that considerable awareness in Malawi about the possibilities of seek-
ing ‘outside’ legal support had grown up over the last decade (see Chapter 7).
The modification of the Malawian inheritance law that strengthened the position
of the women, together with a large public awareness campaign by the Malaw-
ian government and NGOs, encouraged women, especially in the urban areas,
to seek legal advice in order to defend their property, and made state courts
more easily accessible both in terms of resources, know-how, and awareness. Al-
though most women still went to the Chief first in order to urge him to bear wit-
ness to the actual property-grabbing act and convince the relatives to havemercy
in the face of the already difficult situation of the women, this did not usually
work. The Chief’s role in these disputes was usually confined to giving evidence
and bearing testimony if the women decided to appeal to the state court.
Another area in which the Chief had lost much of his authority was petty
crime. The introduction of the ‘community policing force’, which aimed to con-
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struct a local civilian police force to work together closely with the local police,
changed his role profoundly. This initiative had already started in 1998 and
aimed at increasing security in urban areas by using local security guards, also
called “neighbourhood watch” or “local crime prevention panel”, in order to
fight the rising crime rate and make up for the lack and inadequacy of the local
police force. This local volunteer crime prevention force, or “Ndatopa Nanu crime
Prevention”20, had the task of patrolling the area, especially during the night. If
thieves or other criminals were caught, they were responsible for handing them
over to the local police station.21 In former times, many of these cases used to be
discussed in front of the Chief’s court, such as cases involving thieves or perpe-
trators of domestic violence. Now, most of these cases are handed over directly
to the police and enter the state court system, thus curtailing the Chief’s power
in legal matters further.
However, the major impact on his decreasing authority within the area was
rooted in the changing political structures and the rising influence of the UDF.
While he claimed to be independent, in the conflicts around the land invasion
and especially community development, the Chief was very careful not to sym-
pathise too much with the old CDC in which he had been the leading figure
before becoming Chief. He argued that now with the change in the local admin-
istrative structure, it was the state administration that was to decide. He saw
himself in the passive role of a coordinator and mediator in communal issues,
trying to bring people together in order to solve their conflicts, and counselling
them as to where to go and whom to ask in certain affairs. As regards the formal
administrative and legal structures, the Chief was of course right, as the Local
Government Act attributed the Traditional Authorities a mere consultative role.
Yet it seems that his strong non-partisanship and respect for the state author-
ities also derived from the growing influence of the UDF upon his position and
his person. Amongst others, the UDF had also put him on the list of potential
candidates for the vacant position of the Traditional Authority of Lilongwe Area.
Chances were high that he would be elected to this office, which is entirely at the
discretion of the president. Although he denied any influence upon his attitudes
by this offer, a growing number of the ‘autochthon’ community in Sector 7, es-
pecially those that had been involved in community development, criticised his
close collaboration with the local councillor and accused him of being co-opted
by the new authority.
20 “I am tired of you – Crime Prevention”.
21 Claims that the local force misused its power by indulging in self-justice, such as beating thieves
to death, or that its members took advantage of their position to commit crime themselves, such as
theft or rape, have increased over the last years. However, an investigation of this very important
security and power aspect goes well beyond the scope of this book.
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His authority was not only challenged by the new administrative and polit-
ical forces from above; changing social, economic and demographic conditions
in the community also had an impact on his fleeting authority. The area had
been growing rapidly and anonymity among its inhabitants had been increasing
at the same pace. The communal structure was becoming more and more frag-
ile and differentiated, reducing the Chief’s authority and grip on the areas as a
whole. In addition, the in-migration of a different social, economic and more
‘urbanised’ class perceived his role as the Traditional Authority in a more critical
light. Theywere not only richer, but also more educated and as such, could draw
on other social, political, institutional and economic resources, such as the state,
the police, courts, and political parties, to mention only a few. Especially for the
newly marginalised civil servants, the powerful position of the Chief in Sector
7 was perceived as a major backward step into an urban ‘rurality’, an anachro-
nism in the midst of a modernity to which they had been forced to adapt again.
Although most of the civil servants viewed the role of the Chief very critically,
there were also some who re-discovered him as an additional arena for dispute
settlement, which theywould choose depending on the nature of the dispute and
their particular interests. This was especially the case with more minor conflicts,
such as problems within the family or the neighbourhood. Thus, many rich peo-
ple came to the Chief to discuss their marriage problems before appealing to the
state courts.
By and large, however, the Chief’s political, administrative and judicial au-
thority seemed to dwindle considerably in the urbanisation process. In order
to regain control over the area, he re-organised the community by electing sub-
chiefs in order to make the area more manageable and to retain his grip on so-
ciety. But it appears that his authority only remained unchallenged among the
poorer majority of the population, who did not have the resources and the know-
how to appeal to ‘outside’ dispute settlement mechanisms, and who also had
had a different urban experience, one that did not create the need to challenge
the notion of the Chief as an authority in general.
The urbanisation processes Sector 7 had been experiencing since 1998 also
had an enormous impact on the Traditional Authority and his role as a judicial,
political, administrative, and moral authority. The new local political structures,
the presence and activities of NGOs, and the rising importance of public insti-
tutions, especially the state courts – that via the in-migration of the civil ser-
vants and a stronger awareness due to democratisation in general had entered
the public consciousness – have challenged the role of the Traditional Authority
profoundly. Contrary to conventional urbanisation theory, the Traditional Au-
thority did not disappear, to be substituted by public administrative and judicial
institutions, but rather, his function was ‘urbanised’. Although his power has
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been narrowed down considerably due to the emergence of other powers within
the community, the Chief has remained an important figure in dispute settle-
ment, and is an integral part of the urban life world. Whereas urbanisation has
led to the pluralisation of legal arenas, the case shows that these arenas are at
the same time highly segregated: it appears that a kind of two-pronged jurisdic-
tion has developed. Poorer inhabitants, and those who have no know-how and
financial resources in order to access the state courts, seem to continue to go to
the Chief. Richer inhabitants, on the other hand, may choose from a wider legal
arena. They may seek the legal assistance of the Chief to settle disputes, to save
on costs, time and energy. Or they may go to the state courts, as they have the
financial opportunities and the know-how to enter ‘outside’ state law.
The modification of inheritance law and the awareness raised among mostly
women to take legal action in cases of property grabbing has opened a wider
range of legal options for the poorer part of the population. Nonetheless, for
other issues where less legal know-how and assistance exists, the poor continue
to choose the traditional court, while state justice remains largely confined to
richer and more educated persons.
This urbanising role and function of the Chief also seems to challenge notions
of participatory approaches advocated by donors and NGOs. This particularly
concerns the new strategy envisaged by the NGO in Sector 7 to re-establish a
movement for development with so-called non-partisan and ‘natural’ powers
within the community, as described in the last paragraph. Bearing in mind the
rising influence of the UDF on a local level, it seems that the Chief is far from
providing a natural and neutral power force. It remains to be seen whether the
new approach to reach the ‘marginalised locals’ will work out or whether it will
be – via the strong influence on the Chief – equally absorbed by the state and the
party.
4.5 Conclusions: The Struggle for Permanence
In this chapter I have tried to show that the ‘making of the city’ provides yet an-
other important aspect of social (in)securities of urban migrants in town. (In)se-
curities related to the city, such as housing or access to other infrastructure, are
not alleviated once the migrant has firmly established himself in town. Rather, it
seems that most migrants are involved in a continuous struggle over the city.
These place-making processes hardly correspond to a modernist and organic
notion of the city in which urban mobility is exclusively identified with social
upward mobility. Rather than providing the waiting room for modernity, from
where the poor and not yet urbanised slowly gain access to better jobs, housing
and infrastructure closer to the centre of town, the ‘marginal city’ increasingly
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seems to represent an urban ‘normality’, from which fewer and fewer people
seem able to escape. Indeed, we have seen that to an increasingly large extent
the marginal city also involves those no longer fully urbanised who, having been
expelled by modernity, are being swept into these rural-urban borderlands.
Whereas peoples’ urbanity seems to remain confined to these areas, this does
not imply that they dispose of their permanent, albeit rathermarginalised, access
to town. Quite the reverse, the city seems to be in a constant flux of social, eco-
nomic, symbolic and spatial re-structuring processes, which involves its inhab-
itants in a continuous struggle in order to gain access to or maintain their grip
on the city (Sassen 1996; Harvey 1995). These struggles are especially intense
in the rural-urban borderlands, where a new urbanity seems to be developing,
characterised by a series of different lifestyles, resources, institutions, strategies,
and tactics, all existing side by side.
The dynamics that develop out of the co-existence of these different urbani-
ties is especially visible in the legal domain. In their attempts to appropriate the
city, people incessantly mix and combine different legal orders, thereby creating
new ones – as we have seen with the ‘illegal’ land invasion, where customary en-
titlements – though being officially superseded by state-law – were recognised
and compensated for with a number of plots; or the recycling of Nyao practices
as a deterrent and means of enforcement to defend ‘customary’ entitlements.
Apart from ‘formal’ and ‘traditional’ law, this also involves the different proce-
dures, concepts and ideologies of NGOs, donors and political parties. Following
Arce & Long (2000), who describe the transformations of development interven-
tions in the local context into ‘new’ local forms of development and modernity
as ‘counter-developments’, I shall call these new legal orders ‘counter-legalities’.
Contrary to a conventional understanding of the ‘informal’ city, these ‘counter-
legalities’ are not used by poor and powerless urban dwellers on the one hand
and the criminal and lawless on the other. They are also important mechanisms
in gaining access used by the rich and powerful and by an impoverished state
structure that has no means to impose its orders and where personal political
and financial gains often mix with public interests. In this respect, they are not
only to be understood as counter-legalities in the sense of resistance-strategies by
the poor and marginalised aiming at opposing or changing fundamental power
relations. Rather, they appear to be adaptation strategies within specific local
social, economic, political and legal power constellations that are more based on
favours than rights (Simone 1997).
Most of the urban migrants in Sector 7 who had come to town will hardly
ever leave these marginalised areas, thus remaining in a perpetual borderland
situation. While Structural Adjustment has largely immobilised people as re-
gards their social and economic mobility, the harsh social and economic condi-
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tions have forced them to increase their physical mobility. Social and economic
constraints have made the struggle over the city increasingly harsh. This espe-
cially concerns the poor and alreadymarginalised, who find themselves trapped
within a continuous urbanisation process. While they make an enormous effort
to gain access to the city, being involved in land invasion processes and the de-
velopment of infrastructure, they are not able to maintain their access to the city.
Economic and social changes taking place in other areas of town and higher up
the economic ladder seem to deprive them of their city again and again, as it
is usurped by the richer and more powerful urbanites. Although most of them
are also moving downward in economic terms, they are still in a better position
to counter, defend and control their urbanisation processes. Decentralisation
processes and the political changes that have taken place over time have fur-
ther accelerated this ‘tragic of the boundaries’. Whereas decentralisation aimed
at broadening and democratising access to the city, the process, together with
the social and economic constraints, has actually stratified it further. Instead of
supporting people in establishing some kind of permanence, the evidence from
Sector 7 suggests that the development triggered off by the Local Government
Act had the opposite effect. In their struggle for permanence, people have been
increasingly forced to be permanently on the move.
Chapter 5
Shifting Boundaries: Kinship,
Friendship and Neighbourhood in
Town
5.1 Introduction
In his famous essay ‘Urbanism as a way of life’, Wirth (1938) describes the changes
taking place in social relations through urbanisation as the most significant
change and parameter of modernity that would take place in more or less the
sameway everywhere on the globe. Urbanismwould unravel the complexmulti-
functional rural kinship structure into a myriad of highly segmental and func-
tionally-divided relations, which would – amongst others – also encompass the
development of a welfare state. This shift from a multiplex into a simplex so-
cietal structure with its highly differentiated social, economic, cultural, political
or administrative functions would also encompass a different rationality. The
collective, highly emotional and morally loaded Gemeinschaftwould give way to
a highly individualised Gesellschaft driven by utility, rationality and self-interest
only (Wirth 1938; Simmel 1999; for a critique see Silver 1990). By the same to-
ken, friendship would develop as a new, specifically modern phenomenon and
type of relationship, providing a private residue for emotional and affectivemat-
ters and interests which by definition excluded any utilitarian or self-interested
aspect (Giddens 1992; for a critique see Silver 1990; Grätz et al. 2003).
Looking into the urban end of network relations, this chapter argues that
this is not necessarily the case. Taking a more open approach that understands
urbanisation processes as “a whole series of conflicts and contradictions” (Sassen
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2002: 18) over social, economic, spatial and symbolic resources of the city (see
also Harvey 1990; Krätke 1990) also profoundly challenges classical sociological
paradigms of the structure of urban society. The exploration of how migrants
are weaving, maintaining and managing their network relations in town, trying
to cope with ‘old’ and ‘new’ insecurities and needs, reveals that urban networks
provide a complex web of relations and institutions. Urban network relations
hardly fit into static, mutually exclusive relational concepts of modernity and
tradition, ascribing specific functions, meaning and content to different types
of relationships. Rather, they criss-cross between the formal and the informal,
the modern and the traditional and the urban and the rural, mixing different
material, social and symbolic resources, identities and skills.
The notion of the city as an unbound and contested space also allows for a
dynamic view on urban network relations. We shall see that their social, eco-
nomic and spatial boundaries and identities are in a continuous process of re-
negotiation, being continuously transcended and subverted by people in their
efforts to gain access to the city. This also implies that the character of relation-
ships may change. Different types of relationships may overlap and even coin-
cide, providing shifting circles of support whose character and relationship shift
over time and space and with changing social and economic needs and over-
all situations. This concerns kinship and friendship relations, as well as urban
household and family structures.
Modernist notions of a highly segmental and institutionalised society had
also assumed a change in household relations that would reduce the extended
family structures of the rural household to the urban core family (see for ex-
ample Fraser 1989; Moore 1994; Lund & Srinivas 2000; Nabeer 1994; Moore &
Vaughan 1994). We shall see that urban household relations provide important
nodal points of support in town; they constitute highly stratified arrangements
within which relations of power and support are fiercely contested. I shall argue
that the demographic consequences of HIV/AIDS have further accelerated these
dynamics. This is especially discernible in households headed by single parents,
grandparents or children.
The ability to access and maintain network relations and institutions differs
significantly according to gender, age, economic and ‘migration’ status, i.e. the
time that one has spent in one place. However, we shall see that the stratification
of network relations is an overall phenomenon that renders network relations
increasingly fragile. In the face of deteriorating socio-economic conditions and
HIV/AIDS, social networking has become an increasingly desperate and inse-
cure endeavour. Although people are skilfully shifting between their different
network relations, their ‘bargaining space’ (Ghannam 2002) or ability ‘of work-
ing it out’ (Finch 1989) is increasingly narrowing down. These changes in gaining
access to support are not transitory ones that might return to ‘normal’ once so-
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cial and economic conditions improve. We shall see that the continuous strain
on support relations has also had an impact on their rules and regulations, pro-
foundly challenging notions of solidarity and reciprocity.
5.2 The Household as a Site of Social Support:
Relations of Power and Support
Looking at the size and nature of household structures in Sector 7, one finds that
they hardly fit into notions of family and household relations associated with
the modern, urban-based nuclear family. The household or ‘banja lathu’, which
literally means ‘our family’ and which is usually used to refer to those living in
one house, is much larger than the biological core family, which, as a household
type, provides the exception rather than the rule. Extended family members,
such as unmarried siblings or nieces and nephews, the families of brothers and
sisters and finally, one’s old aged parents, usually make up an integral part of
each household in town. Sometimes, the household may also include family
members who are no longer living within it, or at least not on a permanent basis,
but who are part of the household re-distributive circle and for whom support
is budgeted, such as married children living in close spatial proximity. The ex-
pression also encompasses children, nieces and nephews who are living at their
aunty’s, uncle’s or grandparent’s in other areas of town or in the village, and
who may only come from time to time to get a warm meal or spend a period
within the household.
The volatility of household relations in town is also caused by the high fre-
quency of in- and out-migration. It is common for families to have a number
of visitors who may stay for a few weeks or months until they have found their
own place or return back home. The number is seasonally dependent, shifting
with employment opportunities and food security. While during the dry season,
when building activity and tobacco processing offer many working possibilities
to generate cash income, households fill with kin from the village, the chronic
food insecurity and lack of land also makes town an increasingly important tar-
get to migrate to during the hunger period.
The shifting size of households is, however, only one aspect that contradicts
the modernist nuclear family model. Especially in ‘modern’ social policy think-
ing and planning, the notion of the core family perceived as a closed and steady
support unit in which every individual derives equal benefits according to their
needs is strongly present (see for a critique Fraser 1989; Culpitt 1999; Finch
1989).1 This usually also implies a highly gendered notion of decision-making
1 The discussion of the household as a modernist patriarchal model is an old one, vividly discussed
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power, division of labour and distribution of resources closely related to the nu-
clear family model (Moore & Vaughan 1994; Ferguson 1999).
Household relations in Sector 7 reveal that this is not necessarily the case. For
many, the household in town does indeed provide the central and most inclusive
site of support, where the most basic needs, such as food, shelter, clothes and
other daily necessities, are satisfied. Support relations are much more complex
and ambivalent, however, as the following support diagrams of amarried couple
reveal.2 Especially men and women have a highly different view of their house-
hold relations and support entitlements and obligations, which in turn reflects
their different positions of power as well as their bargaining space as regards
access to or denial of support.
In Mr. Jameson’s diagram (Fig. 5.1), the household as a site of support is
hardly present. Whereas he is an important provider for many people in town
and over distance, the only person within his household mentioned as a ben-
eficiary of support is the daughter of his younger father, who he takes care of
together with his wife. The same holds for his role as a beneficiary of support,
where he only mentions external household relations. The help he receives from
his wife and children and the support he gives to them, he perceives as an ex-
change apart, as integral to the household economy and marriage, which has
little to do with other support relations and thus, is not worth mentioning. “To
support somebody means that you have already supported the core family.”3(Interview
especially in the feminist literature. A powerful gendered insight into this subject in relation to
notions of social security, needs and insecurity is given by Fraser (1989; see also Culpitt 1999,
Finch 1989). For the discussion of this subject in developing countries, see for example Moore
(1994; Lund & Srinivas 2000; Nabeer 1994; Moore & Vaughan 1994).
2 These diagrams, which were produced by the people in Sector 7, formed an important tool during
the fieldwork in order to get an idea of support relations and served as a basis to discuss them.
People were provided with five different sizes of circles (extra-small, small, middle, large, extra-
large) from which they should choose in order of the significance of support which they provided,
or which was provided to them by different actors, institutions and organisations. The size did not
only indicate quantity, but more often was related to the quality or specific type of support that
was received or given. Emotional support, for example, was usually perceived as very large and
as difficult to get in town. At the same time, also the distance in which the circles were arranged
around the network owners was of importance, indicating accessibility of the support provided.
This did not imply physical distance alone, which influenced access to support relations, such as
the distance to the village, but was also an indication of the quality of the support relation con-
cerned. Distance also represented a critique at the same time, such as arbitrariness in support or a
slow reaction to requests for support, or the weakness of a relation in terms of support in general,
such as with workmates, who were usually arranged at the outer reaches of the support circles.
3 In Chichewa, “to support” or “to help” is usually referred to as “kuthandiza” or “kusamalira”; “to
care for”. The specific connotations and characteristics of the support relationship or the support
provided is usually explained out of the context in which the word is used. However, Englund
(2001) refers in this context to different connotations of supporting as the sharing of one’s wealth:
while among social equals this is referred to as “kugawira”, the sharing of wealth with people of an
inferior social status is referred to as “kugawa”. “Kusumalira” and “kuthandiza” seem to emphasise
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No. 107, Mr. Jameson)
Looking at Mrs. Jameson’s network (Fig. 5.2), we can see that for her, this
is completely different. The household seems to be central to her network re-
lations, both as providers and recipients of support. For her, her husband is
the most important source of support, providing a highly inclusive set of sup-
port covering the most important basic needs, such as money for food, shelter,
clothes and other daily necessities. In addition, he is also considered an impor-
tant support in terms of decision-making related to business activities or family
matters, and an important source of emotional support and caring. The support
from her husband is perceived as a permanent source of support, to which she
feels entitled as his spouse and the mother of his children. Their reproductive
role and responsibility is also reflected in her perceptions of herself as a benefi-
ciary. The support she receives from her husband not only includes support for
herself, but also for her children and the other dependents in the household.
These completely different perceptions and assessments of household (sup-
port) relations are common to most household networks. Unless it concerns
dependents not considered part of the immediate family, such as the niece in
Mr. Jameson’s case, men rarely mention the household as a site of exchange
within individual social network relations. In female networks, the husband is,
however, always present, mostly as the central and most important source of
assistance. These different perceptions of marriage as a social security institu-
tion clearly reflect different relations of dependence and power. Although most
women are economically active, they mostly depend on their spouses for their
support and that of their children. At the same time, the central role that the
spouse takes up in most female support diagrams is also an indication of the dif-
ficulties that women face in gaining access to this support. Although husbands
are mentioned by most married women as an important source of support that
is permanently present and at hand and where a strong entitlement exists, insti-
tutional rights and entitlements are hardly fulfilled. Many women – both rich
and poor – complain about the insufficient support provided by their spouse.
Most complain that their husbands do not give them enough money and food
to be able to provide for themselves, their children and other dependents in the
household on a regular basis, which renders the provision of food and other ne-
cessities a daily struggle.
This lacking or insufficient support has also consequences for female sup-
port networks outside the household, especially for those over long distances.
Women expect their husbands to assist them in maintaining their trans-local re-
lations. In Mrs. Jameson’s case, her husband takes care of her parents in the vil-
lage, providing them with regular support; but this is the exception rather than
the motive rather than the activity (Anders 2005: 155) (see also Chapter 7).
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Figure 5.1: Mr. Jameson’s Support Diagram
the rule. Many women complain that their spouses do not assist them in sup-
porting their own families in the village and that their spouses use part of their
income urgently needed for the maintenance of their family in town to support
their own networks and kin in the village.
